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AFGHANS' REPATRIATION NOT TO BE BARRED

Kabul ANIS in Dari 29 May 79 p 8

[Text] The information received says that Aurangzeb Kansí, the President of the National Federation of Pathan Students, during a press conference in Peshawar, has welcomed the announcement of amnesty by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and demanded that the government of Pakistan not restrain the repatriation of those Afghans who came to Pakistan, and allow them to live in peace and tranquillity in their homeland.

In like manner, Abdulkarim, one of the leaders of the Avami National Party of Pakistan, at a press conference in Quetta, also made this demand and said that positive steps should be taken to expand and preserve the fraternal and friendly relations with Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

According to other news, Sher Mohammad Meri, one of the Baluch celebrities, has expressed his support of the revolution of Afghanistan and denounced the efforts of the reactionary forces in Pakistan to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. In an interview with the newspaper "Muslim" he said that Afghans who sought refuge on Pakistani soil should return to their homeland.

He demanded that the government of Pakistan change its present foreign policy, taking into consideration its national interests and the situation in the region. He reminded that Pakistan should maintain good relations with the Soviet Union.

According to yet another news, Marshal Asghar Khan, the leader of the "Tahrik-i Istiqlal-i Pakistan" Party, has again warned the government of Pakistan that some foreign powers want to use Pakistan as a military base against Afghanistan.

Answering a question, he said that these powers want Pakistan to absorb the blows and as a consequence to secure their interests. He further said that it is in the interest of Pakistan not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and not to be used by others.

He also said that the present government of Pakistan will find it difficult to resist the pressure which will be exerted, for the government of Pakistan is lacking the power that the people-supported governments enjoy. If Pakistan continues to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, it will stand all by itself in a bad situation, and no country, including those that involve Pakistan in this situation, will be there to fight for this country.

In the end, he said that the army of Pakistan is not a mercenary army to fight for the interests of other powers.

1015

CSOP 4906

EGYPTIAN FREEDOM DEFENSE COMMITTEE REPORTEDLY FORMED ABROAD

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 8 Jul 79 p 1 LD

[Excerpt] Some 50 Egyptian nationalist figures both at home and abroad are in the process of forming a committee for the defense of freedom in Egypt.

Sources of the Egyptian opposition abroad said that among those included in the committee are university professors, lawyers, writers and artists belonging to various Egyptian nationalist political trends. Foremost of these are: national bloc leader Deputy Muntaz Nassar, lawyers Mustafa Munib and Nabil al-Hilali, Dr 'Abd al-'Azim al-Mughrabi, Dr Ni'mat Fu'ad, Dr Yahya al-Jamal, 'Aziz al-Bazari, Ahmad al-Khawajah, Jad al-Azhari, Muhammad 'Asfur and Ibrahim Yunis.

The committee abroad also consists of Dr Ibrahim Sa'dallah, Dr 'Abd al-'Azim Anis, Dr Fu'ad Zakariya, 'Ali al-Ra'i, Fahmi Huwaydi, Dr Kamal Abu al-Majd, Dr Mahmud 'Abd al-Fadil, Raja' al-Naqqash, Ahmad Baha' al-Din, 'Abbas 'Ammar, Mustafa al-Husayn, Samir Karam and the artists Karam Mutawi', Nabil Ali and Tawfiq Salih.

The committee also includes a group of writers and journalists residing abroad, most important among these are poet Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi, Dr Samir Amin, Alfred Faraj, Adib Dimitri, and Fathi 'Abd al-Fattah.

It is worth noting that the authorities of Egypt's defeated [president] are preparing a list of journalists, writers and artists staying abroad in order to recall them to Egypt and try them.

CSO: 4802

MUHI AL-DIN'S DEFEAT IN RECENT ELECTION DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 22 Jun 79 pp 17-18

[Article by "JIM": "Khalid Muhi al-Din Goes Down to Defeat and the Phase of the Authorized Left Ends"]

[Text] When the republican decree was issued on the right of the president of the republic "to appoint" 10 deputies in the Egyptian People's Assembly, a witty Egyptian journalist commented that it would have been more fitting for a decree to be issued permitting the Egyptian people "to elect" 10 candidates. This was because the whole Parliament was appointed since every opposition candidate went down or was brought down to defeat, while President al-Sadat's party won. The newspaper AL-AKHBAR and Fikri Mukarram 'Ubayd, secretary general of the (ruling) National Democratic Party [NDP] vied in trying to explain this sweep by the government's party and the defeat of the opposition. Fikri Mukarram 'Ubayd said that the elections were a second referendum on the treaty and so the "ratio of the opposition in the People's Assembly equaled the ratio of those who said 'No' to the peace treaty. This notwithstanding the fact that the entire objective of the ruling party, the government and the legislation that was passed on the eve of the elections was to prevent turning the elections into a second referendum on the treaty, as it would be dangerous to have any election campaigning in opposition to the issues covered by the "referendum," that is, the peace treaty. Nonetheless, it was clear in everyone's mind that the vote this time had been on the new stage that Egypt had begun in the shadow of the peace treaty, and the regime, which had risked everything on the treaty, would not accept having the results of the elections express any rejection of this treaty.

With regard to the newspaper AL-AKHBAR, it bragged about the commentary of the international press to the effect that the election sweep by the NDP arose from the fact that it was President al-Sadat's party, the paper having missed the point of the joke in the international press.

Fixing elections is an old tradition in Egypt, starting with the dissolution of the first Egyptian Parliament, the Parliament of the 1919 revolution, the first and last Parliament with freely elected members (1924) until the prime minister who had held the elections went down to defeat personally and all the candidates of the leader of the revolution against the British won. When the administration was Egyptianized and the "nationalists," or more correctly, "the constitutionalists" took over running the elections, the fix was on in two ways, as described by Taufiq al-Hakim in his book "A Diary of a Deputy in the Countryside." The fix was handled either by open interference, attacks on the voters and fighting or by letting the voters cast their votes freely and then destroying the "people's" boxes and replacing them with "the government's" boxes to the liking and at the instructions of the minister of interior. When democracy lost its meaning under the shadow of the July revolution, the revolutionary establishment began to have the right to legislate what it wanted: it defined who could nominate himself and who could not be nominated, it had the right to close districts to specific persons and no one would be allowed to be a candidate against it and, finally, the right to abrogate the results of entire elections and in fact to dissolve the People's Assembly. The voters chose the safe course, as they used to go to vote under threats of law and fines for stay-at-homes, and would elect the establishment candidate because the elections were open, because they were afraid and, finally, because the Egyptian people have no taste for heroic battles that they have no chance of winning. Khalid Muhi al-Din and Kamal al-Din Husayn cannot cry on each others shoulders about freedom of elections; districts were locked up for them, they won places in revolutionary parliaments without elections, they supported dissolution of parties and suspension of the constitution, they agreed to have editors named by republican decree and they participated in preparing lists of persons barred from political action. Though their sole excuse is that the regime during the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir was nationalist and therefore did not need democracy, people still have to be convinced that nationalism and democracy are not part and parcel of the same thing.

In the recent elections, it would appear that all three methods were employed. First, the quiet fix; this is clear from the approach of the commissioner of Qina headquarters who actually exaggerated so far as to have Fikri Mukaram 'Ubayd win with 100 percent of the votes. There was also coercion in some districts, with Banha district possibly being the best example of the Revolutionary Council and a power center for more than 10 years. He had been able to work up strong backing in his constituency. In addition, the Moslem Brotherhood had rallied around him, and he had won the sympathy of the people when he was discharged from the earlier People's Assembly and when legislation was passed barring him from nominating himself or claiming a seat. Kamal al-Din Husayn and his father made an end run around the election committees by mobilizing armed supporters, insisting that the votes be counted sheet by sheet. Those were difficult moments for the committee chairman, who had been picked from the judiciary.

A judge who did not want any trouble would be prepared to certify the results of fixed elections if he got them "cooked up and preprepared," basing this on the legal principle that "a judge does not judge on his own knowledge but on the facts presented to him"; however, it would be very difficult for a judge himself to supervise or assist in the fixing. Accordingly, there was a turnover of three judges on the Benha committee which could rightfully be described as a district that had set a world record for the time taken to count votes. The count began on a Thursday morning. At midnight Friday, Judge Sayyid Jad asked to be relieved; the official communique said that he had suffered a heart attack. Then Judge 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Shami was assigned to replace him, but in a half a day he in turn asked to be excused "on the excuse that he was worn to a frazzle," according to reports of the franchised press. Finally, Judge Muhammad Rafit came on board, and he announced the results on Monday evening (Thursday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday and then Monday). The recount ended with a difference of 49 votes in favor of the government's candidate after Kamal al-Din Husayn had presented three challenges and more than 100 telegrams of protest. Kamal is notorious for his telegrams; one of them was the cause of his discharge from the People's Assembly. The recount always helped the government's candidate, whoever he was.

Now for Khalid Muhi al-Din. He is from the feudal Muhi al-Din family that is descended from Turkish stock, as shows up clearly in his features and eyes. His uncle is Zakariya Muhi al-Din, and Kafr Shukr is the center of the Muhi al-Din family, which owns land and peasants. While nothing is so far known about Zakariya's attitudes except for reports that he is a Western oriented right winger, although he took care of making an example of the Brotherhood and the rightwing parties just as he did the communists, but even more so, Khalid Muhi al-Din joined the communist organization known as NAHSHAM or "Toward an Egyptian Communist Party," after he was recruited by Ahmad Fu'ad, director of Bank Misr. This organization was the outgrowth of the "ASKRA" movement that used to be headed by the Jew, Elie Schwartz, the brother-in-law of Moshe Dayan. Ahmad Fu'ad was in charge of the "organization of the army" in the communist movement and was a close friend of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. By being in a communist organization, Khalid Muhi al-Din was able to solve the problem the free officers were having in printing and distributing pamphlets and in drafting policy statements, and he had a special place in the structure of the officers of the likes of 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir, al-Baghdadi, Kamal Husayn, Salah Salim, Jamal Salim, etc., who were characterized by utter ignorance of culture and international thought, and, in contrast to Khalid Muhi al-Din, by extreme good nature and guilelessness in the game of power and in easy submission to the leftwing intellectuals.

Following the revolution, Khalid Muhi al-Din became the commander of the cavalry. Because of his ties with the communist movement, whose name had become HEDTU, that is, the Democratic Movement for National Liberation, and ultimately, the Communist Party, he sided with Muhammad Najib and the Wafd in the 1954 power struggle. There were many factors that led to the failure

of the Muhammad Najib group, but one of them was Khalid Muhi al-Din's hesitancy and weakness in the face of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, who was aware of these traits in him. 'Abd-al-Nasir nominated him as head of a ministry to liquidate the revolution at a time when 'Abd-al-Nasir's tide was being contained by the "cavalry" and he was preparing to strike at the insurgent forces with aircraft. Khalid Muhi al-Din caved in and refused to move against the 'Abd-al-Nasir group; in fact, he accepted an offer of a trip abroad with all expense paid and abandoned the officers who had revolted under his leadership to face death and prison sentences and the terrors of the revolutionary courts and courts-martial. So things were cleared up once and for all in the army. 'Abd-al-Nasir never forgot him for this stance and picked him to oversee "leftist affairs." When the flirtation with the Soviet Union began, 'Abd-al-Nasir picked him to represent Egypt in the "peace movement" that was the international cover for Soviet activity in the 50s. He also chose Yusuf al-Siba'i for the non-aligned and Afro-Asian solidarity movements. Khalid Muhi al-Din was unable to build any popular appeal as a representative to the peace movement. The last thing the Egyptian people were thinking of or looking forward to in the 50s and 60s was peace, having agreed to sacrifice its freedoms and well-being under the slogan, "There is no higher voice than battle." The only justification for the extraordinary revolutionary regime was preparation for "the war" which the masses wanted. Even those who followed international politics and were aware of the dangers of nuclear war followed the strategy that the opportunity of the Arabs and Egypt lay in increasing the incompatibility between Washington and Moscow so that this incompatibility could be played up to benefit "the battle." So, the slogan "peace" was not acceptable in Egypt, although Khalid Muhi al-Din had become the standard bearer behind whom rallied the communists who wanted to cooperate with and serve the regime, the "authorized left" as it was labeled. This attribute prevented Khalid Muhi al-Din from becoming popular, since this leftwing posture of his was known among Egyptian intellectuals as subordination to the machinery and support for all the negative qualities of the regime, running the gamut from the curbing of freedoms to economic measures detrimental to the life of the people and the level of industry and services, and as opposition to the positive qualities of the regime, such as opposition to Arab unity and war with Israel, since this leftwing penchant advocated peace with Israel throughout the 50s and 60s and, in fact, the ones responsible for the communist movement in the 40s had supported the establishment of Israel. The regime employed him in shuttling between the right and the left. He was called upon to strike a blow at the right, as happened in 1964 when Khalid Muhi al-Din took over the AKHBAR AL-YAWM firm and punished the journalists who were subservient to the right only to be kicked out a little later with no grounds for protest because he who is brought in by the establishment's order can be removed by its order. Khalid Muhi al-Din was unable to run in Cairo where one would suppose there were leftwing power-bases, preferring to run in Kafr Shukr, the center of his family's influence. He won every time, and then President al-Sadat appointed him as head of a platform and then of the official party of the left, where he faced circumstances quite different from conditions of political work under the auspices of the paternal Nasir regime.

The new left polarized all the young people who attacked the "authorized left" and Khalid Muhi al-Din in all their publications and demonstrations; in fact, they tried to attack them in the 18-19 January incidents. Now the Soviet Union or the Soviet Communists had no issue; for 20 years they had been advocating peace with Israel and now they were opposing it. Why? The answer was not clear in the minds of the masses. The Progressive National Grouping Party was turned into a grouping for the Nasirists who imposed positions on Khalid Muhi al-Din that did not reflect even his history, such as defending the position of the Nasirists against the Muhammad Najib group, in which Khalid had been one of the pillars, and such as defending the National Union and the Socialist Union and the arrests and the party of the right, etc. Finally came the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the rebellion of the authorized left, and President al-Sadat decided to change the opposition, a unilateral constitutional right of the Egyptian president, that is, the right to name his opposition.

The Egyptian regime raised its umbrella and Khalid Muhi al-Din went down to defeat, he who had won in Kafr Shukr, the stronghold of his family and his influence. Even the Egyptian press announced that he had won, but the late arriving ballot boxes from the villages changed the results and he was defeated. Khalid Muhi al-Din held a press conference at his home where he announced that the future of democracy in Egypt was dark. Were he to have said "just as in its past and its present," he would have been more correct. He also pointed out that some persons armed with sticks had attacked the election committees. The same thing was announced by Kamal al-Din Husayn when he was defeated in the recount, since he distributed pamphlets to his voters announcing: "Your votes have been publicly stolen by force." He also cabled newspapers and news agencies that falsification of the will of the people was an unpardonable crime.

Regardless of what happened to the ballot boxes of Kafr Shukr and its villages, the Khalid Muhi al-Din phase, the phase of the authorized left and opposition by appointment was the phase of the new guard or of those, whether government or opposition, to whom power was confined by the divine right of 23 July. In fact, even more important than this, the official opposition must recognize that the page of the whole regime has been turned over and the slogan of ruling by shouting for battle has fallen since President al-Sadat signed the peace treaty, as anyone who wants to rule Egypt now must actually go to battle, not just shout for it.

8389

CSO: 4802

DELAY IN EGYPT'S OUSTER FROM NONALIGNED MOVEMENT DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 16 Jun 79 p 18

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "It Will Not Be the Arab's Rhodesia"]

[Text] Thanks to Egypt's efforts, the non-aligned movement was established, but nonetheless, a few days ago, Egypt was the focal point of debate within the ministerial conference in the coordinating office of the non-aligned movement comprising 65 countries, which held its meeting in Colombo.

Egypt was the focal point of the debate in the negative, not the positive, sense, and the non-aligned movement was active in an unprecedented manner to support the Egyptian position.

In the negative sense, there were two currents: one advocating the suspension of Egypt's membership in the non-aligned movement facing another current that felt it was best to proceed slowly for some time.

Since the spirit of non-alignment is based on the third [sic] formula, the ministerial conference finally decided to condemn the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and refer the issue of dropping Egypt from the non-aligned movement to the summit conference of non-aligned countries that will be held in Havana in September.

The compromise decision was reached at a time when the Egyptian information machinery was stressing that the conference was opposing the adoption of any steps against Egypt, and that it was not going along with the pressures by Syria, Iraq and Algeria, and at a time when Dr 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid, the very gracious and smooth Egyptian diplomat, his own convictions notwithstanding, was trying to explain that what Egypt had done was for the sake of Arab rights and the Palestine cause, a statement that persuaded on one because it was no convincing, not because no one was unwilling to be convinced.

What happened earlier when the Arab countries decided to boycott the Egyptian regime and then when the Islamic conference in Fes decided to suspend this regime's membership will be repeated from now on. The regime will respond to the results of the Colombo conference by making accusations and exposing some secret papers. We may hear President al-Sadat tell the non-aligners what he told the Arabs who boycotted him; in fact, we may hear him say that the non-aligners reached their decision under the pressure of fear of "Cuban intimidation," just as the Arabs reached their decision out of fear of "Ba'th intimidation." In any case, this is not very persuasive logic. We do not believe that a leader of the type of Marshal Tito is worried about being overrun by Cuban fighters. For a long time, he has pursued a balanced and independent policy and stood up to the Soviets, but in a way that made them respect him, not the way President al-Sadat did, losing their support as well as their appreciation and respect.

It has been clear ever since the joint communique which was released on the talks of Marshal Tito in Algiers with President Chadli Bendjedid condemned the Egyptian-Israeli treaty that the Colombo conference would follow the same course, a course similar to that pursued by Sudanese President Ja-far Numayri, who condemned the Egyptian-Israeli peace without condemning it and supported the Baghdad conference resolutions without intending to implement them.

While Marshal Tito was successful in restraining matters to the minimum achieved at the Colombo conference, it was not done for President al-Sadat personally or out of concern for his regime as much as to avoid the collapse of the non-aligned movement which he feels an historic duty to preserve as long as he is alive.

So, there is about a 3-month period between the Colombo conference that condemned the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the non-aligned summit conference which will in reality be a tiring time for Marshal Tito. This is because if no surprises emerge that will ensure the abandonment of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, he will find himself at the Havana summit regrettably forced to make a hard decision, that is, to approve suspension of Egypt's membership in the non-aligned movement. This comes about because if he does not approve, this would mean that he, along with the member countries, would face a rush by Israel into the neutral arena and renewal of a request which Ben Gurion was pushing in the late 50s for Israel to be included in the non-aligned bloc, a request that was rejected at the time because 'Abd-al-Nasir threatened to walk out of a conference being convened at that time.

So it would have been possible for the actions of the non-aligned bloc to be confined entirely to the position adopted at the Colombo conference, that is, condemnation of the treaty and of American policy, had the summit conference--the final authority on a question of a decision to expel or

to suspend membership--been planned for some place other than Havana. However, its being held in the Cuban capital, not to mention the fact that President al-Sadat has left no bridges standing with the Cubans, will make it difficult for forgiveness to hold sway over punishment.

There is one point that appears fundamental, that is, that President al-Sadat may on his part be of no help to those working for resolutions unmarked by harshness against him in the non-aligned bloc, because he had no role in establishing this bloc; that role fell to Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, and it has become clear that he finds it hard to swallow any accomplishment linked with his late predecessor. Accordingly, we find him in the course of expressing criticism encouraging any steps that could lead to blowing up the non-aligned bloc, encouragement that is pleasing to the United States, which would like to see this phenomenon disappear from the political scene. It may be that American policy exploits some of President al-Sadat's weak points to prompt him to counter the decision to condemn the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in a manner as to help destroy the non-aligned bloc, whose present identity the United States sees as conducive to its getting closer to the Soviet Union.

To repeat, President al-Sadat is unfortunately taking Egypt to a brink where the countries of a bloc that has always been a powerful bulwark protecting Egypt from many dangers and saving it in times of trouble, will be forced to actively engage in suspending Egypt's membership in this bloc.

It, however, is not the responsibility of these countries, precisely as the Arab boycott decision was not the responsibility of those who enforced the boycott. Nor will the African countries be responsible when they also find themselves forced to adopt inevitable decisions about Egypt's membership in the OAU.

The responsibility rests with the regime of President al-Sadat, which has isolated Egypt from its brothers and sisters and allies for the sake of a peace with Israel that was imposed by the United States by expressing intimidation and enticement. This peace will not last, whatever the degree of intimidation and allures.

It still holds that President al-Sadat is unknowingly or in full knowledge moving Egypt toward a situation in many ways similar to that of Rhodesia, which the countries of the world, country after country, have taken pains to keep their distance from or to wash their hands off. While the Rhodesian regime has lasted for a long time despite this isolation and ostracism, this will almost certainly not be the case with "the Arab Rhodesia," the features of which the regime of President al-Sadat is continuing to make public. Egypt cannot be "the 'Arabs' Rhodesia," despite all practices and challenges.

EGYPT

FORMER PRIME MINISTER ASSESSES ECONOMIC SITUATION

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 4 Jun 79 pp 19-22

[Interview with Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz, university professor and former prime minister, by Mahmud al-Maraghi: "Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hijazi Talks to ROSE AL-YUSUF on Open-Door Economy and Foreign Banks; I Demand Justice and Sufficiency in Accordance With Shari'a and Not in Accordance With Principle of 'Subsistence Level'; Our Problems Will Increase If We View Matters Superficially in Era of Peace; We Achieved Economic Independence and Must Preserve It; Economic Independence Our Biggest Accomplishment"]

[Text] Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hijazi, the university professor and a former prime minister, has his opinion.

I said to him: You were the first to formulate the open-door economic policy and to issue its laws, how do you view it now?

I also said to him: You were the first to initiate financial and economic reform in 1968 and in the 30 March 1970 declaration. You then resumed the task in the 1970's. How do you view the situation now and what is the main problem?

I said to him: There are numerous problems that require an opinion: Prices, wages, foreign debts, foreign banks, peace, our Arab relations and our relations with the world. What is your opinion?

Dr Hijazi spoke, focusing on the fact that self-reliance is indispensable, that the open-door policy has added a little and requires evaluation, that the Arabs have given, even though this giving has not and will not replace intrinsic efforts, that peace is coming but that Egypt's problems can intensify if we deal with matters superficially and if we are not alert to the domination of money, the infiltration of individuals or the attempt to control trade, the banks and the agencies in charge of the Egyptian economy.

Beginning of Dialogue

[Question] The dialogue started with a general question: Egypt is facing a number of economic problems, such as inflation, high prices, deficit in the general budget, deficit with the outside world [presumably deficit in the balance of payments] and increased loans. What is the most serious of these problems, or what is the mother problem and how is it to be dealt with?

[Answer] Dr Hijazi replied as if he were censuring me for this presentation. The mother problem is something different from all this, he said:

"There is no doubt that Egypt is facing a number of entangled economic problems which cannot be separated from one another because they may be the cause of the effect. In their totality, these problems interact to give the image of an exhausted economy moving from backwardness to progress and trying to get over the problems of the war economy to the aspirations of the peace economy--aspirations whose ultimate outcome is felt by the citizen. This is why I consider that the fundamental problem of the Egyptian economy is how to secure an honorable life for the Egyptian citizen, meaning the people's broad masses.

"This means securing for the citizen the sufficiency stipulated by the Islamic Shari'a and not the subsistence level under which the backward societies, and not a small number of the peoples of developing countries, live. Egypt's real problem is how to raise the level of the individual income to make it compatible with the costs of living and to secure the level of sufficiency.

"This essentially means growth in the actual production and, consequently, an increase in the national production at rates that realize the standard of income that will secure a proper standard of living for the Egyptian citizen.

"When we know that the poverty level for the individual in the United States is, according to scientific studies, 5,500 dollars [annually], then the question becomes what this level should be in a developing society like Egypt, taking into consideration the level of prices and of incomes in the country.

"Thus I believe that the main problem in Egypt is production and providing work opportunities, whereas the problems that you present--such as the flaw in the balances (the general budget, the foreign transactions, trade), inflation and others--are nothing but problems resulting from poor productivity and low efficiency in employing the elements, constituents and requirements of production.

"It is not right to run after subsidiary problems resulting from the flaw in the Egyptian society's economic structure on the one hand and from the imbalance in the levels of income of the citizens of the various sectors on the other hand. These are not transient problems, but are a natural

result of the historical development of the unbalanced, and perhaps indefinite, policies through the years of economic and social progress."

Problem: Instability

Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hijazi paused a little and then went on to say:

"If we are to face this problem, then we must follow a scientific method by starting with a diagnosis of the problem of lower production rates than those hoped for, of the low production efficiency in the local production elements and even in the domestic and external economic transactions. This diagnosis should seek to find out the actual current conditions in the public and private economic units, especially the conditions concerning the efficiency and productivity of labor, the efficiency of the materials and of the other elements of production, distribution, management, the economic efficiency of the capital employed and of the monies invested generally, whether they are in the form of immovable assets or in the form of assets in circulation.

"These are matters that have been frequently examined and some means to deal with them have been proposed. However, our main problem is the instability and discontinuity of the policies that are formulated and, consequently, lack of serious follow-up for the programs formulated.

"There is also the lack of decisions adopted to develop the programs in order to achieve the planned objectives, unless we believe that we do not know clearly what these objectives are--and I do not find this difficult or impossible to believe. We tried in 1974 to draw up an interim plan through which to deal with the flaw in the plan and programs implemented earlier so as to prepare the way for drawing up a precise plan and executive programs, beginning with the 1976-80 period. This is what we hope to achieve so as not to permit once more the adoption of individual decisions at the level of ministries or governorates swerving from the targeted economic and financial balance or taking us back to the vertigo of 'cleverness.'

"We must stress here that the economic policy followed in the Egyptian society must be clear. This society is established so far on a public sector that occupies a large part of the national economy. This sector is accompanied by a private and cooperative sector that participates with and reinforces the public sector. The degree of participation in achieving the desired economic progress varies.

"Have we been able so far to achieve clear vision regarding the momentum that will enable us to realize the production levels and the economic efficiency through which we hope to achieve an individual income level compatible with the essential costs of living (sufficiency level) of the Egyptian citizen? Who are the ones responsible for creating the momentum? What we mean is: Who are those who make the decisions and who are able to impose their will for a real change in society?

"Here, we must draw attention to the issue of planning, programs and priorities at the national and local levels. We must also warn against the dangers of decentralism and of deviation of the individual decisions at the local or regional level from the national framework. This is an issue that is connected with balances in society and with our ability to face the problems from which this society is suffering."

What Has Open-Door Policy Added

[Question] So, Dr Hijazi calls for a different course--a more disciplined course and one that is more strongly self-dependent and more stable. In the light of this, what is Dr Hijazi's evaluation of the existing open-door policy. What is his evaluation of a policy which he initiated as prime minister in 1974 and under whose canopy he is operating as bank president in 1979? I said this with a question in my mind asking: Is this open-door policy what you mean?

[Answer] The open-door economic policy which began to be bolstered after the October 1973 war sought fundamentally to strengthen the national production movement, to open new spheres for the Egyptian manpower, to make use of the available capabilities of this manpower and of its relative advantages in terms of wages, and even to make use of modern technology in the industrial and agricultural production sectors. All this required strengthening the local financing activity by increasing the savings and the foreign financing (both Arab and foreign monies in the form of either capital or loans).

Whoever examines the statistics published so far will find a number of facts:

The total investment spending actually realized through the open-door economy projects amounts to 1.16 billion pounds, of which 238 millions or 21 percent went for the tourism sector. This is followed by the housing and contracts sector in which 213 million pounds or 19 percent have been invested. The investments in the vast industry and oil sector have amounted to 304 millions or nearly 25 percent. This sector is followed by the investment firms with a total of 141 million pounds or 12 percent, the banks with 122 million pounds or 11 percent. Then come the agriculture, livestock, transportation and communications sectors and the health services, hospitals, and education and training projects.

Thus, the average annual addition in the period from 1974 to 1978 amounted to 232 million pounds. Of the total sum added, only 792 million pounds have been invested in the industrial and agricultural production sector. It can be said that the development has been slow and limited. If we take into consideration the fact that these production projects require time to employ manpower and to produce, then it can be said that this policy is still in its first stages and needs to be bolstered, especially in regard to defining the framework of the projects in which participation

is required. It is also required to facilitate the elements of implementing these projects. There is no doubt that technology and employment are very limited.

But if we view the financial aspect of the open-door policy, then there is no doubt that the demand in this sphere has been relatively large (banks and investment firms with a total investment of 263 million pounds in 5 years). However, evaluating the outcome of this activity can only be viewed from the angle of providing new production capacities. This has not proven true yet. There is no doubt that the experiment of the banks, for example, requires correction in terms of its participation in financing the production sector and of its inclination to grant credit facilities, to finance foreign trade and to speculate with the monies of the depositors. These are matters that require a serious look so that the course may be corrected and so that we may not blame the open-door policy when it is innocent. Considering that these are the initial results of the open-door policy, it cannot be said that this policy has led to inflation or to raising the prices, despite the emergence of certain phenomena in society--such as raising the wages of certain groups and an open-door consumption--which were not among the goals of the policy formulated at the outset. The focus in that policy was on production and its requirements, on whatever could strengthen production and on confining [consumption spending] to the essential commodities.

Peace Fears

[Question] So, the open-door policy needs to be examined. But what about the new development that has taken place with the signing of the peace treaty with Israel?

Will it create a fundamental change in the Egyptian economy?

[Answer] The peace treaty imposes a number of fundamental changes on the Egyptian society, led by liberation of the Egyptian will and its proceeding toward a society of progress, of economic and social development and of work to meet the citizen's needs.

If we know what we want (plan, programs and goals), if we know the priorities (distribution of programs sectorally and geographically), if we know the weak points in society's management, especially in the production and governmental sectors, and if we have the real will for change, the trust in God and in ourselves and the ability to give, then there is nothing to be feared of the society of peace and what it brings with it. But if we waver and view the issues emanating from peace superficially, the problems of the national economy, I can even say of the Egyptian society, will increase. There is no doubt that the degree of the change will depend primarily on our intrinsic capability and our alertness to the problems coming with peace, whether in terms of the inflow of monies, the infiltration of individuals or the control of trade and banks or other agencies in charge of the Egyptian economy.

[Question] There is another aspect. With the signing of the treaty, the Arabs have stopped their economic transactions and offers, the most important of which are the loans. Which of the two following policies do you think is the sound one: Deal with the imbalance by reducing our need for loans and for relying on others or look for another lender, thus putting, perhaps, all the eggs in one basket?

[Answer] (Dr Hijazi put his answer in a quick attempt at evaluation, saying):

The Arabs are Egypt's brothers and they are bound to each other by numerous historical elements which cannot be discussed now. Some clouds may appear in the atmosphere of the Egyptian-Arab relations, but they will disappear, God willing. We cannot stand idle in the face of the negative movements that will neither liberate the land nor achieve progress for the Arab citizen. With utter appreciation for the participation of some friendly Arab governments in supporting the Egyptian movement toward liberation in the October battle and for their participation in the open-door economic policy, the significance of the resolutions taken in the Baghdad conference does not lie in the effect of these resolutions on the economic development movement in Egypt but in shaking the confidence in the capability of the Arabs to deal with the problems of an advanced society built on stability. This is why we will not undermine the importance of the military aid to Khartoum, which has dropped to no more than 70 million pounds, the importance of the Egyptian-Arab trade transactions that are within the range of 100 million pounds or the importance of the Arab deposits and investments that may total 1 billion pounds over a long period.

But we can emphasize through our experience in state management that Egypt is capable of facing the economic challenges, especially since the world is now aware that these are political decisions and not decisions connected with the economic structure. With its land, its Nile, its resources, its manpower capabilities (the sublime society), with the experience of it its citizens and with the industrial, agricultural and oil base present currently, in addition to the educational, cultural and training base that supplies Egypt and the entire Arab nation, Egypt is capable of facing the economic challenges that may be imposed by some Arab countries. Egypt has not lost its friends in the advanced world and it expects the Arabs to return to the march of liberation and progress that is led by Egypt. Once again, our destiny depends on the intrinsic ability of the Egyptian people and on their ability to give at the highest capacity and with a production efficiency that eliminates unemployment, aimlessness and waste in all its forms. This is the correction revolution that we want and that seeks to mobilize the national forces to serve Egypt.

Prices, Whose Responsibility?

[Question] We had to get into some details: Prices, Taxes, the pound and our deals with the international organizations. I said to Dr Hijazi: Let us begin with a question that preoccupies the mind of many people. Some

people blame the international economy for the rising prices, for the deficit in the transactions with the outside world and for many other problems. Others say that these problems are our responsibility and are the result of the policies that we follow. What is your opinion?

[Answer] If we get into the problem of prices, of the deficit in the balance of payments and of the degree to which they are affected by external factors and the degree to which they reflect internal conditions, these are intricate matters. In a society where production and efficiency rates are low, these are fundamental factors that affect prices. If the inability of the national economy to meet the domestic requirements--meaning the imbalance between supply and the demand for commodities and services, especially the essential ones--is added to these factors, then there will inevitably be reliance on the outside world (imports and remittances). The problem gets more complicated when the national economy is geared toward bolstering the exports that generate foreign currencies which we most urgently need to meet the increasing exports on the one hand and to finance the intermediate commodities and investments on the other hand. Thus, the external factors get to have a direct impact on raising the prices and on the appearance of inflation. This is reflected in the various balances (the general budget, the trade balance, the balance of payments, etc.) There is no doubt that the importance of these factors and their distribution into internal and external factors will depend on the degree of the participation of each of them in the equations of society's economic balance. This emerged clearly in the years following the international community's dispensation with the gold base, then with the increase in the oil prices, with the awakening of the Third World countries to the importance of developing the prices of their products, especially their raw and semi-processed materials, with the emergence of the problems of searching for a new international economic system, with the north-south dialogue, etc. All these are events with which we are living and it is not known when the desired economic stability will be realized for the world.

Economic Independence Is Our Biggest Accomplishment

[Question] Some people say that the recommendations drawn up by the IMF for Egypt and adopted by the authorities concerned are not the best means for Egypt, and that these recommendations increase Egypt's problems instead of serving Egypt. What is your opinion? Do you find our relationship with the IMF to be threatening to Egypt's economic independence?

[Answer] If it is necessary for us to deal with the international financial organizations, my opinion has always been and continues to be that consultation is necessary. But we alone are the side capable of evaluating the conditions and adopting the decision that serves the domestic and national interests. Accordingly, it is not right that the IMF recommendations be used as a guideline. They should be taken as an opinion which we accept if it serves the goals that we seek to realize, taking into consideration the conditions of the society in which we live. It is not right to agree

to implement blindly what the consultative parties may propose, regardless of the position of these consultative bodies. There is no doubt that the expertise available to Egypt and the top-level Egyptian economic leaderships are capable of analyzing the conditions and making the right decisions in this regard. No opportunity should be given to the intervention of any side in Egypt's economic independence, the biggest accomplishment made by the 23 July 1952 revolution.

[Question] Since you assumed the premiership and until the present, there have been successive tax reforms. Do you think that the taxes now truly reflect income in Egypt and have they helped to achieve social justice?

[Answer] Tax legislations, as an instrument for achieving balance in incomes on the one hand and achieving social solidarity on the other, cannot stop at a certain limit. This is why I do not believe that the legislations promulgated so far have revealed the real incomes of all groups of the tax society. The most important obstacles in the face of such revelation are:

The inadequate means to keep count of and to follow up the taxable society, the inadequate means to gather data and information that serves the process of measuring taxable income, the Tax Agency's inadequate manpower and material resources, and even the inadequate incentives given to the agency workers and failure to create the proper atmosphere for these workers and for the taxpayers in order to strengthen the mutual trust between them--a trust created years ago and requiring constant re-examination.

Moreover, the tax rates require review constantly so that their purpose may be to encourage the taxpayers to reveal their real incomes and to participate in the economic and social development projects by making such participation tax-deductible from the taxpayers' net profits. What is of concern to us these days is to channel more savings toward productive investment or toward participation in the service and social projects. We wish that the alms tax law would be promulgated and applied to the various [monetary] vessels, and we wish that the opportunity would be given to use the yield of this tax in the various provinces concerned. This is compatible with the inclination toward provincial and local decentralism which President al-Sadat advocates.

[Question] The incentive currency exchange rate was applied fully as of last January, i.e. the currency was devalued in a semi-official manner. Do you think that there are enough justifications for this action, or do you think that the official price could have been continued, considering that the official price meant lower prices domestically?

[Answer] Application of the incentive price is considered part of a complete policy. It is a natural thing compatible with the philosophy followed by the state since 1975. Therefore, this step can be judged only within the framework of this policy--a policy that would be considered

incomplete if it failed to assume its full dimensions. Therefore, it is impossible in this regard to return to the use of the official exchange rates that were prevalent in the past. The multiple exchange rates must be eliminated if this new policy continues and if we consider that we have reached the policy of free exchange rates and not the policy of regulated exchange rates. It behooves us in this stage to continue to evaluate the results and to adopt decisions that encourage savings in foreign currencies, especially in this stage in which the Egyptian economy faces outside influences--particularly from Arab monies.

Words Are Clear

The words thus ended. They are clear words. Self-reliance is inevitable and a new policy more compatible with this goal is also inevitable--a policy that does not close the door in the face of cooperation with the outside world, because there is no place in the modern world for those who isolate themselves. But it is a policy that knows at the same time the internal limits and the external limits, that safeguards independence and continuity and that emphasizes the opinions expressed by the economists in their latest conference and in the inflation conference before it. The difference here is that the testimony comes from the man who initiated the open-door policy, and the call comes from a man who started economic reform in the number of years during which he held the position of minister, deputy prime minister and prime minister. He has always favored his quality as an academician because from an academician, the opinion is always for the sake of God and of the homeland.

8494

CSO: 4802

EGYPT

WOMEN DISCUSS THEIR NEW ROLE IN PARLIAMENT

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 4 Jun 79 pp 60-61

[Article by Mirfat Fahmi: "Women's March to People's Assembly; If Experiment Fails, It Will Set Women Back 100 Years Back"]

[Text] The decree issued by President al-Sadat allotting 30 seats in the People's Assembly for women has had a great impact on society in its entirety, especially on women who consider this decree a present to them and a sound translation of the position that President al-Sadat wants for the Egyptian woman. This decree has encouraged many women to run for the People's Assembly seats.

There is no doubt that each of these candidates has hopes and ideas that she wants to realize.

What are their ideas and what are the programs for which they are waging the elections campaign?

Dr Farkhandah Hasan, a professor at the American University and a candidate for al-Duqqi District, says:

I am committed to the National Party's programs. However, there is a wrong impression among some people that women will enter the People's Assembly to defend women's issues only. This is not true. There is no separation between woman and man. The problem is the problem of the family that consists of husband, wife and children. Therefore, this family's issues are what should be defended.

Dr Farkhandah says that we will not be able to build the modern state advocated by President al-Sadat without women. This is why the state must give women the chance to play their part. Men in Egypt have a bigger opportunity to excel over women. Men go to their work at regular hours and throw all the burden on the wives' backs, whereas women are busy with housework, children and family duties that they have to carry out. If we can provide women with the resources that make their task easier, then there is no doubt that they will carry out their duty in the best manner.

In the advanced countries, foreign women are not better than Egyptian women, but they have their enormous resources that enable them to perform in a superior manner.

I asked: What are women's problems in your view?

We should rise above the small problems and turn to the general problems. Women suffer from the problems of housing, transportation and the lack of work opportunities. Some circles still prefer men to women. Equal work opportunities must be made available to women.

I said: Has the availability of 30 seats for women increased the competition among the candidates?

The availability of 30 seats for women is a positive step toward women's realistic participation. One of the positive aspects of this decree is that has led to solidarity rather than competition. This solidarity has been evident among the women of al-Jizah Governorate who thought of running in the elections, such as Zahrah Rajab and Rawiyah 'Atiyah. When the party selected me, they all withdrew. They have shown their commitment and awareness in giving me their support. They have also taken part, in cooperation with the members of the Women's Organization, in educating women as to the importance of their participation in these elections.

I said: How do you view this experiment?

She said: This experiment is a test for the Egyptian woman and, therefore, I hope that it will succeed. If it fails, it will set the Egyptian women back 100 years.

If we move to another district, namely Shubra, we find Zaynab al-Sabaki who has been nominated by the National Party. She engaged in social and political action before being nominated to the elections, and she was awarded the Medallion of the Republic in 1973 in appreciation for the services she had rendered in the October war. This is in addition to the Order of Merit for Social Service that she was awarded.

I asked Dr Zaynab al-Sabaki about the impact of the decree issued by President al-Sadat allotting 30 seats in the People's Assembly for women. She said:

One of the positive aspects of this decree is that the number of women voters will increase and that women will register their names in the election lists. The Egyptian woman gained rights that are perhaps more than those of women abroad. But what we lacked was parliamentary representation. President al-Sadat has made this dream of ours come true, considering that women were represented in the Assembly by four members only.

I said: Will your interest concentrate on dealing with women's problems only?

I will try to serve the men and women of my district equally. But at the same time, I will not abandon the problems from which women suffer, because I feel what they experience. This is why I have prepared a plan for setting up a model kindergarten in the quarter, as well as a cooperative that offers urgent home services needed usually by the working woman, such as canned vegetables and fruits. This is in addition to a laundromat similar to those found in the advanced countries. It is time for us to follow the scientific course and to plan on a technological basis.

If we move away from Cairo, we find Kariman Jum'ah, our colleague in ROSE AL-YUSUF, waging the elections campaign in al-Minya as a candidate of the Labor Party [hizb al-'amal] for the women's seat. She returned to her town, al-Minya, to run in the elections not, she says, for personal gain but out of love for the homeland and the people and out of loyalty to Egypt.

Mrs Kariman says that she is committed first to the Labor Party principles, in addition to her fundamental commitment to serve the inhabitants of al-Minya and to solve their private and public problems.

We again return to Cairo and to Hulwan District, which is considered one of the biggest election districts. The number of candidates in this district amounts to 30, including 4 women.

One of these women candidates is Mrs Ra'fat 'Abd-al-Hadi. She says:

It is difficult to separate women's issues from men's issues. The Hulwan area in particular requires special efforts because this area currently lacks all services. Moreover, the workers in this area need care in all spheres, and only someone who lives with them and experiences their troubles can secure such care for them.

Along with these three women stands Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi, the candidate for al-Ma'adi and Hulwan area. She is an inhabitant of this district and the secretary of the National Party's Women's Organization.

I asked Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi about the program that she has prepared. She said:

My program is the National Party's program. I work to serve society, and this is why I put the demands of the quarter and of individuals within a general framework, namely development, raising the standard of living and eliminating the suffering of the citizens. We have gone beyond the limits of complaint. Each of the workers of this area knows this problem. They do not need anybody to tell them what their problems are and who of them is suffering. They need someone to eliminate their hardships by finding the solution for them. I have entered this election campaign because I believe that through sound and scientific study and planning, I can defend the rights of the workers and convey their demands to the

authorities that can solve their problems. It is not essential that I be a worker or that I stand behind a machine to know what the workers suffer from. The problems are known, but they need a solution.

Dr Su'ad Abu-al-Sa'ud, the Women's Organization secretary, says that President al-Sadat's decree to allot 30 seats for women is a benefit that raises the level of women's representation in the Assembly so that women may have a voice and opinion. This is why the organization will support the women candidates. These candidates must understand that all the countries surrounding us and the entire world is watching with interest the degree to which this experiment will succeed and the degree to which we will benefit from it. Therefore, the Egyptian woman must take this opportunity to confirm to her society once more, as she has always done, that she is worthy of the trust and worthy of this gain.

8494

CSO: 4802

NEW CUSTOMS REGULATIONS TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 26 Jun 79 p 2

[Text] Customs circles will be supplied with representatives who will solve the problems of investment projects procedures and arbitration committees will be strengthened as to cover all customs circles, an official source at the Investment Authority said yesterday.

This comes under agreements which have been recently reached between the Investment and Free-Duty Zones Authority and the Customs and Taxation Departments according to which a host of important facilities will be extended to investors.

"The agreements," the source said, "include releasing imported goods of the investment projects through getting a bank credit equivalent in worth to customs duties instead of depositing the value of these goods."

"These goods will be duty-free either through having them temporarily released or through paying due taxes whenever they were to be exported again," the source pointed out.

Investors

Under these agreements, investors will submit a list of all equipment they wish to import and pay a given sum of money as a downpayment provided they settle their accounts with the Customs Department as soon as these equipment are available, the source said.

This is intended to overcome the absence of a standard customs tariff on the same kind of goods and solve an often-repeated problem, the source said.

The Investment Authority and the Taxation Department have also agreed that the tax exemptions of products of the investment projects would be applicable from the date of the first production laid for marketing or from the date of opening the venture for the public.

They have also agreed that the taxation cards of the investment projects be issued simultaneously with the application of the tax exemptions to avoid any later deductions, the source pointed out.

The two agencies agreed that the houses-selling projects which are carried out in accordance with the Arab and Foreign Capital Investment Law be exempted from taxes.

CSO: 4820

INDUSTRY MINISTER REPORTS PRODUCTION GOALS REALIZED

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 28 Jun 79 p 3

[Text]

ACCORDING to the Minister of Industry Mr. Ibrahim Atalla, Egypt's industries fulfilled their 1978 production targets. Total output was valued at L.E. 2,490 million of which L.E. 2.8 million worth was in exports. The public sector share was L.E. 2,450 million, an increase of L.E. 394 million over production in 1977. The private sector produced L.E. 1,040 million worth of goods, an increase of L.E. 347 million over production of 1977.

TEXTILES	1977	1978	Tyres	483,000	483,000 tons
Cotton yarn/fibre yarn	210,000	212,000 tons	Oxygen	4,813,000	4,870,000 cubic metres
Bed covers	611,000	604,000 pieces	Acetylene	1,173,000	1,212,000 cubic metres
Underwear	3003	3000 doz.	Tractors	2,671	2,400 units
Ready made clothes	1,530,000	1,500,000 pieces	Motor Cars	12,818	12,833 units
Popular textiles	170 mill.	320 mill. metres.	Refrigerators	129,000	130,000 units
FOOD STUFFS			Washing Machines	114,000	104,000 units
Cream cheese	8306	8003 tons	Cables and Wires	21,001	24,531 tons
Cheddar cheese	1271	2195 tons	T.V. sets	146,000	160,000 units
Processed cheese	1771	8521 tons	Steel Sheets	33,771	41,771 tons
Tomato products	2673	4000 tons	Steel Pipes	41,000	47,000 tons
Mineral waters	82 mill.	91 mill. doz.	Electric bulbs	23,313,000	33,312,000
Sugar	602,000	630,000 tons	Air-conditioning units	8970	11,445 units
Edible oils	155,000	157,000 tons	Phosphate ore	603,000	600,000 tons
Synthetic fats	125,000	143,000 tons	Rock salt	119,000	100,000 tons
OTHER GOODS			Ground salt	170,000	213,000 tons
Cigarettes	251 mill.	373 mill.	Sanitary ware and porcelain	3,306	3,945 tons
Washing soap	161,000	167,000 tons	Porcelain tiles	3,330	3,776 tons
Toilet soap	21,000	26,000 tons			
Detergents	21,000	23,000 tons			
Fertilizers (15.5 % nit)	1,200,000	1,400,000 tons			
Super phosphate	500,000	513,000 tons			

EXPORTS

Exports increased by 27 per cent. They represented a total value of L.E. 318 million in 1978, as compared with L.E. 248 million in 1977. Public Sector exports in 1978 were valued at L.E. 270 million in 1978 as compared with L.E. 205 million in 1977. Private sector exports in 1978 were valued at L.E. 44 million as compared with L.E. 43 million in 1977.

Exports in free currency in 1978 by both public and private sectors reached approximately

L.E. 207 million with an increase of L.E. 68 million of free currency exports in 1977.

Mr. Attalla added that Egyptian industry has proved able to improve quality and reduce production costs — two factors that make prospects for increasing exports promising.

Wages paid by the Public sector in 1978 were L.E. 306 million, with a 19 per cent increase over wages paid in 1977.

Average wages of industrial workers in 1978 were L.E. 641 million as compared with L.E. 548 million in 1977. — G88

CSO: 4820

NEED TO STABILIZE FOOD PRICES STRESSED

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 26 Jun 79 p 2

[Text] Dr Mahmud Dawud, Minister of Agriculture, has proposed a study to store cereals and have them rationally distributed among bakeries by each governorate, which would be the sole, independent unit responsible for this.

Speaking in Cairo at the opening of a symposium on agricultural waste, which was held on Saturday Dr Dawud stressed the need for finding a means to stabilise prices of agricultural crops by cutting out waste.

Minister Dawud said the rise in prices of vegetables and fruit led to an ever-increasing rise in the cost of such products as canned fruit. He expressed his concern that these goods might not one day be available to lower-income groups.

He added that the price of meat has become too expensive for those on low incomes. One reason was a shortage of green fodder which in turn led to fewer fresh dairy products being available. Cheese prices had accordingly risen.

By the turn of this century, Egypt will be obliged to import some 8.8 million tons of wheat unless cereal production is increased and crops are well stored after harvesting, according to Dr Abdul Hakim Mohammed Kamel, secretary-general of the symposium.

"If we fail to increase our total agricultural output this might lead to a loss of exports in some agricultural products, coupled with soaring prices in the local market," Dr Kamel added.

Meanwhile, Minister Dawud received on Sunday a commemorative medal of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) marking the opening of the World Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Conference scheduled to take place in Rome on July 12.

It has been decided that Dr Dawud will lead the Egyptian delegation to the 8-day conference, which will discuss ways of launching a massive campaign against poverty and underdevelopment.

SURVEY OF TAXPAYERS TO BE CONDUCTED

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 26 Jun 79 p 3

[Text] The Taxation Department will make the first comprehensive survey of taxpayers in Egypt since 1952, Mr Ahmed Nafie, Undersecretary for Taxation Affairs at the Ministry of Finance, said yesterday.

The survey, continued Mr Nafie, would be carried out by more than 200 tax collectors and would deal with various kinds of taxation all over the country.

Increasing the source of income of the country in the aim of such a survey, which would uncover those who evade the taxes stated in law 46 for the year 1978, Mr Nafie added.

Meanwhile, the new budget of Egypt for the year 1980, has been worked out by the Ministry of Finance. It is the first budget to be planned in peace time, an official source at the Ministry of Finance said yesterday.

The source added that the new budget will relate wages to production in a bid to increase the productivity of workers and to secure employment opportunities for the university graduates.

The new budget includes measures for reducing the funds earmarked for the power and water supply of the various ministries, to diminish consumption the source added.

In addition, there would be no funds allotted to luxurious or expensive furniture required at public sector organisations, the sources pointed out.

The budget also includes a time-table for every project to be implemented, when to start it, means of financing it, and the expected outcome, the source affirmed.

Subsidies

The reduction of subsidies, an important element in the new budget is in order to guarantee that subsidised goods are available only to those deserving them.

According to the new budget, Egypt hopes to repay its obligations to foreign countries and international organizations on time, the sources pointed out.

CSO: 4820

EFFORTS MADE TO BOOST COTTON YIELDS

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 27 Jun 79 p 2

[Text] The heat wave which hit Egypt last week has helped increase the growth rate of cotton trees and cut down their infestation with cotton worms.

Speaking yesterday Dr Mahmud Dawud, Minister of Agriculture, said that combating cotton pests by chemical pesticides has begun in various governorates, with dusting planes used for the first time, especially in Dakahlia Governorate.

During an inspection tour in cotton farms in Kalubia and Dakahlia Governorates, Dr Dawud said that an area of 26,000 feddans have been already dusted, this year, as against 7,000 feddans dusted during the same period last year.

Stressing that the highest rate of infestation with cotton larvae this year amounted to 420 larvae infections per feddan, Dr Dawud said that a special committee will begin assessing the rate of infestation with cotton worms in July.

Dakahlia has increased its cotton growing area to 190,000 feddans due to growing interest of farmers in growing cotton after the recent improvement in its price.

Four new species of cotton are being cultivated in Dakahlia, including a species called Giza 75, which produces an average of 9.5 kantar per feddan.

Dr Dawud said that the Planning and Production Committee approved an increase in the fertilisers quotas assigned for areas cultivated with cotton, wheat and rice, to 350,000 tons.

A project for producing 15 million eggs per year, will be implemented on an area of 8 feddans in Taikha, Dakahlia. The project will cost about L.E. 800,000 of which 25 percent will be paid by the Agronomists Association.

The Ministry of Agriculture aims to develop an area of 24,000 feddans this year, as against 12,000 feddans in the last year.

During his tour, the Minister of Agriculture approved buying 100 machines for reaping rice grown in Dakahlia. He also ordered that 30 motorcycles be distributed to agricultural inspectors in Mit Chamr and Aga.

He also said that all the cattle in the Governorate have been vaccinated against various diseases.

At a meeting with agronomists, Dr Dawud said that incentives and remuneration given to farm workers to encourage them to exert more efforts in combating cotton pests, will be increased this year.

CSO: 4820

WATER SUPPLIES TO BE INCREASED

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 27 Jun 79 p 2

[Text] A further 200,000 cu metres of drinking water are to be made available each day. Mr Saad Malaman, Governor of Cairo, said yesterday.

It is the policy of the local authorities to develop public services, particularly in the poorer and more densely populated districts of the city where there is ever increasing demand for drinking water.

Under an agreement struck with the Water Supply Board, those areas hardest hit are to receive immediate attention.

There are already other projects underway to increase supplies of drinking water. When the Masturod water main is completed Hellopoles will get an additional 40,000 cu metres a day and Nasr City an additional 80,000 cu metres.

Helwan

There are also development projects at North Helwan water supply station which will produce 20,000 cubic metres a day and Maadi water station which will give an additional 10,000 cu metres.

Considerable improvements in the service of the water supply board will be felt in all districts of Greater Cairo.

More than 200 streets are to get improvements affecting every quarter.

In Helwan and Maadi more than 20 streets are to be improved. The water pressure in this area is very low as a result of the growing number of building projects there.

In south Cairo improvements are to be concentrated on the densely populated areas of Azba-ata, Muski, Ataba and Bulak.

In east Cairo, most of the areas of Ramsis, Abassia and Demeratash Hospital will be covered. This hospital, one of the largest government hospitals, is labouring under a shortage of water.

End to Complaints

South Cairo will no longer be able to complain of too little water. The whole of this densely populated area where there are a great number of small industries in continuous need of water, is to be affected.

Central Cairo, including the populations and commercial areas of Al Azhar and el Daher will receive a complete overhaul in its water supply.

North Cairo, which includes the most densely populated areas of Shoubra and Zaiton, there will be improvement works on the water supply in more than 100 streets.

On completion of this plan, by the end of this year it is hoped, there should be an end to complaints of shortfallings in the supply of drinking water.

CSO: 4820

EGYPT

BRIEFS

AID GRANT--The U.S. Agency for International Development yesterday agreed to provide the Egytian Organisation for Industrialization, which is to replace the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation, with a grant of \$16 million to finance the renovation and replacement of its factories. [Text] [Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 26 Jun 79 p 3]

UNIONS INVITED TO ISRAEL--Cario, 14 Jul--The OCTOBER MAGAZINE reports today that the Israeli Labor.. Federation Histadrut has invited some Egyptian trade union organizations to visit Israel to exchange information and discuss aspects of trade union cooperation between Egypt and Israel. The magazine says this was the first invitation received by the Egyptian Labor Federation. [Text] [Cairo MENA in Arabic 0822 GMT 15 Jul 79 NC]

CSO: 4802

NAZIH CALLS FOR STRONGER GOVERNMENT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Jun 79 p 3

[Text] FRANCE NEWS AGENCY--On Saturday Hasan Nazih, the director and executive director of the National Iranian Oil Company stated that in case the Iranian government decides to follow an austerity program it may decide to reduce its oil production.

In an interview with the FRENCH NEWS AGENCY the director of the National Iranian Oil Company explained that the Iranian government believes that from now on its income from oil can be reduced to 16-18 billion dollars annually compared to 22 billion dollars last year.

Nazih then referred to Iran's internal policy and admitted that the post-revolutionary condition is specified with some type of movement, a mixup of powers, and lack of centralization in the executive power. While admitting the necessity of having a "crash policy" in some sectors to put an end to some of the "emergency problems" Nazih indicated that he was sorry that the acting rulers did not follow a more moderate policy towards a group of Iranians (cadres, businessmen and merchants) who are under suspicion without any grounds. He added that the clergy should help wind up the revolutionary committees or facilitate including them in organized police units, because although their activities were positive in the past, today they paralyze the government. Nazih believes that the same procedure should be applied to the Islamic courts and that the Ministry of Justice should supervise them. He expressed hope for a coordination committee consisting of the clergy and the parties to be established to protect the revolution and the people from the danger of going into pieces. He added that if the government is not strengthened from viewpoint of its power, all sorts of dangers will threaten Iran.

Nazih also indicated: In some cases Imam Khomeyni becomes suspicious whereas all classes of society in Iran, especially the legal experts, respect him and protect the Islamic revolution.

Nazih added: Khomeyni is by nature a kind person and therefore it is expected that by announcing amnesty to everyone or according to Ayatollah Shari'-atmadari by relinquishment of prosecutions he could place the nation in a direction that would make more effort for Iran's Islamic revolution by having peace of mind and the merchants and owners of industries would return to work without fear by considering an economic system suitable to Iran's Islamic revolution and so the country's economy would improve. At the end Nazih said: "One of the factors that help strengthen the government would be to affiliate the revolutionary committees to the government and turn their work to the government officers. Because as I said, the work would not improve if the government is not strengthened."

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CNO: 4906

POPULAR GROUPS WANT TALEQANI FOR PRESIDENT

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 11 Jun 79 p 2

[Text] Despite Ayatollah Taleqani's response regarding his nomination for president as well as the religious statements on the role and position of religious authorities in social and political affairs, a great many number of statements were sent to AYANDEGAN by various groups and classes of society in supporting Ayatollah Taleqani for presidential nomination based on 1- Islam 2- Spiritualism 3- Enjoying Imam's full trust 4- 40 years of struggling 5- Being favorite from every aspect throughout the country. All the statements request that the speech delivered by Mas'ud Rajavi be broadcast on television. Considering the large number of statements and our lack of space, only the names of those who have sent in their statements are mentioned below:

Women's National Union, Moslem Students sympathizers of People's Mojahedin Organization of the Abdolrasul-e Meshkin Fam Agricultural College, the Moslem physicians of Qa'im Shahr, the young Moslems of Kuchaksara- Tuhidi-e Abuzar group, the Moslem villagers of Qadikalalah village supporting the national movement-Moslem students of Amol, the Moslem Youth Book Society, the Moslem students of Hedayat Bakhish School, Moslem society of Samadiyeh Labaf Technical College in Babol, the workers of Textile Plant No 1, the Moslem students society of guidance school of Sari, the teacher villagers of Kaladabu, Syakala, Ezatabad, the Moslem students of Babol, the Islamic Society of the businessmen in Qa'im Shahr, a group of workers of Mazandaran Textile Factory, the Moslem students of Qa'im Shahr, the Moslem students of Bobolsar, the Moslem workers of the National Iranian Oil Company of district 2 of Qa'im Shahr, the technicians of aircraft industry and a group of its employees, the businessmen and residents of Aref Avenue, the Railway Factories council, Ayub College, Bobolsar Mines, Mazandaran's Moslem students of Arz-e Aqdar high school, Sarvestan Moslem youths, the National Movement of Mojahedin in Shiraz, the Student Center, the teachers of Nayriz Province, the student sympathizers of the People's Mojahedin Organization of the following schools: Haydeh, Bazargan, Raf'at Afraz-Fatemeh Amini, and Mahbubeh Danesh Samiyeh, Lila Zomorodiyen, Mahbubeh Mutaheidin, Najmiyeh and Namus guidance school, the sympathizers of the People's Mojahedin Organization at Shiraz University, the Zolalnur educational center, the sympathizers of People's Mojahedin

Organization on Sarsabil and Navab Avenues, the Moslem students of Kavosi high school, the sympathizers of the People's Mojahedin Organization in Portland U.S.A., the Islamic Community of Central Library of Mashhad University, a group of students of Dehkhoda high school, the employees and a group of students of Payvand Mehregan high school, a group of businessmen of Kalaleh, a group of Moslem teachers of district 12 of Tehran, Iran Dokht high school of Behshar, a group of Moslem students, the Moslem youth center of Galugah Mitaheidin (Razi) Kirdguy high school.

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KHUZESTAN MOJAHEDIN BACK TALEQANI FOR PRESIDENT

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 29 May 79 p 3

[Text] Following the proposal made by the People's Mojahedin Organization regarding nomination of Ayatollah Taleqani for president, other groups and organizations also confirmed the nomination and considered it as a suitable choice by publishing statements and requesting that the speech delivered by Mas'ud Rajavi be broadcast by television.

The Arab People's Mojahedin Organization of Khuzestan asked the revolutionary leader to have Ayatollah Taleqani nominated for president. The statement of the organization indicates:

The Arab People's Mojahedin Organization of Khuzestan confirms the progressive views of the People's Mojahedin Organization, and the statements made by our Mojahed brother, Mas'ud Rajavi regarding the good choice made by this progressive organization in considering Ayatollah Taleqani as presidential nominee. Ayatollah Taleqani is a distinguished and religious personality and the hero of the oppressed people of Iran. We demand that the Islamic revolutionary leader appoint him according to religious law to this important historic duty. We will defend with all our heart the progressive views of Ayatollah Taleqani in the country's affairs and the rightful demands of the poor people of Iran.

The statement issued by the Moslem society of Sharif Industrial University indicates: "Considering the necessity of maintaining unity among all forces and classes of society in the nation and the fact that Ayatollah Taleqani has proved his competence repeatedly in maintaining such unity, while supporting the proposal of the People's Mojahedin Organization we persistently ask the revolutionary leader to appoint Ayatollah Taleqani who is a brave Mojahed (soldier of the holy war) and a great teacher of Koran as a presidential nominee according to the religious law.

A group of Moslems, strugglers, and those who live in caves insistently requested that the 4 Khordad [25 May] ceremonies and the speech delivered

by Mas'ud Rajavi be broadcast by radio and television. They have also suggested that Ayatollah Taleqani be nominated as president.

The educational committee of the Moslem students of Iran's University of Science and Industry also announced its support of the proposal made by the People's Mojahedin Organization in nominating Ayatollah Taleqani as president. The statement of this committee indicates:

"Having unity depends on the nation's executive power under a competent person along Imam Khomeyni's leadership. We announce our support of the proposal made by the People's Mojahedin Organization for nominating the great Mojahed (holy fighter) Ayatollah Taleqani for the first presidential position in Iran. We demand that the speech of Mas'ud Rajavi our Mojahed brother be broadcast from radio and television in its entirety.

The Moslem student society of the Computer School have also referred to the political struggles of Ayatollah Taleqani and announced their support for his presidential nomination.

Yesterday a group of students from high schools, universities, educational institutes and colleges of Tehran published a statement which confirmed their support of the Islamic revolutionary court, and considered the nomination of Ayatollah Taleqani for president by People's Mojahedin Organization as an appropriate choice.

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GUARDS GIVE STRONG WARNING TO U.S., ISRAEL

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 May 79 p 2

[Text] In the name of God:

Await the heat of our bullets in your territories.

It was 25 years ago when the U.S. Imperialism stepped into Iran's policy by staging a shameful coup. Since then they have started a strong aggression toward all social, economic, political and cultural affairs of this territory. They have wildly plundered our materialistic and spiritual wealth and prepared to destroy us. They turned our country into a consumer market for military, industrial, agricultural and cultural.. products of the West. They made Iran the gendarme (base) for defending their own interests in the region. For this purpose they placed one of the most cruel and bloodthirsty criminals of history as the country's ruler who laid the foundation of a government for terror, fear, massacres and tortures. He turned Iran into a mace for suppressing, progressive and liberation movements in the region. From behind all the suppression and pressures, suddenly the uproar of the people overthrew the dictatorship and some of the most corrupt elements devoted to that regime were turned over to the People's Islamic revolutionary court.

Every bullet that was fired, the dirty body of one of the criminal agents of Imperialism and Zionism fell on the ground and the world was purified from his filthy existence.

The victory of Iran's people's revolution struck a heavy blow on Imperialism and Zionism. So far, they had tried to hide the scar of their pain until on 17th of May their cry was heard from the throat of one of the Zionists, Senator Jacob Javits, who hollered for human rights and warned that if executions continue, the relation between Iran and the United States would be in danger.

An inspirational remark, Imam Khomeyni who compares the conspiracies of the Muslims against the people to spider webs and does not take them seriously replied with a smile on his face: "Why do we want relations with America? Our relations with America are those of the cruel to the oppressed, the relations of plunderer to the looted. And truly why do we want relations with America? Their relations were dominance over us and our people revolted to put an end to such dominance and plundering of the U.S. Imperialism. According to Imam, we don't have any expectations from the United States and why didn't the United States suffer any pain? The pain that this movement caused on the heart of the United States was not caused elsewhere."

These people who now cry for human rights are the same persons who approved of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombardments. They are the same people who bombarded the Vietnam for years. They are the same persons who have and are killing in Palestine and Lebanon and finally they are the same persons who killed over 4,000 women, children and youth on Black Friday at noon.

Yes, these are the people who for 25 years supported human rights in Iran. Human rights which consisted of burning and torturing the youth, plundering, etc. America should not make fuss that our standards of human rights are not similar to those of Carter and we will not listen to such absurdities.

The Almighty God has determined our values and basis for action in his strong and true book. He teaches us that the "continuation" of life [survival] lies in retaliation. The louder the cries of these wise men are, the more faith we find that our revolution is genuine. And with the cries of Begin, Carter, and Javits, we get to know more about the Javits'. Therefore, the United States should know that by such demonstrations of power, it will not only not harm the strong determination of our people, but it will also increase our assistance. A nation that was able to overthrow the most armed dictatorship regime by empty hands and self-sacrifice, and the cries of "Allah akbar" (God is great) now has arms in its hands and is more decisive for combat to gun down the aggressors to the "peoples" right. Instead of objecting to these executions, it is better for Imperialism and Zionism to await our bullets in the Holy Land.

The public relations of the Islamic revolutionary Guards Corps.

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CDO: 4906

MORE RESTRICTIONS PUT ON GUARDS

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 31 May 79 p 1

[Text] The announcement made by Islamic Revolutionary Court in Tehran.

Following instructions issued by Imam Khomeyni regarding protecting the favorable and beautiful face of the Islamic republic, Tehran's Islamic revolutionary prosecutor's office informed the Tehrani fellow citizens of the following points.

1. None of the guards, committees, and members of the guards corps has the right to enter houses or companies and take action in confiscating or taking into custody their properties. The people have the right to ask for the subpoena and the papers for confiscating their properties. They can also write down their numbers or names. In case of refusal, the resident or the company can report to Tehran's Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office and ask for their case to be studied. In case it was proved that the guard had made any violations, he would be prosecuted by the religious and legal laws.
2. If there is an order for confiscation of properties, the guards can only prepare a list of items, sign the agenda and turn it over to the condemned or one of his relatives in trust. They should leave the house with empty hands and make sure that if there is breach of trust, the trustee would be punished and sentenced to compensate for the losses. If the official guard violates these instructions, he will be prosecuted.
3. If the verdict of confiscating the properties of an accused person has been issued, the guards or officials of the Foundation for the Oppressed do not have the right to throw the accused's wife, child, and relatives out of the house, or to take the furniture, other means of living, or objects that do not belong to the accused, unless it has been specified in the verdict.

The Islamic republic government or the Poor's Foundation should administer justice and be kind to the family of the condemned person and consider the relatives separate from him. If it has been specified to confiscate all properties and the residential house and the family does not have any financial power to buy or provide another house, they should be given

permission to remain there until a suitable house is put at their disposal. The 8th Imam of the shiites has said: "You present the true and beautiful face of Islam to people and they will automatically come to Islam.

What is worthy of being mentioned is that the enemies of the revolution lie in their accusation of Mujahedin's, the guards and prisoners. After investigation the contrary will be proved and the antirevolutionaries would become publicly disgraced.

Signed by Tehran's Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor.

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CSO: 4906

CLERGY MANAGING CITY OF ZANJAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Jun 79 p 1, 2

[Text] AYANDEGAN correspondent reports from Zanzan that the sit-in demonstrations made during the past 4 days and nights in Zanzan ended successfully. Following closing the bazaar and the sit-in demonstrations by various groups in Zanzan and the departure of the provincial governor of this province to Tehran for submitting his resignation because of existence of too many decisionmaking centers, at 4 a.m. on Thursday, Hojatol Islam Malakuti arrived in Zanzan on the part of Imam Khomeyni and held talks with the clergy of Zanzan in Ayatollah Abdol Rahim Vase'iyi's residence. On Thursday afternoon, Ayatollah Lahuti, who is in charge of all Islamic revolutionary guards arrived in Zanzan. Accompanied by Hojatol Islam Malakuti and the deputies to the provincial governor as well as the representatives of the sit-in demonstrators, a meeting was held at the provincial governor's office in order to attend to the 6-point demands of the demonstrators.

In the meeting after long discussions that were held by Ayatollah Lahuti and Hojatol Islam Malakuti, Hamid Fakhimju, head of the Guards Corps dispatched from Tehran received a written order on taking delivery of the public's arms.

Ayatollah Lahuti announced that the Islamic revolutionary prosecutor of Zanzan had submitted his resignation in Tehran and that he would no longer return to that city as a prosecutor. He added: "Of course, if he had not resigned, I would have asked for his resignation, as I am representing the revolutionary general prosecutor."

Finally after hours of consultation and discussion, the meeting for the city's security council was canceled and at 8 p.m. on Thursday afternoon Ayatollah Lahuti and Hojatol Islam Malakuti attended the gathering of the sit-in demonstrators and announced that all of their demands had been met and that all of the "Komitehs" (committees) in Zanzan were wound up and that from then on the affairs of Zanzan would be run under the supervision of the clergy community and the reliable persons from all walks of life chosen by the people and with the help of government departments. And that if the armed individuals do not participate in turning in their weapons, they would be considered as traitors to the revolution and would be prosecuted.

He added that the orders of the commander and responsible authorities of Zanjan's Guards Corps had been issued and that they would shortly start working with their help. He announced that the Guards Corps is the executive arms of the government and that it will suppress all antirevolutionary movements and it will be in charge to stop any type of inefficiency and had poor work. Regarding arresting the group suggested by the sit-in demonstrators, he said that Hojatol Islam Malakuti is Imam Khomeyni's representative in Zanjan. If that is not done with the majority's free will, those persons will go and see the Imam accompanied by Malakuti in order that the Imam would make the final decision about them.

At the end, Momayezi, the political deputy of Zanjan's Governor-General's office announced: Starting this week (tomorrow) the armed individuals have three days to turn in their arms at the governor general's office. Otherwise, after the deadline the holders of unauthorized arms will be prosecuted severely. By shouting "greetings to Momayezi," those present expressed their thanks for the cooperation of the deputy to the provincial governor.

At present Hojatol Islam Malakuti, Imam Khomeyni's representative, is busy studying and solving the existing problems in Zanjan. About arresting the Bahminan brothers, he told AYANDEGAN: "Both during and after the revolution, they have suffered a lot of troubles. However, the final results have not been reached yet." [sic]

At present, peace has returned to Zanjan.

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CSO: 4906

POLITICIANS INVITED TO HELP REORGANIZE ARMY

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 27 May 79 pp 1, 2

[Text] Major General Farbod, Chief of Army Staff, made it clear in a television interview that he will use the view points of political group leaders in reconstructing the army. He pointed out that outside the barracks, the military can have any type of ideology they want. However, inside the army, they should work towards unity and obeying the national government.

In a part of his talks, Major General Farbod said since his appointment to the position of Army Chief of Staff, he has tried to reorganize the army and help renew the morale of the military.

He added that the march of the military on the Army's Day and the people's greeting was a step to relieve the military from their feelings of guilt and inferiority which had resulted from propaganda and also to let the world know that Iran still has an army.

Major General Farbod considered army's presence in Gonbad and Naqdeh as an indication of the army's power that demonstrates that it can relieve tension in critical areas without even getting involved.

On the army's future the chief of Army Staff said: "The army will be developed based on an Islamic ideology and Iran's uncommitted policy."

He said that formerly the army belonged to one person and it was dominated by a morale of individualism. However, at present, efforts are being made so that the army would be inspired by the nation instead of an individual.

Major General Farbod emphasized: This national army will be put in total unity at the disposal of a government which has been chosen by the people. Regarding political parties he said: "They freely participated in the referendum. Like any other individual the military have the right to interfere in the country's fate. However, regarding prejudism towards parties, it is logical that the duty of the men in the army should be unity, because the army, which is the security and disciplinary force of the country, should be in total unity at the disposal of a government which represents the nation."

Major General Farbod emphasized that there is no suffocation in the army and as an example the junior officers "Homafar" participate in street demonstrations and the military use books, publications and speeches inside of the barracks and that they are in contact with the parties outside of the barracks.

The chief of army staff added: "At the General Staff Headquarter a council has been established of the best and most intellectual officers for rebuilding the army."

Major General Farbod indicated that he will invite all party leaders in the country, owners of the press, magazines and those who can present some ideas on reconstructing the army and that renovation of the army will be based on the results of all ideas from the whole nation.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

ISRAELIS MONITORED TELEPHONE LINES IN TEHRAN

Tehran ETTALA'AT in Persian 23 Jun 29 pp 1, 2

[Article: "The Israeli Embassy in Iran Monitored the Telephones of Chiefs of States from Tehran"]

[Text] New Secrets Revealed by the Palestine Liberation Movement.

In the former Israeli Embassy in Iran which has recently become the office of the representative of the Palestinian Resistance (al-Fatah) elaborate espionage devices for monitoring telephones outside the country had been installed. Members of the Israeli Embassy monitored the telephones of different countries with this equipment.

Before noon on Thursday the Executive Committee of the Society of Iranians Cooperating with Palestinians inspected the former quarters of the Israeli Embassy. Brother Isma'il, the Palestinian representative, who has lived in the embassy from the day of revolutionary victory until now, provided information to the committee on the operations and methods of the members of the Israeli Embassy. He said:

"Without a doubt, the 130-room complex of this embassy more closely resembles a torture chamber, a prison, and a spy center than an embassy." Dark interconnected rooms with iron doors with combination locks bear witness to this claim.

Brother Isma'il explained to the group,

"The activities of the members of this embassy have been under investigation for more than four months. With the installation of extremely powerful and sophisticated equipment the Israelis monitored the telephones of chiefs of states, including Syria and Iraq."

"A part of the main floor was designated as a shooting range for the training of security personnel. Wires were installed around the yard of the embassy. As soon as someone might enter the embassy grounds, embassy staff were alerted by the sound of a horn. An aerial rope lift was installed on the

roof of the embassy which in time of danger could be used to transfer a number of people to neighboring rooftops."

"There is a shed on the rooftop with a passageway to the basement of the building where an arms cache was kept."

Brother Isma'il explained further, "Entrance to most rooms was not possible without a combination lock number. We destroyed the ceilings in order to open these doors, which we were able to do after we found their combinations inside the rooms."

9310

CSO: 4906

PEOPLE OF ABADAN PROTEST IRAQI MANEUVERS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Jun 79 p 12

[Text] In order to protest to Iraqi plots and aggressions against the border of Iran as well as the arrest of Ayatollah Sadr and closing the entrances of the holy places in Karbala and Najaf, yesterday afternoon, marching demonstrations were held in Abadan.

According to the Pars correspondent, thousands participated in the march carrying pickets with the following slogans: Death to Saddam Husayn; The Iraqi Ba'th is condemned; Koran will win; Death to the three corrupt: Carter, Sadat and Begin; Iraqi brother, Islam protects you. The march started from Masjed Nou Mosque and after several streets, the demonstrators gathered at Takhti Sports Stadium.

At the end of the demonstrations, a resolution in 10 points was read as follows:

1. We will continue our rightful struggles until world imperialism and Israel's Zionism are completely destroyed and their hands are cut off from the Islamic countries.
2. We condemn the arrest of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Sadr in Iraq and the unmerciful massacre by the coup leaders of the Ba'th Party in Najaf, Karbala and Samarah and other cities in Iraq and express our hatred for so much inhumane behaviors.
3. We advise the coup leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan to stop killing the Moslem strugglers as soon as possible and to be afraid of the wrath of the Moslem nation and know that they cannot suppress the rightful revolutions of the Moslem nations, because the Islamic revolution will permeate the whole world and the destiny of Iran's deposed shah awaits them.
4. The arrest of Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr and the demonstrations of the Iraqi people against Al Bakr's dictator government are the indications for the rise of the Iraqi nation. Following Iran's Islamic revolution, the oppressed and struggling people of Iraq along with Afghan

brothers will fight a holy war until complete victory over East and West colonialism and they will not allow any fear in their hearts from suffering martyrdom in God's way and for freedom.

5. We condemn the aggression of the treacherous and dirty Israel to Southern Lebanon and the destruction of the houses of Mujahed Moslems (soldiers of the holy war) in that territory by continuous bombardments. We will also not forget the treasons of the treacherous Sadat and the aggressor Albakr and other Satans of our era to the Moslems of the world. We the people of Iran announce that under the leadership of our honorable leader, we will defend Islam and the Moslems to the last drop of our blood.

6. While condemning the aggressions of Iraq to the borders of Iran and interference in the internal condition and killing the innocent frontiersmen, as well as sending arms to Iran, we ask the provisional government of Mr. Bazargan to show severe reactions vis-a-vis the Iraqi Ba'this and to hit a strong fist to the mouths of the nonsense-talking mercenaries.

7. We consider any type of conspiracy under the names of language, race and tribe, a plot of colonialism against the Islamic revolution and we consider our Arab fighting brothers separate from a group of mace bearer mercenaries of CIA and SAVAK.

8. We the workers, bazaar businessman, clergy, students and the people of Abadan condemn the Khorramshahr plots set by the mercenaries of SAVAK and the East and West affiliations.

9. With a firm intention, a strong heart and a revolutionary morale, we support to the last drop of our blood the decisive and revolutionary decisions made by Admiral Dr. Sayyed Ahmad Madani, the popular provincial governor of Khuzestan who is following the revolutionary leader, Imam Khomeyni, step by step.

10. At the end we honor the anniversary of the death of Islam's Fedayees and Mojaheds such as Bokhara'i, Harandi, Amani, and Nik Nezhad who followed Imam Khomeyni's movement armed and with awareness, we offer our condolences to Imam Zaman, and the revolutionary leader, of Iran's Mojahed people. Greetings to the revolutionary leader, Imam Khomeyni and the Mojahed and Moslem people of Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Signed by the Moslem people of Abadan.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

ARMS AMMUNITION CACHE FOUND IN TEHRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 23 Jun 79 pp 1,10

[Article: "Large Cache of Munitions and Weapons Found in Tehran"]

[Text] The committee of Region 4 announced that a large cache of munitions and weapons was found in one of the respected homes of Tehran and three persons were arrested in connection with the matter in the same house.

In this house, 2 million tumans in cash, 3 thousand American dollars and several boxes of pamphlets bearing the emblem of the People's Fedayin Guerrillas were taken.

A committee spokesman told our reporter:

"The guards of the Region 4 committee had been previously aware of the suspicious comings and goings of several people from this house and had had the house under surveillance for some time. After the guards had been secretly watching the house for several days the committee took steps to obtain an authorization from the public prosecutor and after receiving written authorization the guards besieged the house and went inside.

After inspecting the house the guards came across great quantities of munitions, Klashinkov rifles, and a considerable amount of money and documents, all of which were confiscated on the authority of the public prosecutor and used in preparation of a report.

The following items were found in the house:

240 Klashinkov rifles, 40,000 Klashinkov cartridges, a box of revolvers, large quantities of dynamite and grenades, 2 million tumans in cash, 3,000 American dollars, large quantities of documents and books and several cartons of pamphlets bearing the emblem of the People's Fedayin Guerrilla Organization.

In connection with this matter 3 persons who were in the house were arrested, by the names of Susan Nasiri Mahalati, Moslem Baqari Lashidan, and Kiyanush Tawkoli. A spokesman for the Central Committee announced today that in

subsequent inquiries and physical searches of the arrested persons their membership cards to the People's Fedayin Guerrilla Organization were found with special code numbers and fictitious names.

Investigations of the arrested parties are continuing in order to uncover the truth.

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CSO: 4906

REACTIONARY FORCES BLAMED FOR TURKOMAN UNREST

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 29 May 79 p 8

[Text] Is Gonbad expecting more events?

We clearly warn all of our fighting and progressive forces of our country that inauspicious conspiracies are about to take place to destroy the results of the victorious fighting of Turkoman people and their achievements which were attained at the cost of lives of many martyrs.

Now once again we observe the multidirectional conspiracies of the same inhumane elements who set the fire of war in Gonbad. These conspirators have tried several times to dispatch groups--whose intentions are known to us--to Qom and Tehran to get to change the truth and prepare the grounds for further plots. Recently they had a sit-in demonstration in an ugly manner in the Ministry of Interior. Mr Madarshahi, the former governor accompanied by Kalbasi, Mirsa'idi, Homayuni, Milani, Aref and some other people carried pickets on which it was written "a crash group is necessary to harvest Gonbad's wheat production and suppress anti-revolutionaries." There were also pickets with the following writing, which condemned the government representatives "Malihi and Rasuli had an effective role in establishing (ceasefire)," and claimed that if they had not interfered in establishing ceasefire, the Turkomans who had been in a restrained position from the viewpoint of armaments would have been suppressed by their agents.

We have numerous reasons to say that these plunderers and the sworn enemies of the people intend maliciously to once again repeat their shameful plots, the same as the unwanted and unequal war that was imposed on the brave people of Turkoman in Gonbad. There is much evidences and documentation on their dirty plans and what is done by their filthy agents in Turkoman Sahra villages. We will mention just a few such indications.

1- The dispatch of groups whose intentions are well known to the villages to create conflicts, quarrels and differences between the Turkoman and non Turkoman villages. As an example on 30/2/58 [22 April 79] eight girls and boys went to Tatar Olya and other villages to make plots for the above-mentioned purpose.

2- Distribution of free food among some of the Turkoman Sahra villages in order to penetrate them and prepare the grounds for making conflicts among the villages similar to what is going on in the villages around Turkoman port.

3- The presence of two students from the University of Isfahan (one from Zabul and another from Isfahan, both of whom had student identification cards from Isfahan University) in Kangan and Yanqa villages for the purpose of making ill propaganda and creating conflicts. They were rejected by the inhabitants of the village (s).

4- The existence of spies related to reactionaries. For instance, a person by the name of Shahkhoz, who is a native of Zabul, has introduced himself as the representative of Ayatollah Molavi, the religious leader of Baluchis, whereas it has practically been proven that he had no such position and that by going to the villages and making conspiracies and deceiving he creates differences among the Zabulis, Baluchis, and Turkomans.

5- The establishment of suspicious Islamic organizations by large landowners such as the youth organization of the Islamic fighters of Turkoman Sahra and distribution of flyers trying to create conflict among the Turkomans and Non-Turkomans.

6- The establishment of Sistanis group (community) residing in Gonbad. By taking advantage of the lack of awareness and naivete of some of the Sistani fellow citizens by a person called Gholam Shahraki, extortioner who has a record for embezzlement in the Irrigation Department and also another record at the coroner's office for raping a child.

7- Some of the naive Zabulis have been moved by large landowners to the suburbs of Gorgan and they have been given tents to live in order to make them look as though they have lost their houses to Turkoman. Following the victory of the bloody revolution of Iran's victorious people the oppressed villagers of Turkoman Sahra who like other fellow citizens intended to get back their rightful rights, get back the lands that had belonged to their ancestors and taken over by the cruel regime. For this reason, it was necessary to establish councils to be run by the villagers. However, those group of extortioners and blood thirsty landlords who were continuing their parasite life by using the products of the villagers, the intolerable labor of Turkoman and non Turkoman villagers for many years, made a sit-in demonstration at the Justice Department of the city of Gonbad by the end of Esfand 1357 [20 March 78] when they found their dirty interests in danger. Without any shame, they called the deprived and oppressed villagers as profit seeking elements and antirevolutionaries and introduced themselves as farmers!! It is truly shameful how such people as the following became innocent farmers who have lost their property: Kalbasi, J'afarbay (2) Saeyyed Hosseyn Azadeh, Milani, Mohammad Qoli Kuchaki, Reza Dhorasanizadeh, Mohammad Faryabi (3) Mohammad Reza M'asumi, Abdollah Sepasi, Mohammad Changizi, Vallollah Parsa, Ali Asgar Dadgar, Hamazan Khosravi, Mehdi Baba'i, Ali Akbar Mehrabi, Javad 'Ameriyan,

Mohammad Hashemiyan, 'Ali Asgar Torabi, Javad 'Abediyan, Mohammad Haftun, Behzad Mubjubi, Mohammad Tofiqiyan, Mahmud Yagha'i, Eshraq Eshraqi, Qholan Hosseyn Abu Talebi, Abbas Razaqi, Mohammad E'tebari, Mas'ud Yagha'i, Gholam Jafaraki, 'Abbas Paryubi. On 24 Esfand [14 March] they wrote an open letter explaining the cruelties done to them under the subject of "the demand of farmers who are making sit-in demonstration at Gonbad Kavus Ministry of Justice" and had the letter published in AYANDEGAN newspaper. After the sit-in demonstrations Hojatol Islam Omid and Abbas Radniya, representatives from Tehran were dispatched to Gonbad Kavus to study the problems. In a meeting that was held in Gonbad in presence of the dispatched representatives and sat-in demonstrations and the group of clergy looking people such as Naqshbandi (4) Akhond Qujaqi (5) who are now fugitives and their dirty cases will be revealed in an enclosure to the announcement for the public opinion. Also Mr Madarshahi, the appointed governor, was present at the meeting. In demonstrations that the 40,000 Turkoman people had made by walking, they had opposed to Madarshahi's appointment. In the meeting there were also some Turkoman youths who objected to having the above-mentioned persons as the representatives of Turkoman people and they wanted the dispatched delegation to meet with the true representatives of the people. The dispatched group did not pay any attention to such remarks and they concluded the meeting unilaterally and only talked to the above-mentioned persons. After this collusion between the two parties (Iran's committee and the landowners' demonstrators), the grounds were prepared from every aspect for further involvement. Shortly after with multidirectional antirevolutionary plots, war broke out and the people of Turkoman were driven to an imposed and unwanted war. The mass media tried in various ways to keep the events out of the public sight and make it appear in a different way by keeping silent, using censorship and calumniating on the Turkoman people and the progressive organization.

Fortunately, with what was revealed by the progressive and struggling groups and organizations, the brave people of Iran became more or less aware of the realities of the imposed war in Gonbad (6) Now the movements of these recognized enemies of the people show the same trend once again and they are doing sit-in demonstrations in order to continue with their plundering of the Zabolis, Baluchis, and the brave people of Turkoman. They again ask for the support of the government in their inhumane acts just as they have done before. In order to obtain military forces (provided in Gonbad war with their treacherous plan by the unaware and naive youth, the SAVAK agents, and their mercenaries) made a tumult and asked for a crash committee to suppress the antirevolutionaries.

To fully emphasize the importance of this issue, we ask all of the aware progressive and brave forces of the society to reveal further these plots and support the rightful demands of the Turkoman people. Help avoid inhumane and antirevolutionary plans from taking place and help the Turkoman people fight with such reactionary servants and the peoples sworn enemies. This is not separate from the struggles of other Iranian people.

We also ask for the arrest and trial of these elements whose actions have been revealed to the Turkoman Sahra people. There are sufficient documents and evidences available to condemn them.

Death to the Conspirators and Hypocrites

May the United Front of all struggling people in Iran be powerful.

Death to the American Imperialism and its affiliates.

Signed by Political and Cultural Center of Turkoman people dated 31/2/58
[21 May 79]

1- Mr Madarshahi: He is the son-in-law of Haji Ashrafiyun. Together with Haji Ashrafiyun he has a gang from which thousands of kilos of opium were discovered near Kalaleh few years ago. Besides smuggling opium, Haji Ashrafiyun has extorted land in Tatar Oliva and other villages.

2- J'afarbay, (resident of Gonbad): He was one of the close associates of the Palace and the mercenary military such as Oveyssi and Hashemi Nezhad for whom he cultivated their lands and took care of the affairs honorarily. He was the parliament representative and one of the close friends of Mansur Rohani, former minister of agriculture. In this relationship he had allocated to himself a great portion of the oat production (type of animal food) which belonged to Turkoman Sahra shares with the cooperation of Mansur Rohani. He was selling it in the free market at a high cost. He was Gonbad's representative at the final parliamentary election in the era of Aryamehr. He did not resign. He donated his salaries earned during his time at Parliament to the Parliament! He had close relations with all of the important people in the Palace and played a major role in handling the affairs of Turkoman Sahra region. Some of his assets, plundered from the Turkoman people, included 3,000 hectares of cultivated land, J'afarbay cotton gin (mill) in Gonbad, some real estate in Gonbad and a villa in Rhezr Shahr as well as many other properties. 3- Mohammad Faryabi (resident of Gonbad): With the help of military mercenaries, Faryabi had taken over the people's lands in Marjanabad by force. He destroyed Marjanabad village and leveled the houses and the mosque to the ground. After many years with the help of other feudalists, he made arrangements for sit-in demonstrations at the Justice Department. It was agreed that Faryabi would speak with the government representative as the farmer's representative! And at last the feudal mercenaries succeeded in helping the other reactionary forces in the country to persuade the government to send representatives to Gonbad to attend to the condition of the bloodthirsty people. Abbas Radniya, the government representative, who is also a feudal, warmly greeted those mercenaries and listened to the heartaches of these poor people! He called the Turkoman people unaware and antirevolutionaries. He promised that he would send Phantoms, guns, and tanks. Finally, it became clear during the imposed war that Radniya had kept his promise. In the actual meeting held

between the feudals and the government representatives, Farabi called all those who fight for their own rights as anti-people and asked for demolishing the Turkoman people.

4- Naqshbandi: A SAVAK agent and the leader of mace-bearers of 20th of Bahman [9 February] massacre. On that date he arranged for demonstrations by 30,000 people in support of Bakhtiar. He is an extortioner of lands in Kokalan district and the imposed representative of Imam's committee over the Turkomans.

5- Akhond Qarachi: He is a SAVAK agent and the representative of the Pious Organization who also participated as Naqshbandi's deputy in leading the mace bearers on 20 Bahman [9 February] in Gonbad. He is also one of the representatives of Imam's committee imposed on Turkomans.

6- The detailed report on the events of Gonbad is being prepared by the research and study committee of the central staff of Turkoman Sahra council which will shortly be revealed and published for the public's opinion.

90th

CSO: 4906

FEDAYIN GUERRILLAS QUESTION CENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 16 Jun 79 pp 1, 12

[Article: "The People's Fedayin Guerrillas Issue a Statement Concerning the Constitution and the Constitutional Convention"]

[Text] The People's Fedayin Guerrillas issued a statement Thursday in which they gave their views concerning the necessity for calling a Constitutional Convention and what type of Constitution should be written.

In this paper the People's Fedayin Guerrillas quickly objected to the secret writing of the constitution and the question was asked, "Why are they throwing rocks at the idea of a Constitutional Convention today and why do they want to solve everything from above when the revolution has arisen from the hearts of the lowest and most oppressed of the people?" The following is the text of the paper.

[Fedayin Guerrillas: Why do they want to solve everything from above?]

Without a Constitutional Convention the constitution will not be a documentation of freedom for the people of Iran.

The heroic revolution of February, which was the crystallization of the historical will of our people, ended the shame and abomination-filled thousand-year monarchy and brought the most beastly dictatorship of our age to its knees.

American imperialism and its lackeys saw clearly an order for their own abolition and death in the imposing presence of the face of the revolution. The revolution showed once again that deliverance of the people from the clutches of imperialism is an historical process which is quickly and furiously spreading all over the world and that no power can stand in the way of the people's desire for freedom, independence, the establishment of a democratic society and deliverance from the bonds of all forms of class oppression. The people's revolutionary resistance shows that the abolition of a classed society and the deliverance of the workers, the peasants, and

all other oppressed peoples is an unavoidable necessity which will arise out of the sufferings and misfortunes of the deprived and tormented people and will yield complete liberation.

The revolution, however, has also demonstrated another reality, namely that the people's sacrifice and risk of life will not always of themselves produce results, and that in such situations there will be people who will make assaults on the gains made by the revolution in the name of the workers and the oppressed people, and who will exert great efforts to fasten the chains even more tightly on the hands and feet of the workers and the lower classes.

Whatever arises from the heart of the people's bloody revolution will be indisputably clear, decisive, and all-pervasive, for the oppressed people will not listen to any voice but that of candor and clarity. They want the revolution to speak with a clear and loud voice in answer to their most basic desires. In this regard the revolution must prepare and ratify its laws in a manner in which the people will see their own sacrifices and risk of life in true practice. It is obvious that here we are referring to a Constitutional Convention and the Constitution, a convention and a constitution which should transform the great hopes of our tormented people into reality. This constitution and its convention should be a certification of liberation for the workers, the peasants and all other oppressed people from the clutches of imperialism and capitalism and an instrument for perfecting society.

But is the present government capable of remaining true to the slogans of the revolution and bringing about such a constitution? Definitely not, for a government in which the workers and peasants do not participate in any way and which is filled with capitalist elements can never be a defender of the interests of the workers and the lower classes. In this regard in this situation how can the codification and compilation of a constitution as a document and certification of freedom of the people of Iran for all of those who are concerned about the destiny of the revolution and about the interests of the most oppressed groups among the people attain enough significance to be comparable to revolutionary victory or defeat?

In the month of March, when they asked the people, without any explanation of specifics, to vote on an Islamic Republic, we refrained from participating in the referendum because we believe the people have a right to make a logical appraisal of an issue they are voting on and to understand it. They should not misuse the spiritual influence of personalities on the people. At that time we said: "The basis of any republic is its constitution, not its name. Is it possible to judge a republic without writing a constitution and clarifying its contents? It is our belief that before anything else the rightful representatives of the people should be chosen to make up a Constitutional Convention. It is this Constitutional Convention which has the right to write a constitution and to select one or several kinds of republics."

From then until now, which is no more than a short while, the progression of events, especially the government's conservative tendencies and its sowing of discord, have confirmed the soundness of our views. Now also, as we confront the Constitution and the Constitutional Convention, we ask them, who released the constitutional draft for publication and then had to recall it under the pressure of public opinion, and why do they intend today with all the talk and publicity to shrug off establishing a Constitutional Convention and to prepare the most important document of the people's freedom, which is the appointer of the historical fate of our 37 million people, behind closed doors far from the eyes and the judgment of the people? Will the seal of approval of those in power not be given once again beforehand? And under their spiritual influence will not a reason be found to oppose democracy and humanity at every step?

According to one of the most basic principles of any people's revolution, making available the widest possible means for the participation of the people in matters pertaining to them, by way of establishing people's authority councils, the codification of the constitution authorizing them should take place by way of electing their true representatives and calling a Constitutional Convention. This election will only be genuine when, prior to it, before the election of democratic representatives, without any threat or constraint, every political group has an opportunity to explain its prospects and its program. It is the right of all the people to express an opinion on this most important issue, which concerns the future fate of everyone and to make an informed decision concerning their future fate. The denial of this right to the people under any pretense and from any person will benefit the imperialists and the capitalists.

Why do they throw rocks today at the idea of convening a Constitutional Convention and want to solve everything from above when the revolution has arisen from the heart of the lowest and the most oppressed of the people? How may the fate of the workers, the peasants, and the rest of the oppressed people be appointed in a Constitutional Convention without the participation of their rightful representatives? Without a doubt, those who oppose the Constitutional Convention and the participation of representatives will bring the revolution face to face with a dead end and will be the protectors of capitalism and the class of exploiters, because the workers and the oppressed are desirous of the elimination of exploitation and capitalism and they will not stand for the sanction and confirmation of laws in the Constitutional Convention which deceitfully legalize in a new way the domination of the powerful. Any law which accepts some other basis than work as the source of private ownership, we may regard with certainty to be opening the way for the influence of a counterrevolution, and the forces of imperialism and exploitation. The representatives of the lower classes have never voted for such a law and they will not approve of it. The oppressed people want the administration of national law, an end to the redoubled national oppression and class separation. Their representatives, more than anyone else, are competent to seek opinions and to discuss a document which ought to give an answer to the rights of the people.

Without their presence and participation in the Constitutional Convention and in codifying the laws in solidarity with the people, Iran will receive a great injury and points of crisis will be kept alive in their midst for the interference of imperialist and counterrevolutionary agents.

In the meantime there are forces in existence today who have used the defense of a Constitutional Convention and resistance to strangulation as a means of settling personal accounts and as a cover for justifying their class-oriented counterrevolutionary institutions. Their defense of a Constitutional Convention is not based on the interests of workers and the lower classes, it is only an internal fight between the ruling powers. The working class will never mix its own aims and desires with this group of so-called freedom seekers whose past consists of cooperation with imperialism and capitalism, and they will judge and assess critics on the basis of which class they are speaking for. The Constitutional Convention envisioned by the lower classes is a convention in which the destruction of imperialism and capitalism must be one of the main objectives of its laws, not to clear the way as much as possible for the rule of imperialism and capitalism under the guise of seeking freedom. We have exposed their false calls for freedom in all conditions and will drive them from our ranks.

In the case of the contents of the constitution, which will define the future system of government, this law should be basically a definitive and complete statement of those desires for which the people have waged their most loyal resistance for scores of years, and especially during the last few years and during the revolution. In other words the Constitution should be a spokesman for the workers and peasants, a defender of the lower classes and it should guarantee their participation in all areas of social life. The constitution must entrust the government truly and in practice to the hands of the workers, the peasants, and the rest of the oppressed people of the cities and villages, meaning those who disenfranchised the shah's regime. The idea of government by the common people means that the constitution will adopt a tone which will bring about the necessary conditions for government by the workers and the lower classes.

Whenever the constitution undertakes to move in this direction it should be announced in the beginning that the councils of the workers and the peasants and the rest of the lower classes are the basic foundations of the people's rule and that the government should be placed in their hands and that the law of the councils should be regarded as the highest authority in all matters.

The proclamation of the cancellation of private ownership of society's resources, the stipulation that all essential capital, major industries, and natural resources belong to the public, and that the basis of every person's wealth is his income from working, not something else, are the basic foundations and true guarantors of the interests of the widest group of the lower classes in our country. It is only in such a situation that real democracy for the workers,

peasants and lower classes will obtain and the democratic rights of the people in all matters will be guaranteed: the right to housing, the right to education and free hygiene, the right to work and go on strike, the right to days of rest without work, the right to establish syndicates, unions, guaranteed equality between men and women, guaranteed freedom of expression, thought and association, official recognition of religious minorities and the rights of the lower classes, and in this way the constitution must proclaim the permanent unity of Iran with all oppressed and suffering nations of the world.

The condition of loyalty to the blood of thousands of martyrs among the people and the many sufferings and privations which our suffering people have borne through years of reactionary government and imperialism is faith in the principles of revolution, convening of a Constitutional Convention and the approval of a document which will destroy all forms of rule by imperialists and criminal agents. Because imperialism is not only the regime of the shah and his army. Imperialism is cloaked in a broad economic, political, military and cultural concept, the basis of resistance to which is possible by way of confiscation and nationalization of basic and imperialist capital and other major capital resources, the complete elimination of all arrangements for enslavement to it, and the commitment of affairs to the principal production workers of society, meaning the workers, the peasants, and the rest of the lower classes.

But does the current government in any way resemble the desires and hopes of the lower classes? Can it bring a single one of the above ideals to realistic fruition? It is clear that such is not the case, for the old-line politicians, the people who were busy counting their stockholdings yesterday and continue to do so today, and the European-educated capitalist intellectuals struggling for power can never be representatives of rule by the deprived and oppressed of society. Whenever democratic conditions for the election of representatives to a Constitutional Convention become available and the people send their representatives for writing a constitution, under such conditions we may be certainly assured that these gentlemen will no longer remain in power.

The convening of a constituent assembly and the codification and approval of a constitution after the revolution is the greatest event in the history of the struggle of our people, for it is here that the gains of the revolution will acquire legal force and the brave deeds which our people have performed will see results.

With our faith that the working class and the lower class people of the nation will bring their long-term struggle to realize social justice and a classless society to victory, we consider it a basic duty of ours to inform them and equip them in their resistance in changeable situations now and in the future. We believe that in the course of their struggle against personal desires and on the basis of their true participation in these struggles the road to victory over imperialism and capitalism will be smoothed.

Forward toward convening a Constitutional Convention.

Forward toward compiling a document of freedom for the suffering people of Iran.

Death to American Imperialism and its criminal agents.

The Organization of Fedayin Guerrillas of the People of Iran.

June 14, 1979

9310

CSO: 4906

TUDEH LEADER KOAVARI ASSESSES REVOLUTION

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 7 Jun 79 p 9

[Interview with A. Koavari, member of the Central Committee and director of the central organ of Iran's Tudeh Party, date and place not given]

[Question] The Iranian revolution is often presented as unexpected and incomprehensible. The CIA was apparently taken by surprise.

[Answer] The Iranian revolution was not a miracle. It was the result of a process over some decades, nourished by the revolt against imperialist domination and the terrible living conditions imposed on the working masses--a movement that was deeply felt and undeniably popular. During the period of the shah, there were those who wrote their wills before they left their homes to demonstrate. It must be remembered that 4,000 people died in those mass demonstrations!--and now Washington is talking about "violations of human rights." In the course of the oil workers' strike, which caused a loss of \$75 million and completely paralyzed the financial apparatus of the shah's government, workers in the other sectors contributed all their wages in solidarity with the strikers, so the profoundly popular character of the revolution is very clear.

[Question] What is the present situation in Iran?

[Answer] After the monarchy was destroyed and we began to build a new social, economic and political regime, an anti-imperialist and popular regime, two lines of orientation soon manifested themselves with particular force: a revolutionary line, and a conciliatory and ineffectual line. The reactionary forces are clearly not only supporting the conciliatory line, but are using every means to divide the progressive forces and set them against one another. For example, we would consider the shi'ite ayatollahs to be progressive, representing the anti-imperialist petit bourgeoisie. The revolutionary orientation and the capitalist latifundist interests intersect in the present Bazargan government, representing the liberal bourgeoisie. The actions of the government can be considered conciliatory and moderate, characterized by its conservative aspects and the abdication that is increasingly stressed. As in the political area, in the economic area there has been a withdrawal from an anti-imperialist orientation, and preferential support to the capitalists, ignoring--and fearing--the potential of the popular movement.

[Question] How are the national and international forces of reaction working against the Iranian revolution?

[Answer] On one hand, we are seeing more counter-revolutionary activity, resorting to assassination and inciting armed conflicts, and, on the other hand, the action of forces that played a sporadic and inconsequential part in the revolutionary process and are now trying to halt this process.

The world capitalist system, particularly the United States and Israel, have mobilized all their resources to destroy the Iranian revolution. Through their spies and with the aid of agents of the former SAVAK, they are fomenting crises, sabotaging the recovery and reconstruction of the economic, political, social, administrative and cultural life of the country--provoking popular discontentment, alienating the Iranian people from their own revolution. To do this, they use the positions they hold in the government and the army, and even infiltrate revolutionary organizations undermining things from within, provoking problems and disagreements within the popular movement. They try to aggravate the minor mistakes of the revolutionary forces, the defenders of the revolution and the revolutionary courts, attacking in this way the major forces of the revolution.

There has also been direct pressure from the United States, with threats of military intervention, which was obviously averted by the clear Soviet declaration that it would not tolerate U.S. military intervention in that area.

[Question] What could be considered the basic factor in the defense of the Iranian revolution?

[Answer] Unity. Unity based on anti-imperialism--a stand that unites the broadest sector of the Iranian population--is essential to stand against the reactionary offensive and to organize a popular movement capable of stimulating the Iranian revolutionary process.

The reactionaries, the members of SAVAK, the imperialist lackeys are trying to isolate the scientific socialist parties from the ranks of millions of combatants who have taken part in the revolutionary movement under the banner of Islam. They are trying to provoke confrontations between the people of Iran, to make the shi'ites and sunnites kill each other, and even to sow discord between the partisans of scientific socialism.

Under the circumstances, Iran's Tudeh Party feels there are central problems to be discussed among the progressive forces: practical solutions for a joint response to the reactionary offensive; the unmasking and neutralization of the divisionist forces that specifically attack the firm stands taken by the Ayatollah Khomeini; the drafting of a common and unified program to consolidate the conquests of the revolution and its future expansion, in terms of the basic and immediate demands of the Iranian people; a unified effort to elaborate a draft constitution that will reflect the revolutionary gains and the basic demands of our people; creation of a unified front for the formation of a constituent assembly that will open the way for a new popular and democratic regime; and a united effort to create a national coalition government, with the participation of all the truly revolutionary forces.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS TAKE REVOLUTIONARY REPRESENTATIVES HOSTAGE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 21 Jun 79 p 2

[Article: "Members of the Yasuj Committee Take Revolutionary Representatives Hostage"]

[Text] Members of the Yasuj Revolutionary Committee, in the wake of the departure of their president from Yasuj, made hostages of Imam Khomeyni's personal representatives and of representatives of the central revolutionary committees.

Several days previously the governors of Kohgiluyeh and Buyer Ahmad had resigned, and this resignation was met with protests and strikes by people of Yasuj and also of the cities of Gach Sara and Dehdasht.

Yesterday Hojat al-Islam Hamidzadeh, representative of Imam Khomeyni and Nasser Allahi, representative of the central revolutionary committees, came to Yasuj along with another group. They began talks with various groups and after several hours of talks they announced the dissolution of the Yasuj Committee.

As a part of this decision, 'Abd al-Khaliq 'Adalati, president of the Yasuj Committee, was expelled from the area and this angered the members of the committee.

The committee members took Hojat al-Islam Hamidzadeh and Nasser Allahi hostage and announced they would not free the hostages until 'Abd al-Khaliq 'Edalati returned to Yasuj.

From another side, the workers of the agencies and administrations of Yasuj, a group of workers from the national oil company of Gach Saran have continually issued statements saying that until the demands of the people are met and the governor returns they will not work.

The government workers said in their statements, "On numerous occasions the anti-revolutionary committee of Yasuj, which was organized by people who only

wanted to obtain weapons, acquire power, amass funds from the Moslem treasury and show contempt for the people, has acted against the people and against Islam.

"This committee of plunderers has brought its boldness to the point of insulting a governor of the Islamic Republic and causing him to leave the area in anguish.

"The employees of the government will not work at any type of job again until the following reasonable demands are met:

- 1--The dissolution of the anti-revolutionary Yasuj Committee and the severe and rapid punishment of its agents.
- 2--The immediate return to Yasuj of Mr Ahmad Homan, revolutionary governor of the Islamic Republic and an apology to him.
- 3--The arrest and punishment of anti-revolutionary elements within the province."

Return to Work

Following this protest a statement was released from his excellency Ayatollah Hajj Seyyed Karamat Malek Hosseini which follows:

"All of the employees of the Islamic Republican Government in Yasuj are reminded that since the disturbances and plots going on now are the work of groups who have received their inspiration from outside the province, it is requested of the respected gentlemen of the administration to be at work because a work stoppage is practically an anti-revolutionary act and one must adhere completely to the responsibilities of the revolution."

9310

C30: 4906

ARREST OF NINE SOCIALIST WORKERS PROTESTED

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 7 Jun 79 p 3

[Article: Babak Zahrai Objects to the Arrest of 9 Members of the Socialist Workers Party]

[Text] Babak Zahrai, editor of the weekly newsletter "Socialist Worker," objected yesterday in a 2:00 pm, press conference to the arrest of nine members of the Socialist Workers Party in Ahvaz.

In a statement issued for the occasion by the executive committee of the Socialist Workers party it was said:

"On Friday, March 30 at 10:30 pm, 20 armed committer members assaulted the homes of several members of the Socialist Workers rty and gathered up and confiscated all the books and newspapers that were in these homes. Furthermore, they also arrested all party members who were in the houses. As of now we have confirmed the arrest of these individuals: Mostafa Saif Abadi, Patemeh Felahi, Mehna Hashemi, Mostafa Gorgzadeh, Morteza Gorgzadeh, and Hormoz Pelahi.

"An hour later Hamid Shahrabi was also recognized and arrested."

In his protest, Babak Zahrai stated:

"If it is the position of the government that the Socialists do not have the right to express their ideas, we now proclaim that our party will not abandon its views. If these activities are illegal, the government should say so."

He added, "At 5:00 pm Saturday the Socialist Workers Party will assemble in front of the prime minister's palace to protest the arrest of its members."

2310
CSO: 4906

GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IDLE FACTORIES

Teheran AYANDEGAN in Persian 19 Jun 79 pp 1-2

[Text] The government, in a directive, has asked ministries and government organizations to take over direction of those companies which have suspended operations or have had difficulty in their operation.

On the basis of a law promulgated by the prime minister and directed to ministries, government bureaus and companies, these have been asked to inform the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of any industry, commercial or agricultural establishment, general services or distribution companies whose directors or owners have abandoned them or have for any reason ceased to operate. This is with the view of taking over the directorship and management of these companies.

In the same law it was decreed that new directors would be appointed by the government, as decided by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, for such factories, corporations and mercantile or agricultural organizations.

The government must, within 2 months from 24 Khordad [15 July 1979], the date the law was promulgated, determine principal ownership of affected companies. New directors for these companies will then be chosen from ministries, government bureaus or companies. The names will be announced in the press after they have been registered officially with the Companies and Industry Registration Office.

The law provides for the issuance of authority to the new directors and the cancellation of authority of the former officials. The authority of the new directors is legal and cannot be cancelled. Shareholders of the affected companies will have no right to participate in management.

9448

CSO: 4906

MANY OFFICIALS IN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE REPLACED

Teheran AYANDEGAN in Persian 20 Jun 79 p 3

[Article: "Twenty-nine Directors General and Heads of Companies Have Just Taken Over"]

[Text] The managing director of the Iran milk pasteurizing plant, two agricultural and manufacturing companies, and more than 20 important posts in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development have been changed. Included were 14 directors general of the Teheran and provincial offices, 3 heads of organizations, deputies for administration and finance of the ministry and members of boards of three government companies.

New appointees named were: Ali Sahabi, chairman of the board and managing director of the Iran Milk Corporation; Dr Hadi Behzadi and Abolqassem Niakan, to directorships for the above company, and Aqianak Qazarian to the post of inspector.

Continuing: Dariush Archin, managing director and chairman of the board of Fars Meat Packers; Dr Kamran Afsharbad, member of the board of the aforementioned company. Also, Ali R'anai Rad, chairman of the board and managing director of the Turkey Breeding and Production Company; Ali Reza Fakheri and Seyyed Abdolmajid Mojarad, became board members of the said company.

Other appointments of the Ministry of Agriculture were: Mehryar Sadroleshrafi, administrative and financial deputy; Dr Seyyed Abdollah Bahman Mirfendereski, head of the veterinary and animal husbandry organization; Mohammad Ali Vahabian, head of the Organization for the Production and Improvement of Seeds and Trees; Mahmud Banan, chief of rural education; Ali Akbar Agah, supervisor of the Disaster and Crop Insurance Study Commission; Safdar Shahrzuzi, managing director of Qazvin affairs; Hossein Shahidizadeh, director general of the Comprehensive Plan for Rural Education; Mohammad Ali Shakari, director general of buildings and property; Mohammad Mafizadeh, director general of agriculture for Gilan Province; Mohammed Baqer Yahyazadeh, director general of agriculture for Mazandaran; Mostafa

Khalafi, director general of agriculture and supervisor of the Office of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs of West Azarbaijan; Dr Abdolkarim Bahnia, director general of agriculture for Khuzestan; Dr Abdolrasul Hamed, director general of agriculture and supervisor of cooperatives and rural affairs for Yazd; Manuchehr Majidi, director general of agriculture and supervisor of forestry and soil conservation of Hormozgan; Habibollah Sepehri, director general of agriculture and supervisor of the General Office of Cooperative and Rural Affairs for Gorgan and Gonbad; Aziz Hakimzadeh, director general of agriculture and supervisor of cooperatives and rural affairs for Kurdistan; Bahram Azimi Zanuz, director general of agriculture and supervisor of cooperative and rural affairs for Kerman; Ahmad Mafi, director general of agriculture and supervisor of agricultural corporations and head of cooperatives and rural affairs for Zanjan; Abdollah Hessami, director general of agriculture and supervisor of cooperatives and rural affairs for Semnan.

9448

CSO: 4906

OIL, GAS, PETROCHEMICAL COMPANIES TO BE COMBINED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 9 Jun 79 p 8

[Text] In a press interview Hasan Nazih, chairman of the board of directors of the executive manager of the National Iranian Oil Company, announced that the three companies of oil, gas and petrochemical would be combined and that the second main gas pipeline will not be constructed.

He emphasized that Iran has no longer any relations with the former oil consortium that has left a very bad memory in the minds of our people and that the negotiations to be held in London in the next few days with the consortium is only to settle the accounts and alleviate financial differences and that there is no other reason. In the interview, the members of the board of directors of the National Oil Company were also present. In explaining the activities of the oil industry in the past 3 1/2 months, he said:

Fortunately since 14 Isfand [4 March] when the first oil consignment was exported from Khark, day by day the condition has improved and at present, we sell about 3,200,000 to 3,300,000 barrels of oil a day. At present, we have many customers from all over the world and it is under such conditions that the price of oil increases regularly. The money for oil is deposited in country's treasury through foreign and domestic banks within couple of months. The executive director of the National Iranian Oil Company added: Fortunately, the wheels of oil industry are spinning regularly without any foreign assistance. Therefore, on the part of my colleagues, I would like to thank all of the employees and workers of the oil industry. They protect and take care of each drop of oil as their own blood and consider and protect the oil facilities as jewels.

Economy

Hasan Nazih said: "In the past few months we have been able to provide a substantial amount of money by economizing. The salaries paid to foreign employees were 30 percent of the total of salaries and fringe benefits paid to the employees in the (oil) regions. By terminating the service of a

group of them we have saved about 4 billion rials a year. Some of the senior employees who received salaries of over 30,000 tomans were either retired or dropped. In this way we have saved one billion rials annually."

Nazih added: "The number of employees of the company's representative office in London were reduced from 50 to 9 persons. Orders were given to evacuate the three apartments that the company's representative office had rented in New York.

The rent of these apartments, which were located in a building related to Pahlavi Foundation, was \$50,000 a month. The building had been constructed in the name of Pahlavi Foundation by loans from Bank-e Melli and a credit of about \$40 million. Apparently they intended to help the Iranian students in the United States from that income. The monthly expenses of the company's representative office in New York was about \$50,000 to 60,000, which we will reduce to the lowest amount possible.

In general, by closing or limiting some of the company's representative offices abroad about 140 million rials will be saved.

The unnecessary positions have been eliminated in the company and by changing the organizations and combining the two industrial and nonindustrial units in Khuzestan, 650 million rials have been saved annually.

The company has 14 buildings in Tehran, nine of which have been rented. The rent of two of the buildings belonging to Shapur Reporter, whom the former Shah liked, was respectively 800,000 and 250,000 tomans a month.

From the rents alone we will save 150 million rials a year. The company had seven aircraft and some helicopters. Only the ones that are needed will be used.

Last year the company had invested 257 billion rials. This amount will be reduced to half this year.

Some revisions will be made regarding the contract jobs and the contract employees to the interest of the company. In this way, the government will also earn a remarkable amount.

By stopping payment of gratuitous aids, which apparently was paid to cultural and charity organizations and in most cases looked like blackmail, will save us one billion rials annually.

In all, 7 billion rials will be saved annually and we hope to increase this amount.

Welfare Actions

Regarding purification of the oil industry, Hasan Nazih said: "This has been done by excusing some from work and retiring a group of employees in the northern and southern facilities. We have also stopped paying salary to those who received salary from the company and worked in other organizations."

Using Gas

After referring to the welfare and social actions taken in the National Oil Company, Hasan Nazih said: "At present, besides in some projects such as Isfahan refinery, we do not need any foreign experts."

He said: "Regarding the interference of "Komitehs" [committees] in the oil industry, I have asked the Imam to issue the necessary instructions. Some actions have been taken in this respect. We have a close cooperation with the Islamic revolutionary staff of Abadan and the guards of the oil industry protect the technical facilities along with their soldier brothers.

In Abadan 400 residential units of the oil company have been occupied by some aggressors in the name of needy people and they do not pay any attention to any authority for vacuating the buildings. Similar cases have also been seen in other areas in Khuzestan. We hope that the limit of the komitehs' interference and duties would be specified as soon as possible, because these people claim that they have taken possession of the houses with the permission of the committees. I have asked the prime minister to be stationed in Khuzestan for a few days together with the council of ministers, as it will be very effective.

In major consumptions, we are studying changing the oil and gas oil consumption to gas usage. The people should prepare themselves to use gas.

For fuel reserves, we will make arrangements, so that there would be no problem in winter.

Export Policy

The executive director of the oil company said: We will sell oil to the buyer under good conditions and a good price on the condition that they would not deliver it to Israel and South Africa. Today, our oil income is 65 million dollars a day. Considering that the prices are going up regularly, we do not find it advisable to increase our production. We observe the official price set by OPEC, considering that OPEC permits each member country to receive surcharge in addition to the price as it wishes.

Anyway with the price of \$18.47 for every barrel of oil, at present Iran has the highest price in the Persian Gulf, though in the free market this amount reaches \$35.00 to \$37.00 for a single consignment. But that happens rarely.

The government determines the amount of production and the oil money is paid in dollars.

In the next OPEC meeting, probably the issue of increasing the price of oil will be studied considering that even Saudi Arabia supports that idea. The oil sale contracts are all concluded for a period of 9 months and we do not have any long-term contracts.

The consortium has no longer any interference in Iran's oil affairs and oil production and sale is completely done by us.

The Names of Oil Shareholders (sic):

Hasan Nazih announced the names of the countries that buy oil from Iran as follows:

Japan 18 percent, Brazil 6 percent, England 16 percent, France 4 percent, Spain and Portugal 1 percent, Scandinavian countries 1 percent, Italy, Belgium and Germany totally 4 percent, India 3 percent, Korea, Philippine, Bangladesh, Ceylon and Turkey totally 3 percent. Through 17 companies, the United States buys 32 percent of Iran's oil. In the interview, it was also announced that the National Oil Tanker Company of Iran will be expanded.

91%

CSO: 4906

IRAN

BRIEFS

ISRAELI EMBASSY TORTURE CHAMBER--It became known today that in the Palestinian Embassy (the former Israeli Embassy) an assemblage comprising 130 rooms belonging to Israel has been discovered. Several torture chambers have been identified as a part of this assemblage. Before noon today, Sheikh Mostafa Rahnama along with other founders of the Society of Iranians Cooperating with Palestinians came to the Palestinian Embassy to inspect the discoveries. It was said that the Zionists used these facilities in cooperation with the SAVAK to torture resisters and freedom lovers. [Text] [Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 21 Jun 79 p 1] 9310

CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

NORWEGIAN TRADE AGREEMENT--Baghdad, INA 21 Jun--Yesterday afternoon in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry building a commercial accord for economic, industrial, and technical cooperation was signed between Iraq and Norway. Signing on behalf of Iraq was Mr Hasan Ali, member of the RCC and minister of trade, and on behalf of Norway Mr Hallvard Bakke, minister of commerce and shipping. The aim of the accord which is considered the first of its kind between Norway and Iraq aims at broadening and consolidating cooperation in the fields of industry, agriculture, oil production, communications, transport, and especially maritime transport, construction, health, in addition to the transfer of advanced technology and the training of technicians. It also examined the form of this expansion and development and alteration of commercial interactions between both nations. With the signing of this accord with Norway, Iraq has completed agreements with all the Scandinavian countries and has made a bond through secondary commercial and economic treaties with Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 Jun 79 p 4]

SURVEY OF FISHING INDUSTRY--Baghdad, INA 21 Jun--The Central Office for Statistics will organize at the beginning of next September the first survey campaign of the fishing industry in the country, in cooperation with the duly responsible agencies. Dr Kamal al-'Adad, director general for Developmental Affairs in the Central Office for Statistics said to INA that the survey aims to assemble detailed reports on the regulation and development of fishing in all its different methods. It also aims for a knowledge of the types and quantities of fish caught, the costs of catching them, and a limitation of the times and locales for fishing in the winter, spring and summer seasons. Cooperating with the Central Office for Statistics in this survey is the Supreme Council for Agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and the Center for Fish Studies and Research. In similar developments the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform will convene on next Sunday a meeting to discuss the formation of a special commission for the regulation and marketing of river fish. [Excerpts] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 Jun 79 pp 4,5]

ISRAELIS SEEN TRYING TO TAME WEST BANK PRIOR TO SELF-RULE

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 15 Jul 79 p 1 LD

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT dispatch]

[Excerpts] London--Tension in the West Bank heightened yesterday following the announcement by the Israeli authorities that they will bring nationalist West Bank mayors to trial preparatory to dismissing them from their jobs and imposing self-rule on the area.

The Israeli military authorities' campaign against Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf and al-Birah Mayor Abraham At-Tawil were met with strong denunciation and rejection by all the West Bank institutions and bodies, which regard this campaign as an Israel attempt to impose capitulationist plans and self-administration.

Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: We denounce and condemn this measure. All the West Bank population and their leadership are united in resisting such measures, because the municipal councils have been elected by the masses.

He affirmed that this grave and calculated measure by the Israeli authorities is aimed at finding excuses to dismiss the mayors from their posts. We will strongly oppose the implementation of this conspiracy, he said.

Hebron Mayor Fahd al-Qawasimah said that the military administration is contemplating ways of getting rid of the mayors in order to implement the self-rule and impose rejected solutions on false legal pretexts. He said: I assure you that the Palestinian people will oppose these measures with greater consciousness and steadfastness.

Halhul Mayor Muhammad Hasan Milhim said: We view these measures with great concern. We are certain that the Israeli authorities did not consider putting Khalaf and At-Tawil on trial from a legal standpoint but for the purpose of creating a political case, weakening the West Bank mayor's stand for creating difficulties in the current critical circumstances for the Palestinian problem.

Milhim added: The Israeli authorities do not hesitate in changing the laws and bending them to suit their purposes--which is entirely contrary to the Geneva convention regarding the safeguarding of civilians' rights under occupation.

He said that Israel is planning to implement self-rule and is taking these measures as a disguise.

Jerusalem lawyer Ilyas Khuri said that the Israeli authorities have not yet submitted a copy of the indictment against the two mayors and that he will reply to the authorities' charges once he receives the indictment.

CSO: 4802

WEST BANK REFUGEE CONDITIONS INVESTIGATED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 6 Jun 79 p 7

[Article from the newspaper AL-QUDS]

[Text] One of the editors of the newspaper AL-QUDS conducted a press investigation about conditions of the Palestinian refugees in the West Bank camps, on the occasion of the Relief Agency's decreasing the services which it gives these refugees.

This investigation included figures and important documentation regarding the numbers of refugees in the West Bank and abroad. In view of the information's importance, we believed that we should reprint it. The report states:

The number of Palestinian refugees amounts to 1,790,000, of whom only 832,000 receive monthly food rations, i.e. only 46.5 percent of the total number of refugees.

Refugees in the West Bank

The number of refugees in the West Bank is 315,000. The number of those receiving supplies is 127,000, that is, only 40.5 percent. They are distributed among the following camps, with the number of inhabitants in each camp as follows:

'Aqabah Jabr	2,567
Al-Am'ari	4,128
Al-Jalzun	4,024
Al-Duhayshah	5,649
Al-Fara'ah	3,878
Bilatah	10,678
Janayn	7,590
'Ayn Al-Sultan	623
Qalnadia	4,087
Al-Fuwar	3,160
'Ayidah	1,906

Number One	3,242
Tulkarm	8,639
Sha'fat	4,577
Dayr 'Amar	1,084
Al-Urub	4,480
Bayt Jibrayn	932
Nur Shams	3,917
'Askar	6,995

Total inhabitants of these camps: 74,112

In the Gaza Strip

The number of refugees in the Gaza Strip is 360,818, of whom only 203,000 receive food supplies, or 56 percent of the total. They are distributed among the following camps:

Jubaliya	43,178
Al-Nusayrat	21,473
Dayr al-Balah	8,617
Khan Yunis	29,501
Al-Shati'	33,527
Al-Burayj	13,096
Al-Mughazi	8,900
Rafah	42,597

In the Arab Countries

In the East Bank, there are 693,000 refugees, of whom 224,000 are distributed among camps and 304,000 receive supplies, or only 44 percent of the total.

In Syria, there are 202,000 of whom 60,000 are in 9 camps and 98,500 require supplies, i.e. 49 percent.

In Lebanon, there are 217,000 of whom 112,000 are distributed among 15 camps and 99,000 receive foodstuffs, 46 percent of the total.

With the Director of the Nablus Area

The investigation published by AL-QUDS included meetings with the director of the Nablus area and several of the refugees' Mukhtars in the camps. The report states:

Before we visited Yusef Ridha, director of the Nablus area, in his office, we were given a tour of two camps, Bilatah and Number One, where we saw at first hand the dilapidated huts, threatening to collapse. Despite repeated appeals, the agency has not repaired them. There are hundreds of children whose families were denied food supplies effective this month.

With us in the director's office were: 'Abdullah Jibrayl al-Bishawi, Mukhtar of Bilatah camp; 'Ali Hasan Barakat, Mukhtar of 'Ayn Bayt al-Ma' camp; Al-Hajj Mustafa Ma'ruf from 'Ayn Bayt al-Ma' camp; Al-Hajj Yusef Taqataq from 'Askar camp; Al-Hajj Sa'id al-Asad from Nur Shams camp in Tulkarm; and several other refugee notables.

The following dialogue ensued between them and the area director, Yusef Ridha:

The Mukhtar of Bilatah camp, 'Abdullah Jibrayl al-Bishawi, asked the area director: "Why doesn't the agency issue food supplies to all the refugees? We have families of eight persons receiving food for three or four, and families of six who obtain food for two. Consequently, most refugees are being deprived of food."

The director answered him by saying:

"First, the agency does not issue monthly food supplies to children born to refugees in Jordan, on both banks, after 1952.

"Second, there are a number of refugee children in other poor Arab regions to whom food is not issued.

"Third, there are thousands of cases of families whose monthly food allotments have been cancelled because of their income."

What Are the Agency's Obligations?

A participant asked the area director: "In that case, what are the agency's obligations, and how does their ratio for us compare from when the agency was established up to the present time?"

He replied: "The Relief Agency was obligated to issue dry foods, flour, rice, sugar, legumes, oils, etc., so as to provide each individual with 1600 calories daily in summer and 1700 calories daily in the winter. However, in the middle 70s, the Relief Agency began to reduce some of the foodstuffs and their quantities. At first it was temporary, so that for example sugar was cut off for a month and rice and flour for 2 months, but in 1978 the flour allowance was reduced to 90 kilos a year per individual instead of 120 kilos. In 1979, the agency decided to reduce this amount to 60 kilos a year, and it pledged, through former Commissioner General Thomas McIlhenney, at the time of his visit to the West Bank and the host nations before completion of his term, not to reduce the other foodstuffs. However, because of a lack of availability of foodstuffs and the financial allotments to purchase them, it did not provide sugar for several months and supplied flour at an average of 3.5 kilos in the month of May per individual. Now it has suspended issuing foodstuffs as of the beginning of this month."

'Ali Barakat, Mukhtar of camp Number One, 'Ayn Bayt al-Ma', asked: "Then, what did the agency provide during last May?"

Yusef Ridha answered: "The nutritional value of what the agency distributed during May was about 750 calories per individual supplied."

At this point Barakat said that since we figured that 40 percent of the refugees in the West Bank receive monthly rations, then what each individual obtained cannot equate to more than 400 calories a day, i.e. 4 beans.

It is well-known that people require daily nourishment on the average of 2500 calories.

Services Have Not Improved

Al-Hajj Mustafa Ma'ruf from camp Number One, 'Ayn Bayt al-Ma', asked: "What is the progress of the services, and what has or will occur with them?"

Yusef Ridha: "The fact is that nothing has been done so far to lower the established levels of health and educational services that would impede the progress of operation. However, no improvements commensurate with the development of services in the area and the population growth have been made."

Al-Hajj Ma'ruf commented here: "On this basis, our school operates with two shifts, in view of the fact that the agency has not built more schools. Also it has not opened and paved the streets and playgrounds."

Diversions Activities

'Ali Barakat said: "In my view, the agency is conducting diversionary activities, since an imperialist nation is striving to steer the agency's policy toward reducing the number of refugees, and consequently, liquidating their case. In the early 50s the agency provided us with 12 items a month. Then it began to reduce them gradually; the purpose of that was to subdue the refugees in order to guide them into abolishing providing these supplies."

Criticizing what the refugees' conditions in the camp have become, he said: "There are scores of dwelling units--huts--which are falling into ruins, some of which have completely collapsed. The agency has not shown any concern over them. It is well-known that these units were built only under emergency conditions and for a period of 5 years. That was done in the middle 50s."

Yusef Ridha: "For the second time I wish to emphasize that I am not appearing as the Public Representative at this meeting, but I do want to say the following:

"First, the United Nations is the one that created the International Relief Agency in order to look after Palestinian refugee matters temporarily after the 1948 calamity. Therefore, the agency's budget was not a part of the UN's regular budget, but rather it is equivalent to voluntary contributions.

"Second, after each calamity, relief actions multiply and pile up, and with the passage of time this assistance decreases gradually in kind and quantity.

"Third, the reduction of services and food supplies is also attributable to the increase in the number of refugees, the rise in prices and the cost of services and food, and the lack of increase in contributions in a way commensurate with the requirement to provide services and food at this rate and on this level.

"Fourth, with respect to the agency's offices, the continuation of their work for more than a quarter century has led to improvements so that they are able to ensure their work on a firm basis. But as an example, means of transportation are difficult. Any field organization cannot operate without means of transportation. Officials coming from Jerusalem have duties which justify giving them transportation, since any administrative action with respect to the work is within the sole jurisdiction of the higher management.

"Fifth, with regard to housing units, they were built on a temporary basis because the costs were smaller, probably less than the cost of a tent. I agree with the Mukhtar of 'Ayn al-Ma' camp that the agency has not repaired or replaced units that are falling into ruins or have collapsed."

7005

CSO: 4802

WEST BANK AUTONOMY JUDGED ADVANTAGEOUS FOR ISRAEL

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 9 Jun 79 p 7

[Article: "Source of Autonomy Authority and the Obscuring of Real Problems"]

[Text] Recently the issue of the autonomy authority has turned into a solid rock of conflict of great significance. On the basis of what we have become accustomed to in the last 2 years, there is cause for fear that a legal matter of a distinct theoretical nature might lead to the obscuring of the real political and practical problems of autonomy. It can be said that autonomy is like an egg which has not yet been laid.

Because the matter has now become the latest issue on the political level between Egypt and the enemy, Professor Yoram Dinstein has submitted certain legal viewpoints and legal conditions regarding the subject of autonomy.

In the newspaper HERTS Professor Dinstein wrote, "What is striking here is the fact that in the discussions held so far, they have missed the point. By 'main point' we mean that it is necessary to make an absolute distinction in this matter between the West Bank on the one hand and the Gaza Strip on the other hand.

"It is true that in both these cases, agreement on autonomy has been reached in principle in the same document, among the same parties and in a single transaction. With all this, the transaction must be separated for the simple reason that the Jordanian government is not a party to the Camp David agreement.

"We must confirm and call attention to the fact that in anything having to do with the West Bank, Egypt does not have and has not had any right or demand or claim on this area.

"Egypt is not the master of the West Bank, and consequently has not had the power to approve of this or that authority there.

"From the legal standpoint, a settlement with Egypt over the West Bank is like a settlement with Czechoslovakia or Paraguay over the same area. The settlement is binding only in the bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel. It should be regarded as a conciliatory restriction Israel has taken on itself in connection with its powers in the region, while these powers originate from another source.

The Six Day War

"The source of the Israeli authority in the West Bank was and remains the combative theory, or in simpler terms, the Israeli occupation of this region in June 1967. In June 1967 the West Bank was an indivisible part of the Kingdom of Jordan, which possessed this region. The war, which the Israelis hastened to call the "Six Day War," in the legal relations between Israel and both Jordan and Syria is now 12 years old. Only a peace treaty with Jordan can bring about an end to the Israeli combative theory and replace it with an agreed autonomy settlement. In the absence of such a treaty, Israel will continue to occupy this region.

"Israel as an occupier will have the right of free disposal (as distinct from the right of ownership) in the West Bank, without the occupation ceding it one iota of sovereignty. Jordan will continue to be the master of this region.

"However, Israel has broad authority with regard to Jordan and the civilian population alike (as long as the occupation does not come to an end and the war is not terminated).

"The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is not relevant from Jordan's point of view. From Jordan's standpoint, Israel is still responsible for what happens in the region, and Israel continues to have the right to use its powers as occupier. However, Israel has committed itself to Egypt to use only part of these powers.

"Thus we should look at autonomy, according to the Camp David agreements, from Israel's point of view as a plus and not a minus in a mathematical comparison. The Camp David agreements do not give Israel any new powers which it did not have previously. However, Israel committed itself to Egypt to use only part of the powers it possesses as occupier at an appropriate time."

Historical and Legal Rights

"To tell the truth, official Israeli policy denies the rights of the Kingdom of Jordan on the West Bank. This is an untenable policy from the legal standpoint, because the West Bank is connected with the Kingdom of Jordan according to the law and the wish of the population by free choice. The question of rights over land is always one of affinity.

"Some people in Israel believe that Israel is the best, because of historical rights. But the legal rights which are based on international law are not determined in Jerusalem. With the exception of six legal experts (one-half Israelis and all of them Jews), every solid expert in international law throughout the world says that if Jordan does not have a right to the West Bank, it has priority in the right to the self-determination of the Palestinian Arab people. Israel in its time has objected to both the existence and the rights of this people. However, in the Camp David agreements and in a diplomatic coup unparalleled in the history of Israel, the Israeli government officially recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just demands. Whoever does not want the immediate establishment of a Palestinian state should support the rights of Jordan to the West Bank."

Status of the Gaza Strip

"The situation in the Gaza Strip is completely different. There Egypt, not Jordan, was the ruler for 18 years. As opposed to what happened in Jordan, Egypt did not annex the area, and the legal status of the area remains a question mark. We can say that sovereignty over this area was frozen in 1948. It seems that Egypt saw and continues to see itself as a custodian assuming responsibility for the rights of the Palestinians in the area. However, the writer of this article is not an orientalist and has not made an in-depth study of Egyptian opinion in this connection. In any case, the war with Egypt has ended in a peace treaty, and with the end of the war, the Israeli combative theory has also come to an end in the Gaza Strip.

"The autonomy settlement which was decided at Camp David is a settlement concluded between Egypt, the state from which the land was taken, and Israel, the state which was the former occupier. Israel no longer has any powers in the Gaza Strip, except on the basis of the Camp David agreements. Thus autonomy, in accordance with these agreements, must be regarded from the Israeli point of view, not as a minus, but as a plus. Ostensibly, Israel should have completely evacuated the Gaza Strip, just as it committed itself to withdraw from the entire Sinai. However, the Camp David agreements allowed Israel to remain in the area, temporarily at least, with the observance of autonomy and within the framework of the prescribed conditions. Here there is no need for Jordan's approval. Just as Egypt has nothing to do with the West Bank, Jordan has no right to the Gaza Strip. There are only three acceptable elements of the Gaza Strip: Egypt, the Palestinians and Israel. Two of these have reached a settlement agreed on at Camp David. Now matters will proceed on the basis of this settlement."

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DEFENSE MINISTRY POSITION ON AUTONOMY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 May 79 p 13

[Article by Ze'ev Shif: "More Moderate Than the Prime Minister"]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense Holds a More Pragmatic Position on Both Substantive Issues as well as on the Tactics to be Pursued in the Negotiations on Autonomy

Already before the beginning of substantive negotiations on autonomy between Egypt and Israel, it has become clear that the Israeli commission to the negotiations lacks a unified stand. The six Israeli ministers arrived at the opening session with differing attitudes on substantive issues. The tip of the iceberg of such differences of opinion could be discerned in the deliberations of the expanded commission and in the deliberations of the government on this matter. The commission of six came to the discussions without holding a serious preliminary session with the purpose of outlining and summing up the tactics to be pursued by Israel in the anticipated clashes of the negotiations. A meeting that was to have taken place between the chairman of the commission, Minister of the Interior Burg, and the minister of defense, was postponed at the last minute by Ezer Weizman. Mr Burg attacked Mr Weizman's positions in one of his speeches, and even Mr Dayan, minister of foreign affairs, did not escape Mr Burg's censure when it became clear that Dayan's positions on the question of autonomy were opposed to his. In other words, the Israeli delegation entered the negotiations on autonomy in a state of divided opinions, which was not the case at the time of the Sinai negotiations. The delegation is not properly coordinated, and it is doubtful if it has drawn uniform lessons from the previous negotiations.

The question is raised whether one can locate, among the various points of view on the commission, the position of top Defense Ministry officials on the question of autonomy. The answer is that such a position does exist, but in no sense does this position express all of the viewpoints and shades of opinion of the highest officials of the Defense Ministry, including the IDF. It is doubtful whether such a uniform position could at all be crystallized. It ought to be remembered that ever since assuming his duties as minister of defense, Mr Weizman has made every effort to keep the

military from intervening in political matters. Such was the case during the tenure of Mordekhay Gur as chief of the General Staff, and so it is today when Rafael Eitan occupies the same post. For that reason there is no question at all of the "General Staff's position" on the autonomy question. No such point of view can be said to have crystallized. Rather, the IDF has taken a position on security and military matters related to autonomy.

Different Views and Approaches

Of course, senior commanders do have their personal opinions, but, as in the case of the Sinai withdrawal, the position of the chief of the General Staff was not the determining factor in the end, and the same holds true today: the position of Chief of Staff Eitan does not carry any special or decisive weight in the matter of autonomy. His opinion is that of one senior officer and it is doubtful if his minister, Ezer Weizman, has attached greater importance to it than to other points of view. Officers and department heads were invited to express their opinions on certain matters associated with the autonomy question, but even in this case there are no grounds for inferring that their views were accepted. More than just that: the position presented by the defense minister to the government and even the document dictated by his deputy, Mordekhay Zipori, during the autonomy deliberations, failed to cover other--or dissenting--points of view within the Ministry of Defense.

On the basis of this we may conclude that one cannot speak of a point of view on autonomy representing the ministry's top echelon. It is rather the position of the Ministry of Defense formulated in consultation with military elements on specific questions, but it does not necessarily express their point of view. Perhaps the most prominent factor of all in it is the work contributed by bodies involved in the planning aspect--as, for example, the Department of Planning, which until a few months ago was closely linked to the ministry and to the IDF, and was headed by Brigadier Avraham Tamir, who is now the advisor to the minister for national security. One may find in this position traces of work performed in the Department of Planning already in 1975, after the interim agreement with Egypt.

If we were to seek a heading which would characterize the general approach of the Ministry of Defense on the autonomy subject, we would not err, it seems to me, if we defined it as a more moderate, more pragmatic position--that is, if we compare it with the principles contained in the brief programs made public in the name of the Prime Minister, Minister Landau or the National Religious Party. This is likewise the case if we compare it to the detailed document submitted by the director general of the Prime Minister's Office, Dr Ben Elisher, who served as chairman of the committee of director generals and their representatives on the question of autonomy.

The approach of the Ministry of Defense to the tactics related to the negotiations resembles in many respects that favored by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Dayan. According to this approach, these negotiations should

concern themselves with the period of transition and not with the permanent state of affairs which will take place 5 years hence in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. From this it follows therefore that sensitive subjects ought to be deferred for another 3 years, when deliberations on their permanent status will begin. Similarly, in the Camp David conference, both succeeded in deliberately deferring a whole range of sensitive issues for future discussion.

The Right to Veto

What all this means is that there is no need, at this point, to examine such questions as sovereignty, borders, Jerusalem, etc. in minute detail. Of course, we are not to conclude from this that the Ministry of Defense is prepared to concede on these issues. The explanation is that a consideration of these issues at this point is likely to have a negative influence on the peace process with Egypt. It is thought that this also represents Sadat's approach, and if Israel is obstinate on this matter, the end result will be the collapse of the conference. Or we shall invite thereby even greater American pressure.

During this transition period the development of the peace process with Egypt will become clearer. Similarly, we will know better the intentions of the states on the eastern front towards us. Perhaps during this period it will be possible to persuade the local population that joint action with Israel on the future of the West Bank is a possibility. The truth is that few among the top officials of the Ministry of Defense are optimistic about the possibility of persuading the representatives of the population to take an active part during the year of negotiations in the negotiations themselves or in the setting up of the autonomy. For this reason the view has crystallized that in such an occurrence it would be better to begin by establishing a separate autonomy in the Gaza Strip. Such a result would enable Egypt to present a significant achievement. Such a plan would have a better chance of success with the local inhabitants, many of whom, as refugees, benefit from the economic link with Israel. Even Israel's apprehensions about this part of the country are less considerable, while the problem of Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip is less acute.

As for the "source of authority" there is agreement in the Ministry of Defense that this must be military control, even if it withdraws from the territory. While Israeli law will apply to the IDF and the Jewish settlers, yet the military authorities will delegate its powers, in matters relating to the Arab population, to an administrative council, which will issue legally binding regulations and ordinances. But it is emphasized in the Defense Ministry that he who delegates his authority is also empowered to withdraw it if such a need arises.

Precisely in the matters of water rights and government lands--which a majority in the government claims ought to remain under full Israeli control--there exists a more moderate approach in the Defense Ministry. Of

special interest is the ministry's approach to the issue of water rights. As is well known, it is feared that an excessive drawing of water in the West Bank would severely harm the underground water resources of Israel. The water needs of the West Bank inhabitants are, in contrast, recognized within the Defense Ministry. The problem, according to the latter, consists in making sure that such harm does not take place. There is no need to brandish an iron fist over the water resources in order to bring this about. All that is required is coordination and an agreement that Israel will hold veto power in such a coordinating commission. In the case of the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, the situation is reversed, because it is Israel in this case that must supply water to this part of the country, whose wells have for some time now been in a state of high salinity.

More than that: The coordination in regard to the matter of water rights should not be confined to the borders of the land of Israel, but should encompass the region as a whole. In the longer run we should return--according to this proposal--to the plan mentioned by President Sadat (in a conversation with the minister of defense in Salzburg) concerning the possibility of laying a great water pipeline from the Nile to the Sinai and the Negev. Regional planning would include also the incorporation of the waters of the Yarmoh and the Litani in the irrigation of the Jordan Valley. Obviously, such regional plans would have no chance of winning support (and this applies to more than just the Nile plan), if Israel adopts a domineering attitude that shows no concern for such coordination with the inhabitants of the West Bank in the matter of our common water problems.

The Ministry of Defense likewise reveals a more moderate position in the matter of government lands. First of all, the ministry is intransigent in its stand against the expropriation of private property for the needs of Jewish settlement and against the resort to security reasons for this purpose. Such was Mr Weizman's latest response (in the case of the 800 dunam near Shchem) and this is not the first time that he has responded thus. Secondly, the ministry does not accept the claim that the IDF is in need of over 700,000 dunam in the West Bank for its training exercises and firing ranges. The view is that one could be satisfied with less. The forces which would be left behind in the West Bank would be permitted to train there, but that does not mean that the ministry will support the claim that other forces would also be permitted to train in the autonomous territories.

The Consolidation of Existing Settlements

Regarding the question of government lands it is emphasized in the Defense Ministry that the future development needs of the Arab settlements should also not be forgotten, including the need for the absorption of the 1967 refugees, part of whom will no doubt be permitted to return to their homes. It is clear that when people speak of control of government lands on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, they are referring first of all to the Jewish settlement. The official position is that instead of setting up

tiny settlements on every hill, since these are more costly to protect and maintain, it would be preferable to concentrate on consolidating existing settlements. The plan calls for five such centers of concentration. The question currently asked within the halls of the Ministry of Defense is the following: Do we want more Jews in the West Bank, or do we want small and half-empty settlements? The consolidation plan is instructive in itself and merits detailed examination at a future date. At any rate, its purpose also is to avoid offending world public opinion, the Egyptians and the local population. It seems to me that on this issue there are shades of opinion among the heads of the ministry. Whereas Mr Weizman--as can be gathered from remarks during his meetings with President Carter as well as at the Camp David conference--is prepared to rely more on military presence and even to define before the Americans our aspirations concerning the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank, others like Mordekhay Zipori speak of a Jewish presence rather than of a military presence alone.

Be that as it may, the position of the Defense Ministry on autonomy is without doubt more moderate than the position of the prime minister or of the National Religious Party and Mr Ariel Sharon. The fact that this ministry is headed by two members of the Herut Movement does not mean that they are willing to swallow automatically every proposal put forward by the prime minister, who is also the leader of the movement. This holds true for matters related to the tactics to be pursued in the negotiations as well as for more substantive issues such as the granting of an automatic right to the Arabs to opt for Israeli citizenship, as proposed by Begin in his autonomy plan.

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PLO ROLE IN AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 30 May 79 p 2

[Editorial: "The PLO and the Autonomy Talks"]

[Text] The news report published yesterday in the name of sources close to President Sadat concerning the arrival of a senior representative of the PLO in Cairo for talks related to the autonomy negotiations between Egypt and Israel, shows us what difficulties lie ahead for us in the continued discussions on this complex subject. The report of the arrival in Cairo of the representative of Al Fatah, the "moderate" faction within the PLO, was published one day after Sadat declared that the PLO must take part in the peace negotiations in one of its future stages, while stressing that it is incumbent upon members of the terrorist organization to arrive beforehand at a "number of painful decisions." Sadat clarified that he is not talking about PLO participation in the negotiations in the near future, at any rate, not before the passage of the transitional period of 3 years. And so the call by the president of Egypt for the participation of the PLO in the discussions has no operative significance at this stage, but that does not mean that this matter will be without influence in the course of the autonomy negotiations. Most probably, Sadat wants to shake up and undermine the rejectionist front united against him by achievements that will prove that far from abandoning the Palestinian issue he considers the PLO a significant factor in the political process. The president of Egypt will do all in his power to blunt the bitter opposition in the Arab world to his political moves, and the autonomy talks are likely to provide him with the means for attempting to achieve that end. A deep chasm separates the positions of the two sides on the subject of autonomy in Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip and the signs are increasingly evident that Egypt will present a harsh position in the talks. The long and tortuous road of this affair has only just begun.

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CUTBACKS SHOW URGENCY OF COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PLAN

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 30 May 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Cutbacks in Accordance with a Scale of Priorities"]

[Text] The government's decisions concerning the recommendations made to it by the finance minister for curbing inflation--accepted yesterday by all of the ministers save one--demonstrate again how vital and urgently needed an emergency comprehensive economic plan is, in lieu of adopting measures in a patchwork method which at times is reduced to improvisations.

The recommendations of the Ministry of Finance, formulated in the wake of the publication of the economic index for April, and calling for an additional cutback of 7 billion Israeli pounds from the budget and which was to be implemented in one uniform across-the-board cut affecting the government ministries, was accepted with one essential modification: the total amount of the cutback will indeed remain unchanged; nonetheless, it was determined that the minister of finance will negotiate with his colleagues in the other ministries in order to establish the budgetary framework for each and every individual ministry. This means, in effect, that a uniform reduction will not take place, and that the size of this reduction in each individual ministry will be determined in accordance with criteria pertinent to them, with due consideration paid to their essential requirements and with the establishment of a scale of priorities.

Another major decision agreed upon by the government yesterday similarly deviates from the original recommendation of the minister of finance: A decision was taken in favor of a full linkage of the new development loans, to affect both the principal and interest--while the recommendations of Minister Erlich spoke of a 70 percent linkage. As was anticipated, this decision on the part of the government was met with fierce indignation by industry leaders, who argued that this decision signified, in effect, a cessation of investments in the productive sector, in industry, agriculture and tourism. One may fairly assume that the industrialists will wage a bitter struggle against this decision. The question is whether ways will be found to prevent stagnation and retrogression in industry without straying from the government's decision.

The government's decision to determine the framework of reductions in each ministry separately and not in a uniform, lump sum, serves as a basis for a more just distribution of the burden of the cutback, through a distinction made between harm caused to essential services and cutbacks to services which in an emergency economic period may be dispensed with. The widespread agreement voiced by members of the government concerning the position taken by the Minister of Education and Culture, Mr Zvulun Hamar, who claimed for his ministry special exemption from the cutback ratio applicable to the other ministries--will keep the harm done in the educational sphere to a minimum, while the original recommendations would have severely affected it. This decision should also be applied to the sphere of defense and to the social and relief services. It is to be hoped that in their disputes with the minister of finance, the various ministers will not be moved by questions of personal honor or reputation and that the cutbacks will be determined in accordance with the needs of state and society.

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CSO: 4803

EDITORIAL VIEWS OPENING OF AUTONOMY TALKS

Tel Aviv HAZOFEN in Hebrew 27 May 79 p 2

[Editorial: "With the Opening of Autonomy Talks"]

[Text] In the opening speeches of the autonomy talks begun in Beer-Sheba, each delegation spokesman expressed the position of his country in accordance with his own custom and taste. Technical talks in which each side will clarify its point of view in detail in regard to the general plan and in regard to each and every one of its articles [will follow].

The spokesman for the Egyptian delegation, Defense Minister Hasan Ali, praised President Sadat, as usual, by whose efforts the two countries of Egypt and Israel decided to sit down together and negotiate in order to attain "not a separate peace but rather a comprehensive order in the region." He mentioned the United States as a full participant in the negotiations.

From this he passed on to the essence of the matter: "President Sadat has emphasized that the Palestinian problem is the very heart of the entire conflict. It is our common responsibility to transfer authority from the military and civilian rule to Palestinian rule."

Unequivocal words. Self-determination, he said, is an inalienable right of the Palestinians. We have come here, he said in effect, to define the nature of the authority and the spheres of responsibility of the autonomous authorities in accordance with the Camp David agreements and the documents pertaining thereto.

In establishing the basic principle that Israeli authority is to be transferred to Palestinian rule, he elaborated on the incidental premises based upon the new authority: No territorial acquisition through war is to be permitted, in accordance with UN Resolution 242, and this basic principle is to be implemented in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. He went on to add: Arab Jerusalem will be a living testimony to the possibility of joint action and coexistence among all the nations and peoples of the region." He does not mention Jerusalem's partition again, but speaks of

"Arab Jerusalem" instead in a general way. He rejects all of the measures undertaken by Israel to change the demographic and geographic character of the territories by the establishment of Jewish settlements. They have no legal force. Egypt rejects all of the judicial and administrative measures relative to the change of status of Jerusalem. As far as she is concerned they are null and void.

And so autonomy consists of returning "the Arab territories conquered in 1967" and as its centerpiece the return of Arab Jerusalem to its former status.

The American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, the head of the American delegation, underscored that which has been already achieved and that which, it is hoped, will be achieved in the future, i.e., that the implementation of the peace treaty will serve as the corner-stone for a general agreement in the region.

Like the Egyptian spokesman, he too is of the opinion that the central problem in the Middle Eastern conflict concerns the "winning of rights for the Palestinian people," a problem that cannot be resolved at one blow and there is no escape from the step by step struggle to arrive at solutions in a logical and gradual manner.

In his conclusion he formulated his words with an effort at maintaining the balance between the two sides: "From the standpoint of Egypt he stressed the rights of the Palestinian people. From the standpoint of Israel, the solution to the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict will be made possible if Israel's right to a peaceful and secure existence receives full and complete acceptance."

The American balancing act omitted one very important matter. Israel's full right to live in peace and security throughout all parts of the Land of Israel. The Palestinian problem has already been solved in the east across the Jordan River.

The head of the Israeli delegation, Minister Dr Joseph Burg, opened his remarks with reference to the objective of the negotiations, i.e., the definition of the powers and spheres of responsibility of the autonomy for the Arab population of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. In spite of complex and numerous difficulties, he hopes that both sides will work hard together in order to reach a mutual agreement in an efficient manner.

"We are meeting in Beer-Sheba, the city of our common ancestors," the minister declared, "the meeting-place of the ancient-modern history of the land of Israel. Not far from here is the city of Hebron, where our patriarchs and matriarchs lie in peace, and beyond in the mountains of Judea, lies Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the Jewish people, whose foundations were laid by King David and where our prophets prophesied the vision of peace among the nations. Coexistence between the two nations is that which validates and lends force to the autonomy."

In these words, formulated as historic facts, namely, that Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel and Hebron the city of its patriarchs, he established in a most clear-cut way that Israel is attached by the reality of history to Jerusalem and Hebron and that there is no altering that attachment. It is the legality of tradition, which is as strong as the laws of nature.

As for the nature of the autonomy for the territories, it is necessary to clarify in the clearest possible way, said the minister, that "autonomy will not be able and cannot include sovereignty. We wish peace and comfort to the citizens of the territories, a matter of the first importance, but we reject in advance any discussion of an independent Palestinian state."

This is the crucial distinction governing the concept of autonomy for the Arab citizens of the territories. They will be able to manage their everyday affairs by themselves and for themselves, in conditions of peace and tranquility, but, as explicitly stated, without Palestinian sovereignty over the territories.

He added, in the sharpest possible terms, that there is not an ounce of doubt in the matter: "Israel will reject all proposals and pronouncements for the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The latter is a recipe for aggression and war, and would constitute a mortal danger for Israel and a serious threat to the entire free world."

With these words he expressed the essence of the Israeli position. Jerusalem and the land of Judea, Samaria and Gaza belong to Israel thanks to the ancestors of the nation and land. They belong to Israel, which has the right to preserve its security and peace.

This is a unique Jewish state that is one of a kind, the ancestral land of Israel, over against 22 Arab states, and absolute justice demands that we guarantee its existence while removing all danger from it. The people that was tried in the Valley of Death will be most scrupulous not to endanger again its very existence in a condition of real freedom [sic].

A succinct speech, embracing Israel's position within the positive framework of the granting of administrative rights to the Arab inhabitants in their internal affairs while maintaining the well-defined position that there is no connection whatsoever between autonomy and the desires and land of the patriarchs in the Cave of Machpelah [in Hebron], of King David and the prophets, in all its breadth and extent. This is the Land of Israel and belongs to the Jewish nation.

Minister Burg called for courage and prudence in the negotiations, with steadfast adherence to the goal and with the patience of those who build the ladder of peace rung by rung.

The wide gap separating the positions of Israel and Egypt, with the United States leaning in the direction of the Arabs, obliges us to pursue a long and exhaustive deliberation, faithful and patient until such time as the historical existential premises of the problem for the Jewish people are accepted.

PUBLIC POLL INDICATES POPULARITY OF ISRAELI PERSONAGES

Tel Aviv JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Jul 79 p 3 TA

[Article by Mark Segal, POST political correspondent]

[Text] Tel Aviv--Premier Menahem Begin's popularity is sagging. The popularity of Finance Minister Simha Erlich is at its lowest ebb, and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's is picking up.

These are the findings in the June public poll conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Center for the JERUSALEM POST.

Replies to another question, conducted among a representative sample, of 1,261 adults, elicited a big majority who do not think that President Yitzhaq Navon is interfering too much in politics.

Question: Who is best suited to be prime minister?

	June Poll Percent	May Poll Percent
Menahem Begin	45.4	49.9
Shim'on Peres	12.4	9.6
Yitzhaq Navon	1.9	1.8
'Ezer Weizman	3.2	2.6
Moshe Dayan	2.4	-
Yitzhaq Rabin	6.1	7.3
Others	3.5	4.1
Undecided	25.1	25.7

Question: Who is best suited to be foreign minister?

	June Poll Percent	May Poll Percent
Dayan	53.5	49.1
Abba Eban	11.3	13.5
Yig'al Allon	2.5	1.7

Weizman	1.7	1.3
Yitzhaq Rabin	-	1.4
Shimon Peres	1.0	-
Others	4.4	4.5
Undecided	25.6	28.5

Question: Who is best suited to be finance minister?

	June Poll Percent	May Poll Percent
Ehrlich	8.9	12.1
Ya'akov Levinson	4.0	3.7
Yehoshu'a Rabinowitz	3.7	3.7
Avraham Shavit	2.4	3.4
Arnon Gafny	1.0	-
Yiga'el Horowitz	-	1.6
Others	8.9	10.5
Undecided	71.1	65.0

In the poll, 62.6 per cent favored 'Ezer Weizman now for defense minister, compared to 62.8 percent in the May poll.

Center Directors Mina Tzemah and 'Amiram Yarconi, in analyzing the results, find Premier Begin particularly popular with younger people while declining in favor higher up the age scale. A profile of the average Begin supporter emerges: Low on the income and education scales, religious, oriental, not a member of the Histadrut, lives in a new town, blue-collar worker, born in Israel. His popularity continues high with Likud voters (81.7 percent) and the National Religious Party.

Opposition leader Shim'on Peres is particularly unpopular among younger people, army-age (8.9 percent). He is more liked among the upper income bracket and among the rural population. Peres' support for premier among Labor Party voters is only 30.5 percent.

As to Moshe Dayan, the pollsters note that older voters like him less than the younger adults do. Orientals like him more (57.6 percent) than those of Western origin (48.3 percent). He is more popular among Sabras (60.3 percent) than among others: The religious like him more than the unobserved, and readers of "Yediot Aharonot" favor him more than readers of others newspapers. New townships also prefer him. Among Likud voters, he is most popular (74.7 percent), slightly less among the NRP (59.7 percent) with a residual support among Labor voters (41.8 percent) and less among old DMC voters (28.6 percent).

Simha Ehrlich is not liked much in any section of the population. The pollsters note that no finance minister was ever a popular figure, but none ever sunk so low in public esteem as Ehrlich. Ehrlich finds his

highest measure of favor among men, younger people, orientals, religious, low-income, readers of "Ma'ariv", Sabras, Likud and NRP voters.

In response to the question - Do you think President Navon intervenes too much in politics? - the response was: Yes, 18.9 percent; no, 76.8 percent, and undecided, 4.3 percent.

The pollsters find more Likud and NRP voters in the "yes" category and more Labor and old DMC voters among naysayers. Some 30.6 percent of the 18-22 age group replied "yes" as did a quarter of the orientals, religious, low-income, and those not reading a newspaper.

The pro-Navon majority is particularly weighted among the 23-30 age group, higher up the economic and education scales, "Ha'aretz" readers and among academics and professionals.

CSO: 4820

ISRAEL

CHINA CONNECTION, ITS RELATION TO ISRAEL ASSESSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Jun 79 p 13

[Article by Shalom Rosenfeld: "The China Connection and the Jewish Question"]

[Text] China is not the first world power to try to penetrate the Middle East on the wings of fighter planes. It was preceded by four other powers, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who, for the sake of peace on earth, are filling the storehouses of the countries in the region to capacity with the latest types of arms.

The revelation of President Sadat in the matter of the planes from the People's Republic, however, has a unique importance, not only because of its immediate military outlook but also because of its political influences in the short run and its global strategic significance in the longer run.

China lags far behind the United States and the Soviet Union in arms production--especially planes and tanks--and also in its military and industrial technology.

Egyptian arms, old and new alike, are far superior to what China is capable at present of providing to Cairo, and 60 MIG-19s or even more (even in their latest style) will, of course, not be the determining factor in the balance of powers in our region.

Moreover, Egypt and China have been engaged in trade relations for several years, and, after the cancellation of the contract with the Soviet Union, Sadat has relied to a great extent on China for receiving substitute parts for the Soviet equipment in its hands.

The importance of this latest revelation by the president of Egypt is set, to some extent, by the timing and the linkage with the perennial struggle between the great powers to accumulate raw materials, transportation routes and strategic strongholds in Africa, the Middle East and, especially, in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, on the one hand, and, on the other, with Egypt's position in the region since the peace agreement with Israel.

It will not be too presumptuous , then, nor an additional sign of Jewish provincialism or egocentrism on the order of "the elephant and the Jewish question" if we use our imagination and examine the "China Connection" from the perspective of its potential with respect to Israeli foreign policy and its programs for economic development.

China made no secret of its support for Sadat's peace initiative and also greeted the signing of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel very warmly.

Following the political developments in Beijing is more difficult and limited, by the nature of things, than following reactions in the West and even in Eastern Europe. There is, however, abundant evidence that China's support of Sadat was unrestrained from the beginning of the initiative and during the talks to the point of taking an explicitly critical tone towards its critics in the Arab world, including the PLO. No doubt the strength of the opposition of the Arab "refusal front" after the signing of the agreement, and, especially, the participation of countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan which are pro-American in this "refusal front," aroused various thoughts in Beijing also. For ideological reasons and also because of differences with Russia, China is interested in preserving its revolutionary appearance in the eyes of the Third World, among whom the Arab nations represent a dominant force. And they are being cautious not to distance themselves too much from them. (Recently, China even accepted a substantial loan from one of the big Arab banks in Europe.)

There is, therefore, a special significance to the timing of Sadat's announcement about the acquisition from China. It attempts to prove that the Egyptian nation is not isolated in the international arena as the propaganda of the opposing Arabs and the Soviet Union attempts to portray them.

Of the three great world powers, two stand by Egypt's side, and this political fact lends Sadat a prestige both internally and externally.

There is no need to say that the People's Republic of China's support for Sadat's foreign policy, whose latest dramatic expression came in the agreement to furnish him with tens of MIG-19 fighter planes, derives entirely from the basic strategic Chinese grasp which is based on restraining the Soviet Union. In recent weeks, though, there has been a noticeable lessening of tension between them.

Anyone and anything which serves this purpose or, more cautiously, let us say almost anyone and anything serving this purpose, is received warmly in Beijing.

The Sino-Soviet struggle extends to the world powers and is by no means confined to the long land border between them. The ideological sabre rattling is only an accompanying melody. The real battle concerns spheres of influence, bases, waterways, "surfaces", and raw materials. The front of this perpetual war stretches from the horn of Africa to Vietnam. And the president of Egypt, pioneer of the dynamic anti-Soviet policy in the Middle East, is the most natural and desirable partner in this region and also a propeller with whose help China hopes to achieve a presence in our region in the days to come.

So much more when this partner is also the partner of the United States which, at present, China views as a key dam against the Soviet expansionist ambitions.

If things were cut up in politics--and especially in this matter of the world powers--according to "black" and "white" alone, without shadings and nuances of shades, what would be more natural than a change in China's relationship towards Israel in a polar way after the signing of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel?

A long time ago, I tried to say in a concise way that we, Israel, have something to offer China in exchange for the establishment of regular diplomatic ties, namely, the Soviet Union's hatred of the state of Israel. In this regard, it is most enlightening to follow the Soviet propaganda in foreign languages, especially Arabic, in recent months, about Sadat's peace initiative and China's support for it.

In the propaganda on local stations and Soviet newspapers, China is stigmatized as betraying the Arab cause generally and the Palestinians in particular. According to it, Beijing is supporting this initiative out of concern for Israel. Radio Moscow, in all its broadcasts in Arabic, spreads every rumor and piece of gossip about contacts between Chinese and Jewish leaders in the United States or between Chinese and Israeli representatives, in order to prove that a "four-sided treaty" is developing, led, of course, by the United States and including the People's Republic of China, Egypt and Israel.

On one of the Soviet broadcasts, for example: "Beijing hypocritically declares its support for the Arab liberation struggle, while actually at the same time it is joining the anti-Arab treaty together with American imperialism and Israeli Zionism at the expense of the basic interests of the Arab nation."

In another broadcast, Moscow went even further and revealed a great similarity between Chinese and Israeli policy. "The Maoists (a nickname for the Chinese in Soviet propaganda) and the Zionists covet territory that does not belong to them. The Maoists, like the Zionists, take advantage of people

of their own race in neighboring lands to further their own selfish ends. Beijing and Tel Aviv are trying to put forth vain excuses for their positions in Africa. Both--the Maoists and the Zionists--hate the Soviet Union a great deal, and they do not hesitate to carry out acts of aggression against neighboring countries."

In short, Beijing and Tel Aviv have one heart and one thought.

We can offer Beijing a basketful of Soviet accusations against the people of Israel, the State of Israel and Zionism.

Israel, of course, has something positive as well to offer China. As has been said, however, in politics things are not divided only into "black" and "white," and China's hesitation to establish open and full diplomatic ties with Israel--hesitations stemming, on the one hand, from ideological reasons and, on the other, from its position in the Third World--outweigh in this specific case the consideration according to which anyone who is opposed to the Soviet Union is, automatically, a friend to China.

Nonetheless, China's entry into the Middle East through the Egyptian door--undoubtedly with encouragement from the United States--opens possibilities for Israel which did not exist till now.

China's present behavior, especially of its strongman, Deng Xiaoping, demonstrated a great deal of receptivity to strong ideas in the field of foreign policy and also courage in their application.

China's moves towards Albania, Tanzania, Japan, Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the United States--in the making of treaties and their violation, in undertaking political outflanking maneuvers and military punitive expeditions--attest to the dynamic non-routine nature of its foreign policy.

If Israeli-Egyptian relations are strengthened through the normalization process between them, if the discussions on autonomy progress in a positive way, and additional Arab factors follow in the process of peace in the Middle East, then there is no reason that China should not change its relation towards Israel and designate a proper place in its strategic mind in the long run as one of the important strands in the world dam to reduce Soviet expansion.

Today, perhaps we will see this thing as less imaginary and less daring than the idea of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty seemed only 2 years ago.

9348
CSO: 4805

BUDGET FOR OIL SEARCHES APPROVED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Jun 79 p 5

[Article by Oded Shorer: "440 Million Pounds Approved for Oil Searches"]

[Text] The Finance Committee has approved the budget of the Energy Office.

The Finance Committee of the Knesset approved in its session yesterday in Tel Aviv the budget of the division of oil searches for the coming year amounting to 440 million pounds.

In the session which took place in "Asia House," Minister of Energy and Communication Yitzhak Modai continued his review before the members of the Finance Committee. During the session, the committee approved the budget of the bureau--156 million pounds for the regular budget and 3.5 million pounds for development.

Committee members approved an additional 20 million pounds for oil searches. All together, the government's part in looking for oil amounts to 30 million pounds. The rest will come from "Alma" field profits--approximately 410 million pounds.

The agreement of the Finance Committee with this addition which will also come from "Alma" field profits was confirmed after meetings held between people from the energy office and the committee in recent days.

In the development budget of the energy office, 600 million pounds are budgeted for research and development. Searches for oil are included in the development budget.

In the branch of oil searches, drilling in the green line will be stressed (about 12 drillings are anticipated), as will geophysical and geological projects.

In the planning of the oil searches, the energy office is relying on private investments for the realization of the drillings expected to take place this year.

Representatives of the energy office complained to the committee that the budgets presented by the budget department of the Treasury Office are too detailed, so that there is no room for flexibility in transferring from one section to another even when, at times, the matter is critical, such as in cases of financing the purchase of crude oil.

9348

CSO: 4805

ARAB MAN SAID TORN BETWEEN HIS LEGACY AND MODERN SOCIETY

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 10 Jun 79 p 9

[Article by Khalil Al-Bana: "Arab Society--Between Traditionalism and Modernization"]

[Text] The Arab society in these times is living through the most difficult stage through which the Arab Nation has passed. I do not exaggerate when I say that it is the most difficult test that it has experienced since World War I.

The Arab now is burning between two fires, between the concept of returning to traditionalism, represented by religion and the teaching of our ancestors, and the concept of adopting modernization, adjusting to the spirit of the age, in order to obtain something from the East or from the West. He is between this and that, in an unenviable position, as if he were between two millstones or at a crossroads. Does he criticize imitation and modernization, or does he discover the truth for himself and his roots in conviction and in his legacy?

At this stage, al-Halim stands confused, not knowing what action to take or what to do. He is between the mutual contradictions of some politicians, the ideologies and schisms of some religious men, and the clamorings and demagogic rantings of some intellectuals. Between all of those, he has lost the capacity to judge and the capacity to express himself. He has lost the ability even to think, and he lives grave-faced and despondent, lacking in balance. Exitways have been blocked in front of him, and his dreams are confused. He no longer can distinguish thin from fat or good from evil. He is in a position from which he cannot extract himself, as if he were in the neck of a bottle.

At this critical stage, two matters which have come together loom over us. It would be difficult or impossible for them to come together because they are mutually contradictory, as different from each other as the land is from the sky. How could one think for example that an Arab (and a Moslem) would extend his hand to shake hands with those who forcibly seized Palestine and expelled its people from every part, to sign

the peace treaty with them, the treaty of ignominy, shame and defeat, on account of the scores of thousands of martyrs and victims who gave their lives as a price for preserving the Arabism of Palestine, the first of the two kiblals [i.e. Jerusalem], the third of the blessed holy places, the point of departure of the Prophet, birthplace of the Messiah, Christ, and his pasture and the cradle of his message. How could one believe that a religious revolution with contemporary significance would be carried out in a non-Arab country during the second half of the 20th century, in order to demand that the people return to the purity of Islam, its code, its justice, and its spirituality.

Between these mutual contradictions lives our Arab man, ideas scattered, vision distorted, not understanding what he should do and how he should respond to the demands of contemporary modern life, after matters have entangled him and everything has become confused. Lacking clear vision, he no longer knows what he wants or what he doesn't want, as if he were between life and death, either immortality or oblivion.

Will the Arab society in its present "shameful" state rise from its stumbling? Will that Arab man after all that has and is happening "get up from his false step?" Will the Arab people, despite everything that stands in their way, awake from their sleep and follow the right path? Or would the belly of the land be better for us than the surface? This is the questioning and the question. We will start from here.

Return to the Past

One can only write about the Arab Nation's present situation, filled with contradictions which are revealed in its regional or popular factionalism and ideologies with which some of its individuals are preoccupied and in which some of its peoples believe or who seek refuge under their protection, by returning to the past for a little, since he who wishes to write about the present will have no ideas to help him without his making a connection with the past, because the past is a part of man's life, his culture, origins, and mentality. History and legacy cannot be easily stripped from man's life, because in dispensing with them, dispensing with his legacy, one has no past and will not have a present since in the past is his bridge, and in the present is the waystation, and in the future is hope. Between the bridge, the waystop, and hope the humanity of man is achieved. Certainly I shall return to the past from which we must draw a clearer picture of what it contains and a better idea of what it encompasses. Who were the Arabs, would you say, 1400 years ago and more, that is before the Muhammadan renaissance?

They were tribes scattered here and there, quarreling, feuding, fighting for the most trifling of reasons, weakness eating away the strength in them, while they seemed to say: "I shall help your brother, tyrant or tyrannized," and "If you are not a wolf, the wolf will eat you."

They were in ignorance, grazing their animals, living a miserable existence in alienation and disbelief. They had no country and no business, and their only concern was robbing and pillage. The only thing to bring them together was the offering of sacrifices to their idols, which did no good, since if one of them starved no one was there to support him or provide for his starving family except the one who made it. While they were wandering about in their errors and avoiding right, a prophet was sent to them from among themselves in order to convey to them their Lord's message and guidance, so that he could extract them from darkness, ignorance, and blind error and lead them to the light of knowledge, goodness, truth and justice, and so that they could become overnight the leaders of this world and the rulers of the two worlds due to the book in their hands and the sword which had the power to drive evil from the world. They entered Khosrau's portals, swept away Caesar's throne, and extended their state from China in the east to the Atlantic in the west, from middle Asia in the north to inner Africa in the south, and all of that in a period of a few years, which count as nothing in the reckoning of time. Their condition continued as excellent as could be. Their state flourished in science, knowledge, culture and art. It passed through its golden ages, during which solidarity, mutual security, love and cooperation prevailed. Every individual lived in harmony and peace and their society was distinguished by the purity of their hearts and souls. They were like a model to be followed, a shining example. Their condition did not last, "because permanence of condition is impossible." Matters turned against them and peoples assailed them. Their country was occupied by the Moguls once, and by the Tartars again, and by the Crusaders a third time. Their civilization collapsed and their souls languished. [What would have passed,] were it not for the men Allah sent them? They restored the nation to its reason for being and breathed into it the spirit of determination, belief, and resolution. Nur al-Din, Salah al-Din, Quttaz, Ibn Tashfayn, and Mahmud al-Ghaznavi appeared, all of whom drank from one well. That was reflected in their peoples. They were victorious after defeat, triumphant after catastrophe, and distinguished after disappointment.

Years passed one after another, and most of the Arab countries came under the shadow of Ottoman rule, who were Turks. They were by nature reckless people, and it was an age of decline, retardation and stagnation, intellectually, culturally, and scientifically.

The world convulsed, and the Industrial Revolution was born. People's lives turned upside down, and that produced changes in their concepts, beliefs and ideas. Nationalist movements in Europe appeared and men of the Arab East were affected by this appeal. They demanded independence from Turkey and liberation of the Arab countries. They strove to revive the Arab language and the Arab legacy and to spread the spirit of nationalism. Turkey used every device to divert the Arabs from their demands, but despite the wholesale arrests and executions which only increased the popular outrage, the liberation demands strengthened.

Some Arab countries, especially in the Arab Maghreb, entered into a new era of domestic colonialism which attempted to expunge the Arab and Islamic identity and alleged that some of these Arab countries were an integral part of their empires. Opposition spread, but the military superiority of the imperialists blocked all attempts at opposition and ended its spread.

World War I came along, and immediately a promise was issued giving the crowning touch to the idea of imperialist Zionism for the colonization of Palestine, so that it became a factor for the disunity of the Arabs and a wedge dividing the Arab body into two halves. Despite repeated revolts in Palestine, supported by the Arab peoples with money, men, and arms, nevertheless the plot was more than the defenseless people of Palestine could bear or that the Arab Nation could bear, since the majority of her peoples had not yet obtained their independence, or rather were still succumbing under the weight of imperialism and subjugation. Forces of injustice and hostility had gathered over the Arab Nation, and a number of its people were filled with dread and the heavy weight of concern. However, "scum is like the scum of the flood."

Torches on the Way

If the majority of Arab countries had succumbed for a long period of time under the shadow of occupation and subjugation, nevertheless many of this Nation's sons were not deceived by the glitter which the colonialists carried. But the events of the past two centuries tipped the balance in our Arab, Islamic world, and was a factor in the intellectual revolution which affected the Arab in particular and the Moslem in general. Close contact with European ideas and culture led to the desire of many to imitate this culture and to behave in like fashion. Intellectuals, writers and politicians, gasping in the rear of Western civilization, became prominent and they wished to adopt it in every aspect of life. They began to call for Europeanization, trying to replace Arab ideas, language, culture and customs, in terms that it was the model of the civilized way of life and progress, a perception by some of them of deficiency with regard to industry, creativity and science compared to the West. This group used all ways and means to cause the Arab Nation to lose its identity.

Among the leaders of those days, a cultured group arose who believed in the importance of science and the necessity for religion, and in the mixing together of the two. They took much from religion, by virtue of the fact that it is the religion of truth, justice and freedom, not submission, indifference, servility, and humiliation. They became prominent as the bearers of the torch in the East and the Maghreb. They were righteous fighters and distinguished thinkers. Al-Amir 'Abd-al-Qader al-Jaza'iri, who ignited the revolution for 14 continuous years against imperialism and the French occupation, appeared; Al-Mahdi in Sudan became prominent because of his fighting against English imperialism. This awakening gave its fruits to the reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad 'Abduh, who appealed to the East to arise from its fall, to unite and adhere to contemporary religious ideas. 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Muhammad Iqbal and others, many others, were among the members of the torch of freedom, and they paved the way for generations after them and left us a clear and specific history of the inexhaustible sacrifice and of the light and hope which they left behind. As a result many appeared from the Arab and Islamic regions giving guidance to the people and urging them to return to the book of Allah and the Sunnah of Allah's Prophet and to the solutions of religious law as a model of life in politics, economics, finance and relations, instead of man-made laws.

The vitality of these heralds has been increased after what happened in Iran recently, a matter which some consider an encouraging factor for the return to the past, far from the weaknesses of the West and the false pride of the East, because the judgment on what Allah ordered can be made from the standpoint that Islam is a religion and a legal state and a way of life. It is impossible to differentiate between its aspects for man as an individual or for man as a member of a group or in society. They attribute the reasons for what besets the Nation and the illnesses it suffers to its remoteness from religion. They believe return to religion is urgently required in order to arise from the fall which has caused suffering in society and to the individual Arab, because religion, according to their words: is the healing balm for the illnesses and disease which are tearing apart the Nation and rotting away in its being. This group itself in this appeal is striving in more than one way to enumerate the roots of its individuals. Nevertheless its one unswerving goal in rejecting the dissolutionism in the systems of East or West is to demand that the past in the Arab identity be preserved.

Either or

The Arab citizen stands perplexed, bewildered. He doesn't know what to do. Should he listen to the call of his emotions and his history and follow behind these heralds? Or will the spirit of the age be victorious in the end? Between applying religious thought and modern life lies a very wide gap.

He is between two magnetic appeals, one calling upon him to preserve his roots and his identity, and the other appealing to him to begin anew and have nothing to do with the past.

There is a hidden, quiet war between the two groups which is gathering supporters, and the Arab man is perplexed. Should he rally to the banner of the modernists who view religion as a relic of history and who demand its separation from the state since, in their opinion, there can be no progress, no development and no culture except through this separation? Or should he join those who view religion as if it were "opium" and the factor for indifference, servility, ignominy, stagnation, backwardness, and rigidity "because it generates a kind of schism which leads to intellectual and practical paralysis in man, which prevents him from being

a productive, effective human being. A condition such as this could lead to a disruption in thinking and an artificial separation between information and ideas and to killing the development of practical, objective, orderly thinking," according to Dr Sadeq Jalal al-'Azzam in his book "Criticism of Religious Thought."

This group cites examples for us in the civilization which the West attained after its separation of religion from the state or the East after its total alienation from religion. They attribute their development and progress to this separation and this alienation. Each of the two factions--the faction of return to traditionalism and the faction of imitation of the East or the West--strengthens its importance and everything that contributes to conviction, and each concentrates on the weak point of the other. The Arab is between this group and that, bewildered, not knowing what to do. Should we become alienated from religion, or follow divine guidance, or should we adopt from our roots, our history, our legacy whatever benefits us in our present lives?

Should we imitate the West with its materialism or the East with its apostasy? Should we return to our legacy, despite some of the contradictions in it, or should we express a new, middle-of-the-road concept, in which we would take from the East and from the West along with preserving our distinctive identity, so that we could march along with the spirit of the age but not avoid the truth of religion. That is the struggle, and a destructive struggle unless we can put an end to it, not by circumventing the problem or not facing up to it as if it were non-existent, but rather the limitation should be through the elements of progress, and the knowledge of what we want without convolution, circumvention, or equivocation, because there is nothing in this discovery which shouldn't yield to criticism. No tendency to subservience is advantageous to our position, and not adopting the entire legacy with its negative aspects and positive aspects will benefit us in our present lives. Without letting emotion master us, without fanaticism and factionalism, we shall select the best and soundest path. But how, when? This is the question that requires completing what we have begun.

A Look at the Legacy

Our legacy is replete with everything good and pleasant. There are many things in the literature and jurisprudence which have not been improved upon. Some would not permit this legacy to be touched, even though some of it is fakery, fanciful tales, contradictory matters and circumstances which do not advance us in knowledge or scientifically. The most harmful thing is for us to be content with this legacy, powerless to modernize our thinking by its aptness and its truthfulness, or to put it under the microscope or on the operating table. We should criticize it by modern, scientific means, and in this there is no call to diminish the legacy but rather a call to remove from the vestiges of the legacy that which is not in conformity with the spirit of the age. Not all of what is contained

in our religious legacy for instance must be sacrosanct, impossible to criticize or challenge, even though we take it as is without thorough examination in order to make it the symbol of our contemporary journey. Is it possible for the legacy in its entirety to stand up to scientific scrutiny and theories "or has it lost its capability with regard to our age because it revolves basically around the relationship between Allah and man, at a time in which we feel sleepless anxiety over the relationship between man and man," as Dr Zaki Najib Mahmud writes in his book "Modernization of Arab Thought."

Those who boast about the splendor of the past and the need to return to it should know that the contrasts and contradictions are still within it and do not benefit us in our present life, but rather would be a call to stumble around and be off balance.

Does traditionalism mean to take everything from the past, even though between the covers of many of those empty books there is nothing to feed our hunger, clothe our nakedness, or heal sickness. Most of them have a personal meaning which does not relate to what man can use in his life. What benefit would man in Arab society get from the poetry of Ibn al-Rafedh or from the writings of al-Siyuti and many others? Is he interested in knowledge of the nature of the heavens and the kinds of foods and beverages in paradise? Or is there a need for a legacy which is of concern to man in his present life and benefits him in his future life?

This impels us to be unconvinced by the legacy over the vagueness and the intolerance of criticism. Also the legacy was not tough on many of the problems from which society suffers. If there are theoretical principles in some of the legacy, nevertheless they are impossible to apply in our present times because they are suggestions which are left to man to either do or not and in which there is no compulsion.

What Is Next and What Do We Want?

We are now living in the second half of the 20th century and almost into the 21st; can time be overturned, or can we turn the hands of the clock back to the past, so that we can live in the age of purity and serenity, in the age of the Prophet or the times of the caliphs? Or is this longing a part of a vast indescribable fantasy which oversteps the bounds of reasonableness into morbid imagination, since our times in which we live belong to us and the times of our ancestors belong to them, and it is impossible to mix the two. The wheel of life revolves and man revolves with it; there is no stopping it and no substitute for it.

What is next, and where is the solution for the ambiguities which beset the Arab man with himself, his family, his associates in his job, and his destiny in his personal and public affairs in the present and in the future? Is it "the attempt to mediate between inherited religious beliefs and scientific knowledge and views toward which man is moving? This solution involves some concessions which religion makes on behalf of science

as a condition of preserving its foundation, its fundamental convictions and its inviolateness." This was quoted from Dr Sadeq Jalal al-'Azzam. Or is the solution in the creation of an Islamic society as the thinker, Sayyid Qattab says. "It is the society in which Islam is applied as a creed, as an interpretation, as a religious law, and as a system of morals and behavior."

Or is it to combine the two solutions which are causing the phenomenon of a serious split in man?

Do we go in the direction of the West or do we throw in our lot against it? Do we head toward the East or do we aim our weapons toward it?

Or is there something in our religion and our legacy which will spare us from error and direct us with our hearts, minds, and souls toward divine guidance?

A question which could be answered if Arab society comes of age.

7005

CSO: 4802

POLAND-JORDAN CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION PROGRAM SIGNED

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 18 Jun 79 p 3

[Text] Jordan and Poland signed here yesterday a cultural and scientific cooperation program to cover the next 3 years. The program calls for the exchange of experts, educational delegations, professors, lecturers, technical delegations, and scientific information, and to encourage cooperation in the field of antiquities between the institutions of education and research in the two countries.

The [agreement] also calls for cooperation in terms of information exchange between the Jordanian and Polish news agencies, and for cooperation between the Jordanian journalist guild and the Polish journalist union, and between the radio and television institutions, including the exchange of films, and serials, and the setting up of study groups for commercial television films.

In accordance with the program the Polish Government will offer 18 courses of study in the Polish Universities [to Jordanian students] lasting from 6 months to 7 years, for upper division and middle level studies in the fields of economic and regional planning, research, and the gathering of information.

The program was signed on behalf of the Jordanian Government by Dr Hana 'Audah, president of the National Planning Council, and on behalf of the Polish Government by the Polish ambassador to Jordan who resides in Damascus. This program comes as a fulfillment of the cultural agreement which the two countries signed in 1977.

9814

CSO: 4802

INSTITUTION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL CITY UNDERWAY

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 20 Jun 79 p 3

[Text] The institution for the development of the capital took up the challenge yesterday to provide public services, and to reduce the degree of hardships which the capital suffers and develop public safety services.

The institution for the modernization of the capital was founded as a public joint stock company whose capital is 10.5 million dinars put up by the security and settlement bank of the capital and by the pension fund.

The administrative council of the institution held its first meeting last Saturday. In attendance was Mr Muhammad Al-Dibas, minister of finance. During the meeting, the primary measures were taken to begin implementation of the suggested proposals, and to make them become a reality. Mr Mu'an Abu Nuwar was elected president of the administrative council of the institution for 3 years, and Mr Zuhayr Al-Khoury was elected vice president of the administrative council for 3 years also. An administrative and technical committee under Vice President Mr Zuhayr Al-Khoury was formed to keep tabs on the activities and projects of the institution.

Sources of the institution said that the institution layed down a program embracing the priorities of the projects which it will implement in the capital to provide public services, land utilization, setting-up markets, trading houses, and providing the necessary facilities for public transportation, and to spread out the projects in a way that will benefit the inhabitants of the capital.

Among the projects which they decided to implement was a parking garage which will provide up to 400 parking places and a parking garage project on Prince Muhammad Street which will provide 750 parking places in addition to the offices and depots which both projects will include.

The law grants the institution the right to buy land and to sell it after subdividing it and providing it with public services, and for ownership, renting, leasing, selling, and for the investing in various kinds of

buildings, agricultural and industrial projects, and in other projects including the erection of residential buildings, offices, warehouses, hotels, apartments, parking lots, and shopping and business areas. The law also allows for the participation in any company or institution or any project with similar goals and advantages, including the participation in the administration of this company [itself] and institutions, projects and businesses, and their direction, as long as it serves the interests of the institution and its goals.

9814

CSO: 4802

PROPOSED ARMY PROMOTIONS MEET WITH CRITICISM, OPPOSITION

Promotions Criticised As Being Partisan

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Jun 79 p 1

[Text] What is going on in the army command over the officers' promotions?

Political circles have been circulating this question for a week now, ever since news leaked out confirming a series of promotions prepared by the army command. A whole group of reservations were stirred up, which required Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss to reject the promotions after they were studied by the military council.

Informed political sources feel that the issue's significance is not limited to "serious mistakes" made in the promotions, but goes beyond this to the existing policy of managing the affairs of the entire military organization, especially after the start of application of the new national defense law.

The sources point out some practices and put many question marks alongside orders issued by "some" of the army command, the most recent of which pertained to the incidents at Jarudi al-'Aqurah. The facts indicate that the "Sarba Army" did not move of its own accord against the Arab peacekeeping forces blocking the mountain road between Hadath Ba'albak and Afqa, but was following orders from certain parties in al-Yarsah. (This is in addition to the information that there are those who affirm that the higher authorities in Lebanon had advance knowledge of the road's opening and had expressed their approval.)

The sources themselves also observe that attempts are being made to make the army seem divided against itself. In al-'Aqurah there have emerged two diametrically opposed forces in a single army--the "Sarba Army" with the militias, and the Baqa' force protecting the Islamic villages. This might put the two of them in complete conflict with each other, as happened with the Arab peacekeeping forces.

The sources revealed that since the passing of the new defense law, the "Lebanese Front" has plunged into a battle against a number of officers, by means of well-known agencies in the army, "which calls for a campaign to straighten matters out and prevent tutelage over the army and its organisations."

The sources say that the main threads of the battle were revealed when the orders for officers' promotions were drawn up more than two weeks ago. It became clear that they contained the names of all the officers who fall under the command or control of the intelligence directorate (the Second Branch), most of whom fought in the ranks of the "Lebanese Front" parties during the two-year war.

The sources add that the orders disqualified all those officers whom influential agencies in the leadership described as being "sympathetic in one way or another with Damascus and with the general national trends." Add to that the disqualification of the names of a large number of Moslem officers who refused to follow the al-Yarsah orders during the war or who stayed at home.

The information indicates that the orders for promoting those of the rank of major and above have been frozen for the present, are in the hands of Defense Minister General Victor Khuri, after Secretary General of the Military Council Col Nabil Quraytia expressed reservations about them.

As for the promotions prepared by the command, they include automatic promotions, seniority promotions, and promotion withholdings.

It has been learned that the seniority promotions, which are the gist of the problem, include a large group of intelligence directorate officers on the pretext that "those officers performed a great service to the army and the nation, and helped strengthen the structure of the military organization!" They also include a group of officers known for their connection with the "Lebanese Front," some of whom we might mention:

1. Maj Francois al-Zayn, one of the officers who participated in the Sulayma massacre, the victims of which included 48 women and children of the al-Masri and Bu-Sa'id families. (Official reports confirm his participation in the massacre alongside Officer Ilyas Khalil.) The command has requested a seniority promotion of 6 months for him.
2. Capt Nasib 'Id (there are reports confirming his leadership of the Kata'ib war council during the incidents); the command has requested a seniority promotion of 8 months for him.
3. Ist Lt Yusuf al-Tahhan (one of the military leaders known to have been in Sarba during the two-year war, and who had a prominent role in leading a number of battles); the command has requested a seniority promotion of 6 months for him.
4. Officer Shamil al-Muwasiyah (who participated in the Khika battles); the command has requested a seniority promotion of 6 months for him.

The findings indicate that the army command has in turn promoted some Moslem officers in order to get them to agree to the promotions, while excepting all the Baqa' officers or whomever is known as a "vanguard officer," and decreeing a delay in their seniorities. It has also delayed the promotion of Lt Col

'Ali 'Ala'-al-Din, who uncovered the Aquamarina scandal, Capt Edward Mansur (brother of Deputy Albert Mansur), and Officer Lucien Barakat, a close friend of former President Sulayman Franjiyeh.

The command also placed under the promotion withholding clause the names of Officers Maj Sa'd al-Haddad, Lt Col Muhammad Salim, and 1st Lt Ahmad al-Khatib.

The fact remains that in the opinion of political circles, this army policy will never strengthen the army's structure on the basis of the required national balance, which is the slogan on the basis of which the government acts, especially with respect to the military organization. The absence of this balance is one of the immediate causes of this organization's decline during the civil war.

Comments By Politicians

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 29 Jun 79 p 5

[Text] The orders for promotions in the army command, which AL-SAFIR revealed the day before yesterday, have stirred up concern among parliamentary and political circles, and a number of responses have been issued calling on the government to "learn a lesson from the past" and take responsibility for what has happened up til now within the military organization.

Yesterday informed sources revealed that, of all the goals which the army command is striving to achieve through giving some officers the right to seniority promotions, one main goal is that there are a number of empty positions in the military organizations which have been newly created by the new defense law and which in coming periods will have to be filled.

Therefore the command is now trying to pass these promotions, which Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss has rejected, and to halt other promotions until appointment time comes around, so as to enable the command to get its officers into these positions, inasmuch as seniority plays a basic role there.

Yesterday a number of politicians commented on the dimensions of the officers' promotion bill. Rashid Karami said, in reply to a question, "After the promulgation of the defense law and the formation of the military council, it was proven that the mentality remained the same and that the required change in spirit was not being achieved, especially since the organizational regulations have not yet been drawn up. As for the promotion bill, I have received reservations about it from some members of the military council itself, which have led to its non-issuance and its being frozen by the prime minister."

Karami added, "Therefore, we remind everyone that erroneous practices will not restore security and political stability to Lebanon, and will not put it on the road to revival and consolidation of unity, because deceit is not dealt with in this manner, and fear is still the way to chaos."

Malik Salan

Former minister Malik Salan said, "If AL-SAFIR's information about what is going on in the army is correct, which I assume it is, then I feel nothing but extreme regret, since it will only lead to the sowing of discord and the creation of bitter feelings in the army ranks, which are still creeping along." He added, "It also appears that the officials are not aware of and do not yet understand that what has happened in Lebanon would not have happened if it were not for the army's partisan nature, which we reject and which led to its dissolution."

Salan said, "Lebanon cannot get up from its fall except through the unity of its people and a mutual understanding about its army. This army cannot build a basis for itself unless it is a national army balanced according to the Bayt-al-Din conference resolutions, whereby this national army would consider Israel and Israel's allies to be its enemies, not its allies, and whereby those who conduct this national army's policy would distinguish between the national officers fighting against Israel and the traitorous officers who cooperated or are cooperating with Israel or its allies."

Fu'ad Lahhul

Deputy Fu'ad Lahhul said, "I am not familiar with the details and fine points of what was published in AL-SAFIR, but I would not be surprised if matters had taken their natural course in the Defense Ministry and that what is now happening is the final result of two basic matters. The first is the phenomena which accompanied the formation of the military council, whether from the standpoint of terminology or from the standpoint of appointing its members. When the defense law was drawn up, it was my idea to establish a military council as exists in all the countries of the world, whereby the members of the military council would be free from all pressures and currents. I wanted it to be formed of officers who had reached their promotional peaks and who in the future would not be under the command of one another. Therefore, the basic proposal called for forming the military council of five general officers representing the basic army positions: the general secretariat of the defense council, the general directorate of the Defense Ministry (the military chamber), the army command, the general administration directorate, and the inspectorate general.

"All of them would be major generals, and would have reached their promotional peak and would be close to retirement age, so that their decisions would be more impartial and so that the actual exerting of any pressure on them would be lessened. Inasmuch as the council would be composed of five such officers, it would not have a strictly militaristic nature."

Lahhul added, "But regrettably, they intentionally, deliberately and sneakily dismissed the senior officers and did not agree to some of them returning to take over the principal posts, among them membership in the military council. I regret to say that through maneuvers and circumventions they are striving to dwarf the position of military council member, except for commander of the army. Inasmuch as we wanted the unanimous approval of the defense

law, so that we would never be suspected of being in opposition, we unwillingly accepted all that, letting the passage of time show right from wrong. This encouraged them to continue instituting peculiarities by means of appointing officers to the military council. So that they could appoint the officers they wanted, the day the defense law was published they started modifying it. We became furious and opposed this, along with some of our colleagues, among whom I might mention Nasia al-Qadiri, Hasan al-Rifa'i, and Munir Abu-Padil. But it was wrong for Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss to approve these modifications even though we had warned him of the danger of their forming the military council as we had expected. Today the crunch has come, and today he violently opposes the promotions which the Defense Ministry intends to pass. He is right now, because everything has a good and a bad side.

"Second is the appointment of Army Commander Victor Khuri as defense minister and his operational retention as army commander. Thus the defense law has been aborted from birth, i.e. before its implementation. In vain General Khuri tried to reject the Defense Ministry portfolio, but later he gave in to the pressure. I would have liked him to have been harder, for he is an officer and a fighter, but the chair was tempting, and pleasing the chiefs was tempting as well. Therefore, all the measures adopted in the defense ministry and all the regulations and instructions for applying the defense law will guarantee basic defects, what with General Khuri's being commander of the army and defense minister at the same time."

Lahhud said, "I would like once again to remind the general what has befallen all the former army commanders when they weakened in the face of the government and its inclinations and cravings--they were dismissed, or died, all of them forgotten. What has happened in the past must be taken into consideration.

"As for the regrettable incidents which happened recently in the al-'Aqurah region, they will be the subject of a defense committee session on Friday."

Deputy Lahhud ended by saying, "In any case, if the defense officials continue following the present course, some day we will not have an army, but will go from setback to setback. The drum-beating, horn-blowing and propagandizing is misleading the public opinion. I am doing today what I did ever since 1972--ringing the alarm bell. I say that there is no army in Lebanon yet, and that the government is responsible, and not the military, which is militarily, patriotically and morally capable."

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TRANSFORMATION BUDGET ALLOCATIONS TO MUNICIPALITIES DETAILED

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 29 May 79 p 3

[Article: "34 Million Dinars Were Spent in 3 Months From Allocations of Municipalities Sector; Total Allocations for This Sector in 1979 Transformation Plan Amount to 155 Million Dinars; Contracts To Implement 58 Projects at a Total Cost of 81 Million Dinars"]

[Text] Allocations for the 1979 transformation budget for the municipalities sector amounted to 155 million dinars. During the period from the first of January till 31 March 1979 a total of 34 million dinars was spent; that is 21.9 percent of total allocations.

The quarterly report that was issued by the Public Popular Committee for Planning stated that contracts have been concluded to implement 58 projects [whose cost is] estimated at 81 million dinars or 149 percent of the contracts that were concluded in the same period of 1978. These had amounted to approximately 54.2 million dinars. The report explained that the program for building consumer societies had received the larger share of these contracts. Contracts for consumer societies projects amounted to 56.7 million dinars, and that represents 70 percent of the total contract concluded in the first quarter of this year.

The report indicated that the funds which were committed to different program projects of the municipalities sector of the 1976-1980 transformation plan are estimated at 906.8 million dinars; that is 115.6 percent of total plan allocations. The balance of these obligated funds until 30 March 1979 amounted to approximately 472 million dinars.

This year 22 water wells have been dug; they produced approximately 22,200 cubic meters of drinking water per day. Nine water pumping stations whose capacity is 17,700 cubic meters per day have been built; and 32 water tanks whose capacity is 17,800 cubic meters have been built. A water system that is 44.4 kilometers long has been built, and a pumping station that pumps 360 cubic meters per day has also been built. A 58 kilometer road has been built and paved, and lights have been installed on 80.5 kilometers of roads. Three parks have been built, and five slaughterhouses have also been built in 1979.

The report indicated that total allocations for the drinking water program amounted to 29 million dinars and that expenditures from 1 January until 31 March 1979 had amounted to 7 million dinars or 26.9 percent of allocations.

[A total of] 50 million dinars has been allocated for the sewage projects program this year. During the first quarter of 1979 the sum of 9.3 million dinars was spent; that is 18.6 percent of total allocations.

[A total of] 8.5 million dinars was allocated to the 1979 Environmental Development and Protection Program. During the first quarter of 1979 half a million dinars were spent; that is 6 percent of allocations.

Allocations for the Planning, Research and Training Program during the 1979 Transformation Plan amounted to 1.5 million dinars. By 31 March 1979 the sum of 600,000 dinars was spent, and that is 40 percent of total allocations.

Allocations for building consumer societies during the same period amounted to 30 million dinars. During the first quarter of 1979 a total of 6.4 million dinars was spent, and that is 21.3 percent of total allocations.

The sum of 4 million dinars was allocated to the program to build tunnels and bridges. By 31 March 1979 the sum of 3.4 million dinars had been spent, and that is 84.3 percent of total allocations for this year.

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DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS SHOW GREAT GAINS

Abu Kammash Chemical Complex

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 21 May 79 p 3

[Text] The glorious revolution of the first of September is devoting much attention to basic industries in al-Jamahiriyah and to the industrial projects whose production depends on natural primary materials, on chemicals and on other resources.

When the chemical complex in Abu Kammash is inaugurated next year--75 percent of this project has been completed--al-Jamahiriyah will enter into a new phase in the world of industry and industrialization. Our colleague 'Abd-al-Salam al-'Alim undertook this investigative report. Having met with officials of the complex, he is able to spell out the most important resources upon which the complex depends in its industries. He also indicates and enumerates the most important industrial products that the complex will produce when it is inaugurated. This pictorial inquiry which was photographed by our colleague Salim al-Zantani sheds some light on an important industrial stronghold. It is one of the achievements of the glorious revolution of the first of September which is destined to become a productive resource for [our] self-sufficiency in all areas. It may thus be said that the entry of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah into the stage of basic industries is considered a great step towards building the new society and meeting its needs, if luxuries were not a basic supplement to all the necessities of life. This advanced and developed stage has not yet been achieved by many countries even though they had begun their industrialization programs year before we did. This is because the revolution has been persistent and has been determined to launch an economic revolution to diversify production instead of letting the national economy depend on oil only as its principal source of revenue. Oil may one day be depleted. It is for this reason that the glorious revolution of the first of September thought of undercutting exploiters. It resolved to build a strong and a stable economy that would also be an alternative resource to oil. In addition, it had the basic objective of attending to the country's manpower and its labor force. This labor force is the significant factor in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. This is because the objective of the industrial revolution is to increase workers' production efficiency by

means of training and education; to achieve an ideal use of the country's capabilities; to provide facilities and raw materials; and to guarantee work opportunities in all areas.

The Abu Kammash Plant

Our investigative report is about one of the large and great industrial strongholds; the Arab Libyan citizen should be proud of the fact that it exists on his land. It is the Chemical Complex in Abu Kammash, and it is considered a basic and an exacting industry. The fact that we are manufacturing things like chemical products represents a wise decision on the part of the glorious revolution of the first of September to utilize the primary materials that can be found near the plant. This is what Project Consultant Mr Young Reid told us. He also told us that this project is considered one of the largest petrochemical projects in the Middle East. The present magnitude of the project and the possibilities for future expansion were taken into consideration when the contracts for it were drawn up. After the area is linked to the railroads and construction on the Port of Zawarah is completed, the project will be considered an important one that utilizes the natural resources that are located near the plant, including the salts of the salty marshes, energy from oil and manpower. The consultant added that the project will lead to a comprehensive resurgence especially after industries that depend on products manufactured by the complex are established. Such industries include plants for molding plastics, for pipes, for packaging and canning, for bags and for boards. They include industries that depend on caustic soda and chlorine such as the detergents industry, vegetable shortening, soap and the pesticides industry, etc. The project will also create new elements of skillful workers who will become the nucleus for the implementation of similar projects, Mr Young Reid affirmed that the industrial project at Abu Kammash will be competitive and that it will also dominate European and African markets at competitive prices. This is because raw materials and energy are available. In addition, al-Jamahiriyah's location is unique because of its proximity to the centers of consumption. Furthermore, the products of the complex have select, superior features, and the demand for such products is increasing.

The consultant praised the project and said that it would render significant services to the national economy and that it would also play an important role in the Arab region, in Africa and in the world. He also said that this project will enable the Arab and the African regions to achieve self-sufficiency in the aforementioned products and that this would have farreaching consequences [on the region]. In addition, it will provide material profit when production begins.

The Location of the Salt Marsh and the Project

The salt marsh of Abu Kammash and the project is located in the western part of al-Jamahiriyah, 165 kilometers from Tripoli. The marsh occupies an area of 50 square kilometers. The project depends on extracting table salt from the natural salt marshes. The complex will turn this salt into caustic soda, hydrochloric acid and polyvinyl chloride plastics. All these are very important chemicals that have a variety of usages.

Raw Material Reserves

It is unknown how long these salt deposits have existed, but they have been increasing continuously because of the continuous filtration of water from the sea. This filtration causes the formation of a layer of salt that averages 30 centimeters in thickness. This layer is divided into two porous layers that contain saline solutions. The first layer is made of gypsum and porous rock, and the second layer is made of salt. The salt reserve in this [second] layer is approximately 170 million tons; and the reserve solutions amount to approximately 19 million cubic meters. This quantity is semisufficient and non-depletable. When salt and salt solutions are taken out of the marsh, they are replaced by means of the filtration of the sea water that takes place through the sand and rock barrier. The afore-mentioned salts thus either dissolve in the water solution or rise towards the surface where the water evaporates and the salts settle and form deposits. This process increases the salt deposits in the marshes. It has been going on for thousands of years and will continue for several centuries in the future.

Kinds of Products

After various possible products were considered and the capability of the local as well as the international market to absorb these products [was given careful thought], production of sodium chloride was selected. It will be produced from the salty solution of the marshes. Some of this sodium chloride will be consumed locally, but most of it will be used within the chemical complex itself. It would be dissolved in water in a concentrated saline solution and then decomposed by electrolysis to produce chlorine and caustic soda. Most of the caustic soda is to be exported, and the rest is to be marketed locally. But most of the chlorine is to be used in the complex where it would be combined with ethylene in the production of vinyl chloride which is turned completely into polyvinyl chloride plastics, (PVC). In addition to these principal products, other products will be produced such as hydrochloric acid, sodium hydrochloride and hydrogen gas.

Table Salt

The annual world production of salt is approximately 200 million tons. Pure salt is used in chemical industries for the production of chlorine, caustic soda and sodium chloride. It is also used in other industries such as the preservation of fish and canning vegetables and fruits. It is used in feeding cattle, in tanning hides, in refining oil and in melting snow. In addition, salt is a nutrient.

Caustic Soda

World production capacity of caustic soda amounts to approximately 25 million tons. Caustic soda is used in the manufacture of aluminum, rubber, soap, industrial detergents, paper and rayon. It is used in the treatment of vegetable oils, in the drug industry, in the textile industry, in the food industry and in different chemical industries. The local market will absorb approximately 15,000 tons annually of an estimated annual production of 49,000 tons. The rest of the plant's production will be exported.

It is noteworthy that at present there is a major shortage in these industries throughout the world. Demand for this product is increasing because of its high degree of purity. For example, the development of the aluminum industry and also of the paper industry in African and Arab countries will require many times more this quantity. There cannot be a paper industry or a rayon industry without caustic soda.

Chlorine

The annual capacity of this plant in chlorine production amounts to 45,000 tons. About 40,000 tons will be used inside the plant, and the remaining 5,000 tons will be sold locally. Chlorine is used in bleaches, in the paper industry, in the textile industry, in water and sewage treatment, in the manufacture of pesticides, in industrial detergents, solvents, paints, plastic fire extinguishers and chemicals. According to ongoing studies 5,000 tons of chlorine will be sufficient for local consumption.

Polyvinyl Chloride (Plastic)

World production of polyvinyl chloride in 1974 amounted to 13.5 million tons. The figure for next year's production is expected to be 22 million tons. The importance of (PVC) is due to the fact that it is a multi-purpose thermoplastic and that it combines readily with different stable products as well as dark colored products that would ultimately give it the required specifications as far as strength, sturdiness and beauty are concerned. It can also be easily combined with other plastics. It may be said that it can be used in innumerable ways: in electrical tools, cables and others; in cars, airplanes and other means of transportation; in table cloths, in chairs and also in hoses, pipes, homes and industries, in floors and carpets in homes and offices. It can be used in packaging foods and in household containers as a substitute for glass containers and glasses. It can be used for packaging, for wrapping and for making bags as well as transparent and opaque sheets. The varieties of polyvinyl chloride that will be produced by the complex are considered to be among the best kinds of plastics in the world that are suitable for all kinds of molding--extrusion molding, grouting, blowing, casting, drawing and compression molding. It is estimated that local market consumption as of 1980 will be from 10,000 to 15,000 tons annually, especially after new fields for this product will be found and part of this production will be exported as a raw material.

Hydrochloric Acid

The local market will be able to bear the quantity of hydrochloric acid that will be produced. Hydrochloric acid is used in excavations, in drilling for oil and in oil refining. It is used in laboratories, in the chemical industry and in the metal industry.

Operation of this giant complex will require 1,150 workers and engineers divided as follows: 30 engineers and chemists; 85 production supervisors; 25 mechanical

and electrical supervisors; 375 skilled workers; 385 workers; and 250 employees for the administrative, the commercial and the marketing agency. This is because the process of operating the plant, the process of production and that of plant maintenance require specializations and expertise of the highest level that can understand the modern complicated technology. The former General National Organization for Industrialization has therefore given much attention to training so that the project can be put into operation by Libyans. The organization did concentrate on all levels of training and on all specializations inside the country and abroad so as to create cadres of trained leaders and supervisors and skilled workers. Large numbers are being trained abroad in the different methods of production and maintenance in plants similar to the complex: 65 individuals are receiving training in Germany; 83 individuals are receiving theoretical and practical training at the Institute of Turin in Italy; 120 workers are receiving training in engineering operations and design in Britain; 35 individuals are receiving a specialized university education in Europe and the United States for 5 years following the general secondary school certificate. They are studying different branches of engineering and modern technology. In addition, a theoretical and practical training program is underway at the project site.

A Mini-City for the Project

A mini-city for the project is in the process of being implemented. It will include homes for project employees, complete with all utilities, a school, a small hospital, a post office, playgrounds, exhibition halls, markets and a mosque.

It is noteworthy that 75 percent of the present phase of the project has been completed. Inauguration of the project is expected to take place early next year.

Development To Meet Needs

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 28 May 79 p 3

[Text] In the next few days a strategic symposium on industrial development and meeting the basic needs of the people will be held in Tripoli.

This symposium is being organized by the Industrial Development Center for Arab countries with the cooperation of the Institute for Arab Development in al-Jamahiriyah. A group of Arab and foreign experts will participate in this symposium to discuss the working paper that was prepared by the Industrial Development Center for Arab countries concerning the strategy for industrial development. Some industrial experiments in the Arab world and world-wide will be evaluated as to whether or not they included the priorities of the immediate daily needs of their societies.

Our colleague, 'Abd-al-Salam al-'Alim wrote to us about this subject and said: "Economists throughout the world are saying that for a development strategy

to achieve its goals, such strategies must not be launched from a vacuum or from idealistic premises regardless how ambitious they may be."

It is evident that in spite of the consensus that exists about the importance of industrialization and about the fact that it is vital for economic growth, industrial development attempts that have been carried out in many developing countries and in Arab countries were not always carried out in this manner.

The simple notion behind the subject of this symposium is the necessity of focusing on basic needs in all development plans. According to industrial usage basic needs are food, shelter and clothing. The great revolution of the first of September gave this subject priority and allocated hundreds of millions of Libyan dinars to it because of the important contribution such a strategy would make to the national economy. It would meet the increasing local demand for many necessities. One who has been following transformation plans in al-Jamahiriyah would note that some investments have been steered directly towards production projects that are characterized by the impact they would have on altering the general economic structure. Ever since the birth of the industrial revolution in al-Jamahiriyah attention has been focused on basic food industries and on the vertical and horizontal integration of those industries with agricultural, animal and fish development plans. Such a strategy would industrialize surplus agricultural production and would meet the needs of animal resources programs for the purpose of achieving self-sufficiency. These industries are to grow at a rate of 115 percent during [the years of] the plan and at a compounded rate of 16.5 percent.

30 Plants for Food

To clarify our view further we met with Brother 'Ashur al-'Itri director of the Planning, Statistics and Follow-up Office at the General Administration for Industrialization. He was willing to give us the facts about the industrial sector's [fulfillment of] society's basic needs, Brother 'Ashur said that there were 30 plants engaged in food industries and that they were divided among the different sectors such as the fish and tuna industries, the feed industry, the flour mill and flour derivatives industry and the fruits and vegetables industry.

The production capacity of existing plants in the sardine industry amounts to 3,000 tons per year. Production capacity of the tuna lines in these plants amounts to 3,500 tons per year.

Three plants have been built for the dairy and the dairy products industry. The annual production capacity of these plants will amount to 2,460,000 liters. This figure will double by the end of 1980 after the completion of the Suqal-Khamis Dairy Plant, the al-Bayda' Dairy Plant and the Misratah Pasteurization Unit. This production will be strengthened by the end of 1981 when the plants at al-Narj and at (al-Qurah Bulli) will have been completed.

In the flour mill and flour derivatives industry three plants have been completed, and these plants have been producing since 1976. Production capacity of these plants amounted to 180,000 tons per year. This production will be supported by an equal production capacity after the inauguration of the mills in al-Marj, in Tobruq and in Surman.

Three plants that manufacture sparkling water have been completed. I can say that we have achieved self-sufficiency in this area and that we do in fact have a surplus that can be exported.

Five plants which produce feed have been completed. They produce 306,000 tons of concentrated feed per year for dairy cows, for slaughter cows, for laying chickens and for other domestic animals. This production will be strengthened after the inauguration of the plants in Benghazi and in Tobruq and after the completion of the expansion of the feed plants at Saraman and Zalaytan. This is expected to take place in 1981 when production capacity is expected to double.

In the area of canning vegetables and fruits a vegetable and fruit complex has been completed. It includes 12 production lines that produce all kinds of fruit juices, all kinds of fruit jellies and preserves and tomato pastes. A plant to produce the required cans has been attached to the complex. The production capacity of the complex is 14,630 tons per year. This figure will double after the completion of the vegetables and fruits complex in Jabal al-Akhdar in 1981.

Seven Clothing Plants

Seven plants for clothing have been completed as follows: the Textiles and Industry Plant at Zanzur whose production capacity amounts to 21 million meters of different fabrics per year. A plant which manufactures ready-to-wear suits in Darnah has also been completed; it produces about 200,000 suits per year. This figure will double after the new expansions in the plant are completed. In addition, a plant to wash, weave and dye wool has been completed in al-Marj. Its production capacity amounts to 55 tons of heavy woven wool fibers per year. This figure will double after the completion of the wool complex project at Bani Walid, the textiles complex in Zanzur and also the cotton textiles plant in Zanzur. A shoes factory in Misratah has also been completed; it has an annual production capacity of 126,000 pairs of shoes, and it produces a line of plastic shoes with a capacity of 160,000 pairs [per year]. As far as the tanning industry is concerned, three tanneries have been completed. They produce 2 million feet of finished leather; 500,000 tons of sole material and 480 tons of compressed leather. In addition, they prepare hides as a semifinished product.

Fifteen Factories for Housing Materials

In the construction materials industry 13 projects have been implemented to produce 6 million tons of cement, 110,000 tons of lime and 320,000 tons of bricks. It is expected that the production capacity of the cement plants will amount to 7.5 million tons per year. It is also expected that the production

capacity of the lime plants will amount to 200,000 tons per year after the plants at Darnah, Zlitan and Sabha are completed and after the expansions at the lime plants in Tripoli and Benghazi are completed. After implementation of the cement plants is completed, total production capacity will amount to 7.5 million tons per year. This is a record figure that no other Arab country has achieved. In fact, with this figure al-Jamahiriyah will become the first Arab country to export cement. In addition to all of this, the housing sector will implement two plants to produce pre-fabricated housing at a production capacity of 3,000 homes per plant per year.

300,000 Homes Have Been Implemented

We met with Brother 'Abd-al-Hamid ibn La'imah director of the Planning and Follow-up Department at the Secretariat of the Public Popular Housing Committee. He explained to us his statement that housing was one of the basic ingredients in the lives of individuals in society. The importance of having suitable, healthy housing for different categories of families is equal to those families having the other basic needs of life, that is, food and clothing. In fact, when housing of a suitable standard, kind and design becomes available in a sound and healthy setting, the housing sector will be considered one of the principal tools for introducing social change for the better in society.

The housing situation was very poor when the revolution came into existence. It was estimated that the housing shortage in 1969 amounted to 65,000 homes; whereas it was estimated that the number of families [that required housing] in that year was 365,000 families. It was estimated that the number of existing dwellings lacked the components of housing. Approximately 120,000 dwellings were unsuitable for shelter; that is, 40 percent of existing dwellings. This makes it clear that the number of dwellings suitable for housing did not exceed 60 percent of the total existing dwellings. For these aforementioned reasons the revolution of the first of September sensed the importance of providing healthy housing for all the members of the Arab Libyan people. It also checked landlords who were exploiting some housing units. The housing units that they did not need were taken away from them and given to citizens who did not own housing units. Thus it is that instead of renting their homes all the members of the Arab people of Libya are to own their homes. This is in accordance with statements made in the "Green Book" that the home belongs to its occupant and not to its landlord. The number of housing units that have been completed since the outbreak of the revolution throughout the areas of al-Jamahiriyah exceeds 300,000 units, complete with utilities.

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BRIEFS

TRANSFORMATION PLAN EXPENDITURES--Actual total expenditures for the projects of the Transformation Plan during the follow-up period until the end of March of this year amounted to 333,223,328 dinars. That is 21.2 percent of the targeted volume of spending for 1979. The correspondent of al-Jamahiriyah News Agency told AL-ANBA' that when compared with expenditures for the same period last year, funds that were spent for the projects of the Transformation Plan amounted to 267,792,874 dinars or 15 percent of 1978 allocations. Sources at the Secretariat of Planning stated that planned expenditures during the current follow-up period exceeded actual expenditures during the same period since 1976 by 80.5 percent or 35.8 percent of the comparable period in 1977. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 22 May 79 p 1] 8592

LIBYA-AUSTRALIA TRADE EXCHANGE--The newspaper, AUSTRALIA NEWS has recently stated that the volume of trade between the People's Socialist Arab Libyan Jamahiriyah and Australia has increased significantly. The newspaper stated that the value of Australian imports from the People's Socialist Arab Libyan Jamahiriyah from 1 January 1978 till September of the same year had amounted to 1.06 billion pounds sterling and that Australia's exports to al-Jamahiriyah had amounted to 871 million pounds sterling. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 27 May 79 p 2] 8592

BENIN FOREIGN MINISTER VISIT--Mr Michel Alladaye, member of the Political Bureau and minister of foreign affairs in the Republic of Benin arrived in Tripoli yesterday evening to visit al-Jamahiriyah for a few days. He was welcomed at Tripoli International Airport by Dr 'Amr al-Maqsi secretary of the Public Popular Committee for Light Industries. Mr Michel gave a statement to the correspondent of the al-Jamahiriyah News Agency in which he explained that the purpose of his visit was to follow up on the activities of the Arab Libyan-Benin Committee that was formed to strengthen relations and cooperation between the two friendly peoples. He said that the Libyan and Benin Arab peoples have been making an effort to achieve economic unity ever since the outbreak of the first of September Revolution in al-Jamahiriyah and the outbreak of the 26 October Revolution in the Republic of Benin. He explained that it was necessary that we always meet so that we can talk and discuss African and international issues together. This is what was affirmed by the command of the two revolutions in the two countries. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 30 May 79 p 9] 8592

PRIME MINISTER BOUABID DISCUSSES SITUATION IN MOROCCO

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 79 pp 39-41

[Interview with Maati Bouabid, prime minister of Morocco by Mireille Duteil, date not given]

[Text] There was great surprise in the country when on 22 March 1979 the king of Morocco appointed Maati Bouabid to the difficult position of prime minister in replacement of Ahmed Osman. Minister of justice since October 1977, after 17 years out of government, Maati Bouabid, an attorney by profession, has the reputation of being an "ambitious man" (see DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE No 25, dated 23 April 1979). Several weeks after his installation, the new chief of government announced a series of social measures which put an end to several months of strikes and intense tensions. The consolidation of the government announced a series of social measures which put an end to several months of strikes and intense tensions. The consolidation of the democracy, the installation of social justice and the permanence of a dialog between the various political and social partners, such are the keynotes of the policy he intends to follow. Two months after his installation, DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE asked him to explain his goals at greater length for its readers.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: Mr Prime Minister, you were chosen to head the Moroccan Government at a delicate juncture. What are the principal objectives you have set for yourself?

Maati Bouabid: Yes, I did indeed arrive at a particularly delicate juncture. First of all, it is characterized at the international level by the economic crisis. We are going through a difficult period in the energy sector, as prices of oil continue to increase. Add to that the increased costs of finished products, the cumulative backwardness of the developing countries, certain problems in the Sahara which are forcing us to incur expenses for our national defense to the detriment of the development effort and you will have an idea of the circumstances in which I was appointed prime minister of his majesty's government.

My objectives? The priority of priorities is the defense of the country's interterritorial integrity. In this regard, I must remind you that all Moroccans are in agreement on this point. The second problem that is quite close to my heart is the consolidation of the democracy. I must tell you that I will do everything I can to consolidate it, principally by defending its freedoms. But responsibly, of course. Absolute and abstract freedom can only lead to anarchy. This democracy must be given economic and social content. That is why from the beginning I paid close attention to decentralization by placing the sum of 1 billion dirhams at the disposal of the local collectives.

Of course, I have also taken upon myself the objective of supporting and defending social justice to attenuate the disparity between incomes and to improve those of the most disadvantaged strata of the population. I am also in favor of dialog between the various social partners. This dialog had started when I came into government. I want it to become permanent.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: It has been said that you are a "liberal of the left." You were an activist of the National Union of Popular Forces...

Bouabid: Labels are of little importance. I replied to one of your colleagues who asked me the same question that I was never a system man. If [you mean] defending social justice, progress, the rights of workers and freedoms, if attempting reforms to fight against corruption, if coming out in favor of dialog, then I am a liberal of the left. But certain governments which are described as "leftist" are nothing more than open or veiled dictatorships which usurp the popular will. If that means being on the left, then I am not. That left I reject.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: You came into government during a period of social agitation, and you reestablished order in a few weeks. However, the present calm was obtained at the price of hundreds of firings because of strike incidents in the educational and health sectors and at the price of arrests?

Bouabid: Obviously there was agitation. An agitation which was kept going. An agitation which was not solely due to wage demands. No. Behind that, and the obligation of maintaining the security of the state. What happened? On the pretext of exercising their right to strike, certain individuals, among those whom you said were arrested, in reality struck a blow against labor freedom. I am well acquainted with the problem. Everytime there has been a strike, not only since 11 April, but in March and February, no one attacked the person of the strikers. But there is a difference between a strike and a blow at the freedom of labor.

As for the firings, you say that they resulted from strike incidents. That is incorrect. The constitution recognizes the right to strike. But this right, up to now, had not been regulated as allowed by the constitution. Moreover, to this day, the public service statute prohibits strikes by government workers. Therefore, the strike leaders struck a blow against the freedom of labor. Also it was quite normal for the authorities to

impose sanctions which could range from reassignment to suspension and even firing. You will say to me that these are not the words of a man of the left and a liberal. I tell you that the authority of the state must also be defended. If it is not, there is anarchy. I am a jurist. I was an attorney. Those who were fired have rights. This is not the first time that individuals will appeal to the administrative chamber. And the latter has not always found the government and state to be right. If the administrative chamber vacates the decision made by the minister of national education or the minister of public health, the state will be forced to first rehire the fired government employees and to compensate them afterward. I will see to it that the court decisions are carried out exactly.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: Do you intend to ask Parliament to pass a law regulating the right to strike in the public service?

Bouabid: Yes. I said so in my first statement to Parliament. The first thing we are going to concern ourselves with is regulation of the right to strike.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: In the past, the Moroccan authorities often considered social movements political response manifestations rather than the expression of social demands. Finally, you, too, seem to be in agreement with this idea.

Bouabid: Let us take some simple examples. In the private sector, the workers are face-to-face with their boss. They manage to resolve their problems with him, and we are not going to stick our noses into such situations. These are real strike movements. Their objective is wage increases.

In the public service, things are quite different. For example, on 11 and 12 April 1979--press reports will bear witness to this--the strikers, teachers and professors, were not saying, "We are striking for 48 hours. A warning strike..." but: "We are striking for 48 hours every 2 weeks." We then had talks with all the unions. I received them personally for over 4 hours. What they were interested in was not the resolution of their demands but the release of certain unionists who had been arrested for attacking the freedom of labor. That was blackmail. I told them so. It was no longer a matter of professional demands.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: Can you not be accused of having only reestablished provisional order? In the public service, the strikers belong to the middle class. They have seen their standard of living sharply eroded. The increases granted to the lowest incomes do not directly concern them...

Bouabid: We wanted to increase the lowest salaries. The Interoccupational Guaranteed Minimum Wage and the Agricultural Guaranteed Minimum Wage were too low. They affect a very large slice of the population. We raised them 40 percent and the low salaries 10 to 15 percent. They are basic salaries, to be sure. If our finances had permitted we would have done

better. We limited our effort to the most disadvantaged workers who are the most numerous. I hope that the civic spirit of the middle classes will permit them to understand.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: In your reply to Parliament, you asked the most disadvantaged categories to prove their patriotism...

Bouabid: First of all, the wealthy, the managers and owners whom I received when I initiated the dialog did not come there as egoists but as understanding men ready to make a sacrifice. They assured me that they would do so. I found myself in the presence of patriots. Men knowing the problems and desirous of making this a prosperous country. Of course, measures will have to be taken on the fiscal level in an effort to attenuate the disparities between the various social strata of the population.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: Specifically, do you intend to undertake fiscal reform?

Bouabid: It is in the works. It envisions the reduction of these disparities. The Ministry of Finance is in the process of studying certain projects.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: Going back to the problem of freedoms... The opposition of the left contests the authenticity of the democratic character of the government. It contested the results of the elections, stating that freedom of the press at times experiences constraints and demanding the release of political prisoners. What answer do you give the opposition of the left?

Bouabid: I followed the elections as a spectator and from a distance. In any event, the opposition did not contest the elections until after announcement of the results. As far as the democratic experiment is concerned, I am not saying that it is perfect. But you speak to me about freedom of the press. As for me, I am amused to see myself called all kinds of names in an opposition newspaper. I do not react. I was minister since October 1977, prime minister beginning 2 months ago, and I have not yet instituted a trail of the press medium.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: And what about political prisoners? Are you thinking about examining their cases?

Bouabid: I am going to put you at ease. I myself defended causes in certain trials. I will always remember the Union leader I defended. I felt at the time that it was really a political trial. Actually, people were tried definitively for attacks against the internal or external security of the state. Persons who entertain relations with the enemies of the country, we have some in the Kenitra prison. A trial is now being readied in Meknes. If you consider them political prisoners, that is subjective. For us, persons who have had dealings with the enemy are subject to certain penalties provided by the Moroccan penal code which does not make any provision for political crimes. There are no common law crimes.

Something in favor of what you call political prisoners? I told Parliament: "It is not a question of pushing these people into the commission of such and such a crime in order afterward to fill his newspaper with names or photos and state that they are political prisoners because that makes a good story." As far as I am concerned that is sheer stupidity. Now, if requests for pardons are addressed through normal channels and reach his majesty, he will make a decision. Here is a dossier called "royal clemency." I have to look it over and send it to the royal cabinet for action.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: Does this dossier concern many persons?

Bouabid: There are some 30 cases now in this dossier. At the end of 1977, his majesty had 43 persons released whom the opposition describes as political prisoners, whereas it was often persons seized with weapons in their hands.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: Today when Europe is in the process of building and the European Economic Community is expanding at the expense of its other partners, is it not more urgent than ever to resolve the Saharan matter, to construct a Maghreb which would not present itself in a dispersed manner vis-a-vis Western Europe?

Bouabid: As for the Sahara, our position is nonnegotiable [intangible]. That land is part of Morocco. Legally we are on solid ground. We are in favor of the reconstruction of the Maghreb. Our Maghrebian neighbors still have to admit once and for all that the Sahara is Moroccan and that it is not for us a question for discussion. We can cooperate with them on the economic and financial level, in the foreign trade sector... Our economies are complementary. But certain Maghrebians have to understand that if they wish to construct the unity of the Maghreb they must not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: These last several years, Morocco has remained a step behind the Arab world by refusing to participate in the rejection front, by implicitly supporting Anwar al-Sadat. During the past few weeks, above all after the Fes Islamic conference, we have witnessed a spectacular reestablishment of Morocco on the Arab scene. Is it Morocco or the Arab world which has changed?

Bouabid: I see what you are driving at. Morocco has never been a step behind the Arab world or the Muslim world. His majesty has just been elected president of the Jerusalem Committee. That is entirely logical when one remembers that the first Islamic congress was held in Rabat. It is entirely natural given the respect that the Muslim countries have for Morocco. It is quite within the spirit of Islam. As for our position with respect to the Arab countries, it has never changed since 1974, the year of the Arab summit in Rabat where a general line of conduct was definitively established. We have never sought to keep ourselves apart from principles defined in this manner. The position we took at Baghdad

was in consonance with the line traced by the 1974 Arab summit. Is it we or the Arab world which has changed? In any event, we have not deviated from our route.

DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE: One last question, Mr Minister. Morocco is one of the rare African countries where there is a multiparty system [multipartisme]. However, Morocco still has a bad press in Europe, in France. In your opinion, what is the reason for it and what do you intend to do to change this public image?

Bouabid: Morocco does not have a good press. With a certain press, I will say. Democracy exists, the multiparty system, freedom of opinion, speech, association, union freedom... But it is precisely for this reason that a certain press holds a grudge against us. Because, obviously, the press is not in our pay. They can write what they wish. Above all in the foreign press. This press does not look kindly upon our democratization efforts; we cannot do anything about it. What I can tell you is that we are very credible. When we discuss with serious countries, they understand us. They understand our positions.

It is this public image that we wish to keep—that of democratization and credibility.

8143

CSO: 4400

TUNISIA

PRIME MINISTER HEDI NOUIRA DISCUSSES TUNISIAN, ARAB ISSUES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 10 Jun 79 pp 6,7

[Interview with Tunisian prime minister by Muhammad Hamadah]

[Text] Every time I visit Tunisia to meet with Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, I recall his youth, days in school and struggle for Tunisia's independence. In the '30s he was in Paris representing the foremost fighter, Habib Bourguiba, serving as his observer and spokesman among student groups, politicians and journalists. I recall Tunisia's battle of liberation, the martyrs and prisons. I recall patience, steadfastness and wisdom, and how these attributes became the trademarks of a school established expressly to teach the science of national liberation, one whose techniques became the master blueprint for resisting colonialism in all its forms: military, political and economic. It is at this school that Hedi Nouira studied, and later taught, all the time remaining faithful to Bourguiban principles and traditions. It is here that he applied these principles, alongside Tunisia's most eminent fighter. It is also with this spirit that the prime minister runs Tunisia's affairs and deals with Arab issues.

At the time of the interview, Tunisia was enmeshed in a political debate: Palestine and Lebanon--the tormented twins--the separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the barbaric Israeli raids on Lebanon and its people, and especially against the people who were expelled and dispersed by Israel, whose homeland was defiantly stolen with the deftness of the confirmed criminal and the haughtiness of the colonialist who has no regard for humanitarian and ethical values. Tunis, the capital, in mid-1979, is a hub of Arab activity, where politicians are gathering to rebuild the Arab League on a new foundation. The entire affair is a risky bet, pregnant with dangers. Tunisian and Arab officials are keenly aware of this; they are moving quickly but cautiously to contain the danger of the separate peace. The prime minister talked to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI about these developments as well as internal Tunisian affairs knowledgeably and forthrightly.

[Question] There are feverish preparations for the constitutional congress of the Socialist Party. How far have the preparations progressed and what will be the results of the conference?

[Answer] Preparations for the coming conference are nearly complete. Having completed the election of party steering and organizational committees, we have begun to elect popular committees from the more than 1,000 party cells throughout the country. To date, only 15 of these have not yet held their conferences. As soon as this process is completed, representatives from these groups will be elected to the constitutional congress.

On the political level, coordinating committees--central committees at the state level--are debating national issues, everything that concerns Tunisia and its people. In particular, these "think tank" committees are examining the government's achievements since the last congress and how it fared in implementing the provisions of the Progress Accord, which are approved during the so-called Clarification Congress held in the fall of 1974. The aim of these debates is to learn the shortcomings, if any, of the last congress and to examine and analyze its successful achievements and strong points.

It is obvious from what I tell you that the next congress will look into Tunisians' problems; it will concentrate on society's political and non-political structure. It will examine Tunisia's position in the Arab world and the world at large. These will be the main topics of discussion during the congress, which will then prepare political resolutions and set goals for the government to pursue.

[Question] The various political opposition groups do not appear to be strong; some of them are on the verge of asking to rejoin the party. How does the party feel about that?

[Answer] The opposition, as it must, is purely political. It centers on goals and ways to reach these goals, but it cannot be personal. Since the opposition is as I describe it, it is not difficult to resolve disputes. The important thing is to know whether the opposition is irrevocably committed to its position. If the opposition views the dispute as over fundamental principles, then it is not possible for it to join the party as a prelude to continuing its opposition from within the party. While debate and differences of opinion are permitted within the party, they cannot be over fundamental political principles.

[Question] Some union activists have been or will be released [from prison]. There is talk that Habib Achour will be released. Is this true, and what are the implications?

[Answer] Those who were jailed were punished for violating the law. Justice took its course according to the law. Only the president is authorized to grant clemency after a sentence is passed. Some of those who were released were released legally. The law permits the release of prisoners before their sentences are served, subject to certain conditions. The person you mentioned is not legally qualified for release now. But, as I said earlier, the president is authorized to make special decisions that he feels are appropriate.

[Question] Five or 6 years ago you were a forerunner among those advancing and implementing the progressive idea of letting citizen groups handle development projects. Your argument was that such groups were capable of guiding development without help. Today, on the eve of the party congress, do you still feel the idea is good? Do you believe that citizen groups are up to the task? If so, what is the next step?

[Answer] In today's government and in dealing with an advanced society, all concerned parties must be involved, particularly in economic and social matters. Our government has been guided by this principle, and we have established a dialog with all concerned parties on a clearly defined basis. This has been going on for several years. The result has been satisfactory to all parties by their own admission, including the testimony of labor union leaders, many of whom are members of international organizations. All of them have confirmed that Tunisia's policy is good and productive. The difficulties we encountered, including the critical confrontations since the beginning of 1977, are attributable to the fact that some of these leaders have changed their positions and reneged on the agreements formerly approved by everyone. They made it clear that they planned to break these agreements. Their actions are motivated by political considerations and have nothing to do with social or economic issues. It is simply not true that the social accord is vague or ambiguous. On the contrary, it is clear and forthright. It was approved after a long and arduous debate. I believe that the experiment was successful and that our way is good for reconciling conflicting interests for the benefit of all Tunisians rather than those of a few individuals or groups.

[Question] There is no doubt that Tunisia has come a long way with respect to development, despite its limited resources. This is true whether one uses 1956--the year of independence--or 1970--the year you assumed the prime ministry--as a basis for comparison. But there is still a long and hard way to go. How do things look for the near and intermediate future, especially in view of the fact that the international climate is not very encouraging?

[Answer] A country such as Tunisia, with modest resources, aspiring to move ahead and catch up with the developed nations, must take into account what is taking place around it in the world, particularly in the

countries which supply its needs and buy its goods. Tunisia, like other countries in the same position, is greatly influenced by what happens in the industrialized world. We import most of our manufacturing and processing machinery, some primary materials, a good deal of semi-manufactured products, and depend on the industrialized world for many of our services. Whenever these countries are beset by economic crises, our development plans suffer. This is what happened in 1973, following the jump in oil prices. The resulting increase in the cost of primary materials and processing equipment is often double or triple the rise in oil prices. These upheavals have a direct, negative effect on Tunisia's agricultural and industrial development plans. Even the tourist industry suffers. The net effect is a setback for our economy reflected in a balance of payments deficit. Yet despite the negative ripple effect of the European economic crisis on Tunisia's economy, the Tunisian people, with great determination, were able to control the situation and limit its impact, and, consequently, maintain a moderate level of economic progress, although slightly below what our plans had envisioned.

[Question] Do you believe there will be another economic dislocation similar to the 1973-74 oil crisis? Is there a way to avoid the damaging impact of such an upheaval, particularly in Third World nations with weak susceptible economies? What effect will Middle East developments have on future oil price increases? Will these increases be politically rather than economically motivated?

[Answer] It is difficult to say with certainty whether future oil price increases will be politically or economically motivated. One reason is that the currency on which oil prices are based is gradually losing its purchasing power due to inflation. If oil prices were kept at their former levels, it would have meant a devaluation of that commodity's worth. This is why oil producers protest that they are not raising prices but attempting to maintain their purchasing power. It is simply an accounting problem. Importers, on the other hand, especially the industrialized nations, attempt to offset the impact of higher oil prices by increasing the volume of their exports, including machinery, primary materials, semi-manufactured products, and consumer products. Their aim, too, is to increase their purchasing power.

Another point to be considered is that whenever an industrialized nation is beset by an imbalance in its monetary situation, the result is usually inflation, coupled with economic and social dislocations. The ultimate losers in this process are the Third World nations which must pay higher prices for the manufactured goods they import from the industrialized world. More frequently, Third World countries' development plans go awry when their financial resources fall short of their development needs. The effect on the industrialized countries, however, is inversely proportional to the strength and productivity of their economies. Weaker and

less productive economies face economic crises. Developing nations, on the other hand, fare no better. Their development plans suffer when development funds are diverted to cover additional expenditures due to the higher cost of imported goods. Most Third World countries, as you mentioned, have fledgling, sensitive economies to begin with. Consequently, they are fundamentally far more susceptible to sudden increases in energy prices.

[Question] The Arab world is passing through a very critical period, following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Arab countries have begun to implement a series of anti-Egyptian government resolutions. It seems they have succeeded so far. Do you believe their action will stave off the dangers that will certainly follow the implementation of the treaty? What are some of the direct, positive steps that, in your opinion, the Arab world must put into effect?

[Answer] The first step is to unite their ranks and speak with one political voice. What the Arab world has done so far is not, in my opinion, an attack against the Egyptian government--we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The action is a protest against [Egyptian] violations of formerly agreed upon policies.

[Question] It is apparent that the Arab League has not been able to achieve its economic goals. Do you subscribe to the principle that a credible political structure is possible only on an economic and educational foundation, that is by economic solidarity and working for joint Arab interests? Is that not the only way to political solidarity? Europe, for example, created the Common Market before it attempted political unity, as exemplified in the establishment of a European Parliament.

[Answer] In today's world, the goal of political institutions is economic and social development for man's benefit. The Arab nation has vast monetary resources, but gold and money deposited in banks do not help economic development or create a political clout. Political influence is based on economic power and a socially stable society. We must, therefore, use our material resources as a tool to create an economic foundation and a stable society if we are to gain political influence.

[Question] Tunisia's action in pushing its candidate to the secretary general's position of the Arab League seems unusual. Traditionally, the secretary general's office goes to a person from the country where the Arab League's headquarters is located. Any explanation?

[Answer] Tunisia has no ulterior motive. Our concern is to insure the successful operation of the Arab League. Moving the League's headquarters

from Cairo to Tunis will cause some changes. We believe that a Tunisian secretary general will smooth the transition. Our aim is, therefore, not to gain political control, but to insure success.

[Question] Previous party congresses were conducted under banners that proclaimed the nature of the conference's agenda. The congresses also had some important political features: The 1959 congress was billed as the "victory congress"; the 1964 congress, the "destiny congress"; and the 1974 Monastir congress was labeled the "clarification congress." How will the coming congress be billed?

[Answer] The renewal and loyalty congress.

9063

CSO: 4402

POPULATION, URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF EMIRATES STUDIED

Paris MAGHREB MACHREK in French Jul-Sep 78 pp 56-62

[Article: "The Personalities of the Towns of the Gulf Emirates"]

[Text] In the Gulf emirates of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (which unite Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwan, Ras-al-Khimah and Fujairah), urban dwellers accounted for about 85 percent of the total population in 1957.

The rate of urbanization was very high everywhere except in a few small emirates with scanty populations which do not have any petroleum. Those emirates are Ajman, with its 21,500 inhabitants, Fujairah with its 26,500 or Umm-al-Qaiwan with its 16,800. Elsewhere, in the other principalities of the Gulf, the proportion of city-dwellers in 1975 was overwhelming, with a few important nuances¹: 85.8 percent in Kuwait, 78.1 percent in Bahrain, 91.5 percent in Qatar, 91 percent in Abu Dhabi, 95.4 percent in Dubai, 70 percent in Ras-al-Khimah and 68 percent in Sharjah.

These high rates of urbanization, the highest in the Middle East, are the result of a veritable urban revolution, which in the space of one or two decades has permitted miniscule states to make a leap over several centuries, passing without transition from the Middle Ages to the late 20th Century. Modern cities, miraculously rising out of the desert and endowed with the most modern facilities, bear witness to an almost aggressive futurism. Such geographical transformations are obviously connected with petroleum.

Even the emirates which do not have any petroleum (or more exactly, have not yet discovered any deposits) profit from petrodollars inside the United Arab Emirates. In fact, Abu Dhabi, with annual petroleum income in excess of \$6.5 billion, finances more than 90 percent of the federal budget.

A Dizzying Population Growth

A few figures allow us to measure the size of the population growth in the emirates during the last 20 years. Thus between 1957 and 1977 the population of Kuwait grew from 206,000 persons to more than 1 million²: the population

of the emirate has thus quintupled in twenty years. For Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, the growth is even greater, since the population almost sextupled between 1965 and 1975. During the same period, Qatar showed "only" a little more than a doubling in the number of human beings, which is already a demographic record, since the population of that emirate quadrupled between 1950 and 1971. The cities and more especially the capitals are the regions which have seen the most spectacular growth.

Evolution of the Population of the Emirates between 1965 and 1975

	1965	1975
	(in thousands of inhabitants)	
Kuwait	468	1000(κ)
Bahrain	182	260(κκ)
Qatar	71	160
Abu Dhabi	30	235.6
Dubai	40	209.2
Sharjah	20	88
Ras-al-Khaimah	18	57
Fujairah	8	26.5
Ajman	3.5	21.5
Umm-al-Quaiwan	3	16.8(κκκ)

Sources: "Population Bulletin of the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia"; J. J. Tur: "The Emirates of the Arabian Gulf, "Collection "Que sais-je," Paris, PUF, 1976, 126 p.; the "Records of the Arab world," Beirut.

This dizzying population growth is principally due to foreign immigration. With the exception of Beirut, foreign immigration does not have such an important role either in the recent rapid growth or in the present composition of urban populations in any other city in the Arab world.

However, the extraordinary growth of the Gulf cities is explained also by the steadiness of the very high birthrates, while the mortality rates have gone down spectacularly. Without any doubt some deaths are still not recorded, but the low mortality rates are chiefly caused by the improvement in hygiene, the development of the health services and of the infrastructure of physicians and hospitals, and last of all by the youth of the population.

κEstimated for 1977; see footnote 2 at end of article.

κκA statistical report published in Manama on 22 May 1978 gives the figure of 341,000 as of 1 January 1978; ("Summary of World Broadcast," London, BBC).

κκκIn other words, 665,000 for all the United Arab Emirates. The statistical report for 1977 gives the figure of 862,000 for the end of 1977 (Gulf News Agency 11 April 1978).

The birthrates are somewhere between 42 and 50 per thousand³: 42.8 per thousand in Bahrain, 46.7 per thousand in Kuwait, 50 per thousand in Qatar and in the United Arab Emirates. The mortality rates are estimated at between 5 per thousand (Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates) and 8 per thousand (Bahrain)⁴. Thus the rates of natural growth are particularly high; 45 per thousand in Qatar and in the United Arab Emirates, 41 per thousand in Kuwait, 34.8 per thousand in Bahrain.

The demographic behavior of the nationals should really be distinguished from that of the foreigners. The birthrates and mortality rates of the foreigners are lower because of their structure by age (a heavy preponderance of adults) and because of their composition by sex (an overwhelming majority of men). The example of Kuwait is significant.

Comparison of Birth and Mortality Rates of Kuwaitis and Foreigners
(1972)

	Kuwaitis	Foreigners	Total
Birthrates in percentages			
Kuwait (Emirate)	50.5	43.2	46.7
Kuwait (City)	46.2	27.7	37.7
Mortality rates in percentages			
Kuwait (Emirate)	6.7	3.7	5.1
Kuwait (City)	7.2	4.1	5.7

Source: "Population Bulletin of the United Nations" No 6, 1974, p 83.

The number of foreigners varies according to the emirates. The foreign population makes up more than half the population of Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. On the other hand, the emirates that lack petroleum have a population where the native people are dominant. In Bahrain the proportion of foreigners has always been rather low, in general lower than 20 percent, except at the time of the February 1965 census, when it reached exactly 21 percent. The low petroleum production in Bahrain doubtlessly limits its appeal to foreign labor and explains the less cosmopolitan aspect of the emirate's population in comparison to that of its neighbors. Furthermore, immigration is controlled here: in the last census, 1971, the foreigners, who are not as numerous as in 1965, represented only 16 percent of the total population of Bahrain⁵.

Date of Census	Total Population	Bahrainis	Foreigners	Percentage
1941	89,970	74,040	15,930	17.7
1950	109,650	91,179	18,471	16.8
1959	143,135	118,734	24,471	17.1
1965	182,203	143,814	38,389	21
1971	228,000	191,520	36,480	16

The case of Bahrain deserves particular attention, however. Today a modest producer of petroleum⁶, Bahrain was the first emirate on the Gulf to attract a large number of foreigners, because that principality was the first Arab country on the Gulf to exploit its petroleum, considerably before Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. The first petroleum deposits were discovered in Bahrain in 1932 and intensely exploited beginning in 1934. The exploitation of petroleum began in 1946 in Kuwait, in Qatar in 1949, in Abu Dhabi in 1962 and in Dubai in 1969. BAPCO (Bahrain Petroleum Company), rather than hire local labor, which was volatile and demanding, always preferred to hire foreigners. This violated a clause in the act of concession. That attitude did not prevent the calling of severe strikes which shook Bahrain especially in 1938, 1954 and 1965. In spite of its efforts toward industrialization (an aluminum plant, naval shipyards, a cannery, a flour mill, shops manufacturing plastic articles, parts to be used in underwater drilling, etc.), and a policy of diversifying the economy (favoring the tertiary activities of one of the most important financial centers of the Gulf), Bahrain maintained rather strict control over foreign immigration.

In Kuwait, on the other hand, the importance of the foreigners is still preponderant, and their percentage with respect to the total population increased from 45 percent in 1957 to 52.5 percent in 1975.

Evolution of the Population of Kuwait (in thousands of inhabitants)

Year	Total Population	Kuwaitis	Percentage	Foreigners	Percentage
1957	206	113	55	93	45
1961	321	162	50.3	159	49.7
1965	467	220	47	247	53
1970	738	347	47	391	53
1975	994	472	47.5	552	52.5(x)

In Qatar, according to the latest estimates, the foreigners probably accounted for between 55 and 60 percent of the total population of the emirate. In Abu Dhabi, that proportion is still higher and probably reached 84 percent of the total population in 1975. At the time of the 1968 census the foreign population already accounted for 56 percent of the population of Abu Dhabi.

^xAn estimate made in 1977 gives the following figures: total population, 1.129 million; Kuwaitis, 539,000, or 47.5 percent; foreigners 590,000, or 52.5 percent.

Those foreigners are Arabs (principally Palestinians, who play an important role in Kuwait, Lebanese, Omanis, Iraqis or Syrians), but also Iranians, Pakistanis and Indians, without forgetting the western technicians, principally Anglo-Saxons, who do not make up more than a small part (less than 10 percent) of the foreign population of the Gulf. The composition of that foreign population varies considerably from one emirate to another. In 1965, for Kuwait and Bahrain, those differences were considerable.(x)

Composition of the Foreign Population in 1965
(in percentages)

Nationalities	Kuwait	Bahrain
Palestinians and Jordanians	31	
Iranians	12	25
Iraqis	10	
Omanis	8	33
Lebanese	8	
Syrians	7	
Indians	5	14
Pakistanis	5	11
Miscellaneous	<u>14</u>	<u>17</u>
	100	100

In Abu Dhabi in 1968 42 percent of the foreigners were Iranians and 34 percent came from India and Pakistan. Thus less than one-fourth of the foreign population of that emirate was Arab.(xx)

Structure of the Population of Bahrain by Age Groups in 1965

	Under 16 years	16-60 years	Over 61 years
Bahrainis	50.5 percent	36.2 percent	3.3 percent
Foreigners	28 percent	70 percent	2 percent

xIn Kuwait, according to the 1975 census, out of the 522,749 foreigners 39 percent were Palestinians and Jordanians, 41 percent other Arabs, most of them Lebanese and Egyptian, 5.9 percent Iranians, 19.5 percent Pakistanis and Indians, 3.5 percent miscellaneous (Europeans and Americans) (cf FMA [expansion unknown], I-K 8). In Bahrain, according to the 1971 census, out of 37,900 foreigners 44.9 percent came from Arab countries, essentially from the two Yemens and from Oman, 13.5 percent were Iranians, 32 percent Pakistanis and Indians, 9.4 percent Europeans and Americans (cf FMA, I-B 2).

xxAccording to FMA, I-Ea 4, the census taken in Abu Dhabi on 1971 gave the following proportions: of 52,000 foreigners, 17.3 percent came from Oman, 21 percent from other Arab countries, 40.4 percent from Pakistan and India, 17.3 percent from Iran, 3.9 percent other countries.

In all the emirates of the Gulf, the pyramids formed by the native and foreign age groups are very different. Many of those foreigners would like to become permanent residents of those recently independent states⁸ where they sometimes have certain social advantages (for example, free education and medical care) granted to the natives. However, in the Gulf emirates that are rich in petroleum, naturalization is more and more difficult to obtain, although the prodigious growth in income has been much more spectacular than the recent population growth. The acquisition of citizenship in a Gulf emirate has become an exceptional privilege which very strict legislation limits as much as possible.

Thus, by their dizzying population growth and by the large amount of foreign immigration, the young metropolises of the Gulf remind one of certain cities of the new countries, or certain cities of North America at the beginning of the 20th Century. In the same way, the new urban skylines that have shot up in the emirates recall to a great degree the urban fabric of certain cities in Texas or in California rather than the traditional agglomerations of the Arab Middle East.

Original Urban Plans

The cities of the Gulf are trying to make a compromise between modernism and the traditional Orient. In fact, these cities of today rather give the impression of vast workshops dominated by feverish activity. Trucks and bulldozers dance an incessant ballet over still warm asphalt, transplanting a new lifestyle to the desert. Few regions in the world have experienced such rapid mutations.

In an outpouring of light that changes night into day, including neon signs, the young and dynamic oil cities of the Gulf are growing in feverish activity and speculation as they make way for a frenzy of cement, glass and aluminum, the principal materials utilized. In spite of the impression of opulence that already spreads over an urban structure in the process of being organized, in spite of undeniable architectural successes in certain official monuments or business buildings (banks, Arab or foreign companies), those cities have an essence that seems somewhat unreal. Since they have plenty of space taken from the surrounding desert, the new capitals of the Gulf show a very disconnected urban landscape, where the alternation of workshops and empty lots yields suddenly to official districts that are already almost completely urbanized.

Those uncompleted cities have been made for the automobile. Construction, often begun without an overall plan, goes on in a disordered way, but with the primary aim of facilitating auto traffic above all. Much more than in American cities, the urban evolution that is agitating the Gulf emirates is based on the privately owned car. The automobile has become mistress of the city, imposing broad boulevards, impressive avenues and many vast parking lots.

In each of the young cities of the Gulf there is a startling contrast between the old city, turned in upon itself, and the very open new city. In Kuwait, the city created from 1946 to the present is 20 times larger than the old city⁹. Surrounded by a masonry wall as late as 1954, the old city was protected against attacks by man, wind and sand all at the same time. It was the expression of a society: a patriarchal society of seaman, pearl fishers, "men who defied the desert," artisans and merchants.

In the old city of Kuwait, as in the old quarters of the other cities of the Gulf, the traditional urban landscapes of the Arab and Moslem world are found again¹⁰: a tangle of little streets and alleys, low houses with no windows on the street, breathing and living around their interior courts, dominated by the slender silhouette of the minarets. There is an original urban atmosphere there composed of sound, odors, human swarming: cries of donkey drivers and porters in the narrow streets, cries of the merchants to attract their clients, and the odor of spices and perfumes.

That contrast between the old city and the newer quarters is found elsewhere too, obviously. However, in no other region of the Arab world is the contrast so violent as it is here. Between the traditional old city and the modern quarter where cement, glass and aluminum reign, there are two totally different urban universes which live together without the slightest transition. Sometimes, as at Doha, the capital of Qatar, the old city is being progressively destroyed, cut across by wide avenues. On the other hand, Manama, the capital of Bahrain, has kept its old traditional quarters made up of imposing 20-to-30-room houses, crowned by the curious "Badgirs," wind towers which channel the most delicate puffs of air toward the occupied rooms, the precursors of air conditioning.

In addition to the very extensive modern quarters, which have grown up in proximity to the old city, new cities have also appeared. They are constructed in the desert several kilometers from the original urban nucleus. A certain social segregation sometimes rules over the distribution of those new cities.

Around Doha, Khalifa is a people's city with inexpensive lodgings, while Rayyan, more airy and verdant, welcomes the more fortunate elements of the population¹¹. In the same way, several kilometers from Manama the construction of a model city, called Isa Town after the name of the sovereign, is one of the most interesting accomplishments of Bahrain. It constitutes one of the most striking social experiments in the Gulf Emirates. Isa Town, planned for 35,000 inhabitants, is not a bedroom city but has its own activities. It is located in the heart of the island halfway between Manama and Awali, another new city. Awali, which is the home of BAICO (Bahrain Petroleum Company) has a more substantial aspect: the offices of the company and the residences of the foreign cadres are scattered around a relatively verdant park.

The most spectacular transformations in the urban landscape have been made at Abu Dhabi. In 1960, the capital of the United Arab Emirates was still nothing more than a village, continually growing poorer, to the contrary of what was going on in Dubai. Dubai already enjoyed a solid prosperity before the discovery of "black gold." The island of Abu Dhabi, connected to the mainland since 1968 by the al-Muqta'a bridge, 486 meters long and 26 meters wide (which has been supplemented by a second bridge 2 kilometers long to the west of the first one) has become a perpetual workshop. The residential and commercial quarters shelter 60,000 inhabitants on the old island, while the infant industries are being developed in the suburban zone of al-Mafraq, located on the mainland.

Among the different cities of the United Arab Emirates, Dubai is without any doubt the most picturesque. Stretched along a tortuous creek, the city is still centered around the old port, where the merchants still use the cries and the gestures of former years to welcome ships loaded with valuable produce. In spite of its new petroleum revenue, Dubai is still a great gold-trading center and a center for reexporting various items (watches, cameras, electrical material, etc.). This dynamic financial center has overflowed its primitive urban framework and is spreading to the northeast of the creek into the Deira suburbs. A 1,200-meter long tunnel dug under this arm of the sea facilitates communication between Deira and Dubai.

More in Dubai than in any other emirate, a frenzy of construction is observed. There, ambitious futuristic projects follow each other in the improvisation. After the construction of Port Rashid, finished in 1972 and clearly larger than the Port of Abu Dhabi (Port Zayed), the industrial complex of Jebel Ali, located about 50 kilometers from the city of Dubai, was inaugurated in 1976. This industrial conglomeration should become the "Rotterdam of the Gulf," with a new port equipped with 70 wharves, an aluminum foundry, a gas liquifaction plant, a refinery, a steel mill, etc. The economic chaos that appeared in the Gulf in early 1977, as well as the indebtedness of Dubai, may seriously delay the realization of that ambitious industrial project.

In a general way, the cities of the Gulf are multiplying their grandiose development projects through mimicry and in the absence of any economic coordination, without taking into account the identical accomplishments which may already be completed or projected in the neighboring emirates. Some very well-equipped ports and some airports designed for the gigantic new planes are thus constructed in a few months.

Only Kuwait, whose wealth is the oldest, whose experience is greater and whose population is larger, has better-studied projects. Thus, after 1970, a plan for urban management envisages the restructuring of the Kuwait-Ahmedi agglomeration¹²: thanks to the development of expressways and to the planting of a "greenbelt," it is anticipated that a series of cities will be built along the coast. This is already called by some people "the mini-megalopolis of Kuwait," which would spread along the Gulf making a stretched-out crescent 80 kilometers long between al-Jahrah in the northwest and Mina Abdullah in the southeast.

Bahrain has even longer experience, due to its early exploitation of petroleum, to the point that in the emirates it is frequent to hear the remark that "the people of Bahrain are 25 years ahead of the others." In spite of everything, Manama was not able to resist the speculative fever of the years from 1974 to 1976 which resulted from the increase in petroleum prices. That period of economic euphoria transformed the downtown area: huge buildings and commercial complexes have since then dominated over the old souks. Close to the old port, the new commercial and residential complex is still only partly occupied, since the economic difficulties that have affected most of the emirates since the beginning of 1977 have not spared Bahrain.

However, Bahrain still has some good cards: the industrialization policy, encouraged from 1967 to 1975 to compensate for the decline in petroleum resources¹³, seems to have been progressively abandoned as a service economy has developed. Bahrain is seeking more and more to become a regional and international financial center halfway between London and Singapore¹⁴. Furthermore, the construction of a 24.5-kilometer causeway connecting the Bahrain archipelago with Saudi Arabia is anticipated. That ambitious project, undertaken entirely by Saudi Arabia (the cost of the works has been estimated at between \$800 and \$900 million), should be finished in 1983. It would encourage the influx of Saudi businessmen and tourists.

All of those projects should not make us forget the importance of the transformations that have already been made. In the emirates of the Gulf the landscape has been transformed as if by magic: the desert has been literally metamorphosized. On those arid lands the supreme luxury is water, which is often present in the urban landscapes. The wide avenues, which cut a rather broad urban structure into pieces, are studded with traffic circles carefully made into gardens, sometimes decorated with fountains. It is even possible to find public gardens also with ponds and flower beds, while many villas have a swimming pool and--supreme challenge to the climate--a very British-looking lawn, watered ten times a day with water produced at great expense.

By the originality of their urban design as well as by the composition and recent evolution of their population, the young cities of the Gulf, created or reanimated by petroleum, thus represent a type of city that is very peculiar to the heart of the Arab Middle East.

FOOTNOTES

¹Cf "Population Bulletin of the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia," No 9, July 1975, pp 32-33, and "UN Monthly Statistical Bulletin," 1975.

²Official estimate of the Central Statistics Office: 1,129 million persons in 1977.

- ³Cf "Population Bulletin of the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia," No 10-11, 1976.
- ⁴The infantile mortality rates in the emirates varies from 40 to 60 per thousand (which is still high in comparison with western Europe where they go from 10 to 20 per thousand), but it shows considerable progress, as it used to be higher than 200 per thousand.
- ⁵J. J. Clarke and W. B. Fischer: "Population of the Middle East and North Africa, a geographical approach," University of London Press, London, 1972, 432 pages; cf in particular A. G. Hill's excellent chapter, "The Gulf States: petroleum and population growth," pp 242-273.
- ⁶In 1977 Bahrain's petroleum production reached only 2.85 MT (million tons), while Kuwait's exceeded 98 MT, Abu Dhabi's 81 MT and Dubai's 15 MT ("Middle East Economic Survey," 10 April 1978).
- ⁷J. J. Clarke and W. B. Fisher, op cit, p 267.
- ⁸Kuwait's independence was declared in June 1961, Bahrain's in August 1971, Qatar's in September 1971 and that of the United Arab Emirates in December 1971.
- ⁹F. Pourcelet: "Notes on urban geography: the recent expansion of the city of Kuwait," in "Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain," Paris, LXXI, June 1968, pp 4-8, and S. G. Shiber, "The Kuwait urbanization documentation, analysis, critique," Kuwait, Al Madiana Al Kuwaitiyyah, 1964, 643 pages, numerous figures, photos, illustrations.
- ¹⁰A. Bourgey: "Islam and geography," in "Revue de géographie de Lyon," 1970, No 1, pp 75-104.
- ¹¹G. Loew: "Bahrain and Qatar, a comparative study," in "Revue de géographie de Lyon, 1974, No 4, pp 355-367.
- ¹²Cf J. J. Tur, op cit, p 67.
- ¹³The most important industrial project has been the construction of an aluminum foundry. The ALBA (Bahrain Aluminum, an international consortium in which the Bahrain government is associated with Western companies) plant imports alumina from Australia and uses electricity from a thermal plant fueled by local natural gas. The ALBA plant, which employs nearly 2,100 persons and produces 120,000 tons of aluminum annually, is one of the earliest realizations of heavy industry on the Gulf.
- ¹⁴At the end of 1977, 37 international banking units were counted in Bahrain (OBU: Offshore Banking Units). However, it is now considered unlikely that its growth can continue at the same rate (cf "Middle East Economic Digest," 28 April 1978).

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The publications of the United Nations were very valuable for information on the demographic data of the Gulf emirates, the "Population Bulletin of the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia" is particularly valuable.

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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

URBAN GEOGRAPHY OF COUNTRY STUDIED IN DETAIL

Paris MACHREB MACHREK in French Jul-Sep 78 pp 63-72

[Article by Jean-Marc Prost-Tournier, accredited instructor in geography, headmaster, French-Lebanese School of Beirut: "The Urbanization of North Yemen"]

[Text] North Yemen is one of the world's least urbanized countries; settlements of over 25,000 inhabitants in 1973 included only 7.4 percent of the country's population. Sana'a, the capital, in which lived 26 percent of the urban population, nevertheless had jurisdiction over only 2 percent of Yemen's population, all told.

To tell the truth, only about three real cities can be counted: Sana'a, Hodeida and Taiz. The other "cities" are scarcely more than overgrown important villages, regional capitals certainly, but nevertheless still fundamentally large rural market-towns; there is little in them to produce the seeds of true urban development.

Regional Villages

The Sleeping Villages of the Tihama

The Tihama is a torrid and desert-like coastal plain extending along the Red Sea over 400 km north to south and 30 to 40 km wide. It is subdivided into two parts: lower Tihama or Khabt, completely desert with several palm groves and fishing villages, and upper Tihama, with broad divides separated by the pebbly streambeds descended from the mountains of the Serat; these are slightly wetter, but chiefly benefit from ground water that makes irrigation possible.

The principal settlement of lower Tihama is the port of Hodeida, to which we will return. Outside of Hodeida there is no true urban settlement to be pointed out.

North of Hodeida, Salif, benefiting from salt pans (rock salt), is a harbor for exporting salt, most of which is shipped to Japan. It may give promise of some industrial development; in fact, the 1976-1981 Five Year Plan provides for the building of a fertilizer plant.

*According to the 1975 census by the department of Geography of the University of Zurich, for the Swiss Technical Cooperation Bureau and the Central Planning Organization in Sana'a, the population was evaluated at 4,705,366

At the southern extremity of the Tihama, Moka (al-Makha) offers no more of its former prosperity as a port for exporting coffee than a sad picture of decline. A ghost city where delapidated mosques, isolated minarets rise from the desert like columns of an ancient city, sickly palm trees are scattered in the midst of invading dunes, a miserable fishing port also used for moderate smuggling, all giving a striking impression of irreversible abandonment. The decline in Yemeni coffee exports, the earthquakes and the 1912 bombings (Italian-Turkish war) explain the downfall. Will Moka experience a resurrection? The 1974-1976 Three Year Plan provides for small improvements to the port. But can present-day Yemen pay for the luxury of two modern ports? Despite its proximity to Moka, Taiz is in touch with Hodeida and Aden. Thus the rebirth of the Moka port can only be very limited.

The contact between the lower and the upper Tihama is marked by a whole series of large villages which are often active: Zohra, Bajil, Beit al-Faqih, Zabid and Hays.


Zohra, northeast of Hodeida, is an agricultural village made up of huts. But the addition of an irrigation perimeter, beginning at Mohr Wadi [stream] may give it a certain propulsion. Hays, on the other hand, which is east of Moka, is an agricultural village without any great future which profits from a still-active traditional handicraft (pottery).

In the Tihama's central sector Beit al-Faqih, the traditional capital of the large Zaranig tribe, is an agricultural, commercial and not unimportant handicraft (pottery, sandals) center, chiefly celebrated for its traditional weaving (large bolts of cotton goods). Zabid, which was founded around the year 800, was the political, cultural and religious capital of the Tihama in the Middle Ages; was not algebra invented in its "university?" Today, although it is not abandoned like Moka, it gives a certain impression of decline: its former port of Galetka is silted over; its few craftsmen (goldsmiths, weavers), its beautiful buildings (facades of ornate houses of striking bricks making beautiful geometric designs) are not enough to enliven it. Will its awakening come from developing, under the direction of Hungarian technicians, a vast irrigation perimeter around the Zabid Wadi?

Finally, Bajil, located in Hodeida's orbit (about 30 km away), is the only settlement of the Tihama interior that seems to be able to have the benefit of important development for the future. A large agricultural market on the Hodeida-Sana'a road, with colorful and lively market fairs, Bajil is about to be industrialized. Although its weaving plant, built in 1956 by the French, was still closed in 1973, its 100,000-ton-capacity cement plant, built in 1972 by the Soviets, was to be enlarged in 1978, while the 1976-1981 Five Year Plan provides for the building of a lime plant. Some industrial workshops (pharmaceutical products, soap works, etc.) are contributing to enlivening this small village. Its role as an agricultural center will also be confirmed by the improvement near the Sourdoud Wadi irrigation perimeter, which has been entrusted to the Soviets. Thus Bajil seems to have the best chance of becoming one of North Yemen's principal centers of dynamism.

inhabitants and estimated at 4,941,371 by mid-1977 (FICHES DU MONDE ARABE, I-Yn 6).

ARAB REPUBLIC OF YEMEN



Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Saudi Arabia | 5. Trails |
| 2. Roub al Khali Desert | 6. Paved roads |
| 3. Ethiopia | 7. Central high plateaus |
| 4. Gulf of Aden | |

The Mountain Citadels

The Serat, a mountainous rampart which rises east of the Tihama and separates it from the high plateaus and the high plains of interior Yemen, aligns the summits that exceed 3,000 meters (3,760 meters for the Jebel Nebi Chaub). This mountainous barrier, formed basically of enormous basaltic piles, has been dislocated by faults and deeply dissected by erosion; streams flowing to the Red Sea have dug vertiginous gorges that mark the boundaries of isolated blocks with more or less tabular summits, true fortresses closed to external influences. The best example, in the center, is the Jebel Harraz, which has been used as a refuge for Ismaelians.

Each "country" thus isolated has its capital: large agricultural villages, true fortresses, still often surrounded by walls and dominated by imposing citadels, grouping together massive stone houses with a military appearance, these mountain settlements are basically "souks" which centralize the region's agricultural production and distribute the few imported products and the products of local handicraft. These traditional market towns have jurisdiction over the district's landowners and receive the still embryonic administrative services. Not much of it seems able to claim modern development in the immediate future, except perhaps for Dhamar.

To the north, Chahara is a nearly inaccessible eagle's nest. In the central sector Hajja (41,000 inhabitants in 1973) is the most important of the regional villages. The capital of the province, it has been used in the past as a capital of refuge for the Imams when there were foreign invasions, but access still remains very difficult, despite the relative proximity to Sana'a (about 150 km). Shibam and its high city of Kawkaban also constitute an important center of Yemen's mediaeval history, and are at present linked with Sana'a by a motor vehicle road. Mahwit and Tawila are regional villages of the Serat which Sana'a's proximity seems to doom to stagnation. Finally, Manakha, perched on an impressive crest, controls the principal pass on the Sana'a-Hodeida road. It is the capital of the Jebel Harraz and a marketing center for coffee and qat [translation unknown], a drug-plant which is replacing it more and more.

To the south the mountainous bastion of the Serat which is Yemen's western rim changes character: less high, with a less harsh relief, it benefits from more abundant rains which enable it to be called "green Yemen."

Large villages control the principal mountain basins of green Yemen, located between 1,200 and 1,700 meters. Taiz is the principal settlement of this whole region, of which it is the capital, dwarfing Ibb (20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants) and especially Jibla, a large picturesque market town only 8 km from Ibb. Taiz is too close to these two villages to leave them any chance for important development. Tourba, south of Taiz, also appears to be a satellite of Taiz.

The Large Agricultural Villages of the Interior High Plateaus

Between the mountainous western rim of the Serat and the eastern mountains extends a zone of high plateaus in which are entrapped true intramountain plains about 10 km wide, several dozen km long. This zone, situated 1,800 to 2,700 km high, goes from Yarim in the south to Sa'ada in the north, covering about 300 km. These interior plains in fact constitute intensely developed alluvial basins, separated from each other by rocky and infertile shoals, sometimes volcanic (between the Sana'a plain and the Amran plain), sometimes limestone.

Each plain (qa) is controlled by one or two settlements. Sometimes a village watches over a basin's crossing point. Apart from Sana'a, this region's principal settlements are large agricultural, commercial and administrative villages, still often surrounded by walls and for the most part seeming not to have much chance for development.

To the south, Dhamar (30,000 inhabitants?) and Yarim are large, sad market towns, with homes of somber stone, sinister in appearance, with delapidated walls. Dhamar is a crossroad on the Taiz-Sana'a road, a point of departure for the road leading to the southeastern provinces through the villages of Radah and Beida. Dhamar should profit by the creating of a small textile plant, provided for by the current Five Year Plan. Yarim, at the foot of the great Sumara pass, situated near ancient Zafar, the capital of the royal Himyarite of antiquity, is chiefly a stop on the Taiz-Sana'a axis.

In the center, a number of villages are within Sana'a's orbit. South of Sana'a, Ma'aber is a secondary crossroad; to the north, Amran, about 40 km from Sana'a, enclosed by earthen walls, dominates a "qa", rich with springs (al-qa al-Hais), whose center of production it is; it is also a crossroad of trails leading to Hajja and Zohra to the west and Jawf to the east. Khamer, farther north, is a strategic village and Hoth is the center of a small "qa" that is already extremely dry, the al'Harf "qa" or Soufian "qa."

Finally, Sa'ada is the rather modest capital of the north. It is an austere city, situated in a not very fertile area and still semi-dissident. Sa'ada is the religious center of Zaidite Shi'ism, which marked Yemen in such a strange way; its mosque preserves the body of Yahya Ibn Hussein, the first Imam and founder of the dynasty to which the city seems to remain faithful. This explains why it has suffered civil war: although its earthen wall is intact and encloses cramped quarters around the recently rebuilt citadel, some of these quarters, especially in the south, are very much damaged and nearly razed to the ground. But the houses of unfired brick with walls narrowing toward the top have a handsome appearance. Sa'ada, situated in an area already extremely dry, must not count on agriculture for its future development, but rather on the region's iron resources and the glassmaking projected by the present Five Year Plan; it will have great need of it, if it is to keep its 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants.

The Miserable Villages of the Eastern Steppes

The steppes that form the transition between the eastern mountains and the Roub al-Khali desert are very sparsely populated. However, this was the center of ancient Yemen. Thanks to irrigation (the famous Marib dike was over 800 meters long) and particularly to the commerce of caravans (products from India, incense, etc.), important settlements rose up here at the time of the first millennium BC, and the road that ran along their length was called the "incense road." Celebrated cities attained a high degree of civilization.

Ma'in, whose name recalls that of the Mineans, the creators of the first kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is no longer anything but a modest oasis in the region, rich with springs, of Jawf, which awaits its development.

Kharibah, the site of ancient Sirwath, is scarcely more than a desert station.

Marib, the ancient and celebrated capital of the kingdom of Saba, suffered from the civil war; after a long and arduous journey, it rises from the desert like a ghost, having jurisdiction over only 3,000 inhabitants. It is the smallest provincial capital (Liwa) of Yemen.

Finally, the only village of some importance in this area of the eastern steppes is Beida. Its prosperity is due in part to the temporary emigration of its adult men to Aden. The present Five Year Plan provides for developing the copper mines located in the region.

Two Regional Capitals

Hodeida, Yemen's Modern Port

Hodeida is the second-largest city in Yemen (population 82,724 in 1975); it is a city without a past. It was just a fishing village when the Ottomans decided to establish Yemen's principal port there in the middle of the 19th century.

Actually its progress dates only from the creation of a modern port in 1961; this port was equipped by the Soviets when the Chinese built the road that connects it with Sana'a (226 km).

The port was built 4 km north of the city's primitive nucleus. It has two docks, 18 hectares in area and 7.65 meters deep, and is connected with the sea by a 5-km passage, 7.95 meters deep. This modest port is relatively well-equipped.

The city of Hodeida, which was founded rather recently, offers nothing of the traditional except for some old "Indian style" buildings. The buildings are concrete houses bordering wide avenues. The city is developing fairly rapidly, and the outskirts are also experiencing a certain wild urbanization in which the buildings bear witness to the stages of the immigrants' urban integration. First, simple huts made of branches, such as one sees in the villages of the Tihama, then a brick or stone wall marks off a courtyard in which stone buildings stand adjacent to the huts.

The hut will ultimately disappear; it is giving way to a group of barracks-like buildings, built to last and more or less luxurious.

Hodeida appears to be the economic capital of Yemen, because of its port, because of the import-export houses established there and because of its industrial activity. All told, Hodeida in 1972 had jurisdiction over approximately 200 industrial and handicraft institutions, bringing in 46 percent of the value of North Yemen's industrial production. The principal plants are oil mills, an important cigarette factory, repair workshops connected with the port, several textile handicraft workshops, two beverage plants. The Five Year Plan (1976-1981) provides for construction of a workshop for agricultural machine assembly and a spinning mill.

In 1973 the port received 520 vessels: 50,483 passengers (chiefly pilgrims from Mecca); 550,134 tons were embarked or debarked there (530,943 tons of imports and 19,191 tons of exports, or only less than 3.5 percent of the total). The development of the port of Hodeida has been quite rapid, since the movement in 1967 was only 78,881 tons, and 275,240 tons in 1970. Exports, still very weak, have nevertheless increased considerably, since in 1971 they amounted to just 1,665 tons, and 8,104 in 1972. The current Five Year Plan provides for deepening and expanding the port (600 meters of new piers, creation of a floating pier) and building silos.

Taiz, the Ancient Capital

Taiz, the capital of green Yemen, the center of Sunnite and republican Yemen, for a long time appeared to be a rival of Sana'a, but it now seems largely outdistanced (1975 population 81,000).

The city appeared in the 13th century, in the period of the Ayyoubides, when it replaced Zabid as the capital. It remained the capital until the 16th century, under the Rassoulides and Tahirides. In the 1950's the Imam Yahya made it his residence. The proximity of Aden enabled Taiz to benefit earlier from the modernizing influences of Saudi Arabia's large metropolis. For this reason it appears to be a more modern city than Sana'a.

The city sprawls in a kind of basin situated at 1,400 meters altitude, dominated to the south by the formidable mass of the Jebel Saber (Patience Mountain: 3,070 meters), a forward spur of which was used as a foundation for the city's citadel (al-Kaira). This Taiz basin is closed off to the south by two hills which are on their way to being urbanized (villas and hotels).

The old city, which has lost most of its ramparts, looks extremely dilapidated; many of the stone houses, of mediocre appearance, seem abandoned. The traditional markets are still established in the old medina between Bab al-Kebir and Bab al-Moussa. A modern city has risen along a broad avenue, constituting an east-west axis; it is characterized by modern, rather low (one or two floors) buildings without much character, built of stone or concrete. This city, infinitely less picturesque than Sana'a, seems more dynamic on the commercial level, with its lively streets, its well-stocked shops offering merchandise

that is often not to be found in Sana'a. Its industrial function still seems to be quite modest: Taiz has jurisdiction over just 145 industrial and handicraft establishments, which realize a little over 16 percent of Yemeni production (Hodeida, 46 percent and Sana'a, 21 percent); footwear manufacturing, a biscuit factory, brickyards are the basic ones. Modernization in the near future of the port of Moka and an improvement in relations with Aden (South Yemen) might give this city a certain impetus.

Sana'a*

Sana'a has now been pulled up to the rank of capital of Yemen; it is far outdistancing its former rival, Taiz, and with even more reason the ancient historical capitals now relegated to the rank of villages. However, it has serious competition on the economic level from Hodeida.

Sana'a's progress is explained first of all by a very favorable location in the center of the country. The site itself offers fewer advantages; Sana'a is spread out over the eastern rim of a high plain (2,200 to 2,500 meters), dominated by about 500 meters by the Jebel Nukum, crowned by a fortress. To tell the truth this fortress, which is already rather far from the city, could be used as an acropolis only with difficulty, and so offers no major interest; Sana'a was more protected by its walls and by a citadel (al-Qasr) built against the city's southeast wall on an early spur detached from the Jebel Nukum.

The city is crossed north to south by a stream that most of the time is dry, except episodically in summer during the rainy season. The plain and the city of Sana'a have the benefit of irrigation from wells and culverts, called madjal, in this area where because of the rainfall the dry crops (wheat, sorgo, barley) are risky. A series of large oasis-villages makes the Sana'a region a prosperous agricultural region.

Sana'a's past is less ancient and less prestigious than that of Marib, the former capital of the kingdom of Saba; it scarcely seems to be mentioned before the first century of our era, and even then hypothetically, for in antiquity the fundamental axis of the caravan trails passed farther to the west through the wealthy oasis-cities situated on the edge of the desert (Sirwah, Marib, Karnaou). Sana'a and the cities of the interior highlands were of only secondary importance; they were only promoted with the establishing of a second caravan route using the series of intramountain plains aligned north to south, of which Sana'a's plain occupies almost the center. Its role as capital does not go back before the 6th century BC, when after the Ethiopian and Persian invasions the ancient capitals on the edge of the desert were on the decline and the new population axis was established in the high intramountain plains of the center.

*See our article: J.-M. Prost-Tournier, "Sana'a, Presenting the Capital of Yemen," excerpt from the REVUE DE GEOGRAPHIE DE LYON, 1975, vol 1, No 4, pp 361-381.

Human Content and Activities

A Young Population, Growth due to Immigration

The 1975 census evaluated the population of Sana'a at 138,625. In 1939 Strothmann (in the "Encyclopedia of Islam") estimated it at 18,000 souls, 5,000 of them Jews. In 1962 the figures quoted are 55,000 persons and in 1971 81,000 residents (plus an undetermined number of semi-emigres).

Its population is very young (44.17 percent under 15 years of age) and marked by a clear preponderance of males (54 percent are men), chiefly shown in the age brackets of the active population, which is explained by a certain female over-mortality imputable to accidents of pregnancy, but especially by strong currents of immigration.

Thus the growth of Sana'a's population, estimated a 8.5 percent per year, is basically due to the influx of peasants who are victims of the rural exodus and to the polarization in its direction of the currents of migration. Already nearly a third (31.7 percent) of its population in the city is of foreign origin; immigrants come from all parts of Yemen. However, nearly two thirds are natives of the province of Sana'a itself (62.9 percent). Then come the immigrants from outside (7.2 percent). These are Yemenites who are natives of Aden or Djibouti, or even Ethiopia, who control most of the commercial activities. The next largest contingent of immigrants come from the rugged mountainous regions that mark the rim of the eastern highlands (the Serat).

A not yet Very Active City

The population of working age is evaluated at 49.96 percent of the total population. The really active population is only 29 percent of the total population, or 58.07 percent of the population of working age. The work force is thus quite diminished, the mass of people without work is significant.

Agriculture still plays an important role. Sana'a includes very many gardens within its walls, irrigated from wells operated by animals. On the other hand, the immediate outskirts of the city are surrounded by fields cultivated with the aid of rainfall or irrigated. So it is not surprising that 2,120 persons (7.96 percent of the active population) devote themselves to agriculture. As a matter of fact, these figures do not adequately express the role of agriculture, for a good part of the more or less financially independent citizens are landowners. The large oasis-villages around Sana'a, Rawdah, Haddah, Wadi Dahr, belong in large part to the townspeople and--this is typically oriental--they often go there to live in the summer, this summer migration transforming the villages into rural suburbs of Sana'a.

Industrialization is still embryonic. At the end of 1971 the principal industrial and craft establishments numbered 88 (those having more than five employees); they employed 2,725 persons out of a total of approximately 3,500 workers in this sector (about 13 percent of the active population). Despite the low

number of workers, Sana'a is nevertheless the second largest industrial center in Yemen, realizing 21 percent of the country's industrial worth. The largest firm is the plant for spinning and weaving cotton, built by the Chinese north of the city, in Sha'ub al-Charqi. It employs 1,438 persons, many of them women, and realizes over half of Sana'a's production worth. This plant is Yemen's largest. The other "industries" are mainly of the craft type (brickworks, building firms, manufacture of metal framework, doors and windows, mills). The most modern sectors are represented by several repair shops, workshops for manufacturing footwear, a printing plant and finally the electric plant.

Sana'a is an important commercial center for Yemen, but less important than the port of Hodeida, where most of the import-export houses are concentrated. However, where wholesale and retail trade are concerned Sana'a plays a primary role as distribution point for a large number of imported products (for all the highlands north of Yarim). On the other hand, the standard of living of the population being higher than that of the rest of the country (civil servants, foreigners, etc.), retail trade is intensified. In 1971 there were only three commercial banks and the number of modern shops scarcely exceeded several dozen; but hundreds of boutiques are gathered together in the traditional markets. Officially, 2,975 persons are working in trade (11.17 percent of the active population), but these figures do not express all of the city's commercial activity; many itinerant dealers, not counted in the census, move through the various quarters, and the markets in particular attract a great number of occasional temporary merchants, especially at market time, when impressive crowds of peasants gather (chiefly on Friday).

Finally, the services appear to be Sana'a's principal activity, since they employ over 19,000 persons, or 72.6 percent of the active population. Government services hold first place, with 9,831 persons, or 36.91 percent of the active population. "Communications" employs 817 persons (3.07 percent); this involves mainly taxi drivers and airport personnel.

Finally, 8,702 persons (32.67 percent of the active population) are classified under the very vague heading of "other services." This includes some few persons practising professions, hotel and restaurant employees and in particular the large number of domestics whose status and condition is more or less well-defined.


An Urbanism in Slow Evolution

Sana'a extends in an east-west direction. It may be divided into two fundamental parts: the intramural city and the extramural outlying districts.

The Extramural Neighborhoods

The districts lying outside the walls are recent extensions of the city. They are developing chiefly north and south in unorganized residential neighborhoods where little islands of construction are isolated from each other by military installations, vacant lots, gardens and fields. The outlying districts are not very densely built up, except for the one that extends south between the

MAP OF SANA'A



- Key:
- 1. Urban space—1972
 - 2. Traditional market
 - 3. Hospital
 - 4. President's house

- 5. Turkish city
- 6. Arab city
- 7. Al Hordi barracks
- 8. Cemetery

cemetery and the al-Hordi barracks, and in the northeast the popular Bab ash-Sha'ub quarter, where live many workers in the Chinese textile plant located a little farther north.

The most important residential expansion is to be seen to the north, on both sides of the road from the airport and from Rawdah; there, in an area that suffered destruction at the time of the siege of Sana'a in 1969, a neighborhood is being built, with comfortable homes occupied by foreigners (several embassies, including that of France) and by new officials of the Yemenite nation. Low houses (one or two levels) dominate, built of stone and brick, and in areas that have remained more rural (to the southwest), low houses of earth and adobe (agglomerated balls made up of a mixture of chopped straw and earth).

Westward expansion is less important (the Kuwait hospital), but some semi-industrial firms are lined up along the first km of the Hodeida road. There is no expansion worth pointing out to the east (cemeteries), beyond the walls of the citadel.

The City Within the Walls

It is subdivided into three parts. In the center, the modern business quarter, located at the junction of two traditional districts: to the east the old Arab city and to the west the Turkish city, at the western extremity of which is the former Jewish ghetto.

The Modern Business Center

Until the dawn of the 1962 revolution, Sana'a was composed of two twin cities forming a figure eight: the old Arab city on the east and the Turkish quarter on the west, to which the ghetto was fused. The junction of these two entities, between the two loops of the eight, was formed in the center by an official quarter, a hinge quarter surrounded by walls. In the center of this enclave rose the Palace of Gratitude (Dar al-Choukr)--the present museum--and the Dar al-Sa'ada (Palace of Good Fortune)--the present Tourism Office--and finally the Megam, the government palace, nothing of which now remains but the bulky tower with masonry at its foot, in which is found the al-Mottawakil Mosque. The whole of this official quarter was once designated precisely the Mottawakil. A vast cemetery extends southward, outside the walls.

This whole area since 1962 has been subject to significant changes. It still plays the role of hinge quarter and to a certain extent a dominating role, but the political role has yielded to the economic role; in fact, this is where modern trade is established, the banks, the import-export houses, a number of offices, etc.

Southwest of the Dar al-Choukr Palace a vast square was developed, the Meidan al-Tahrir (Liberation Square). On this square are the Post Office, the Development Bank (Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and a ministry. A broad avenue begins at the square, forming Sana'a's modern commercial axis.

This avenue, Abd al-Moghni, which has a north-south direction, ends north of the presidential palace and is extended by the airport-Rawdah road. To the south, it is established at the site of the vast Bab Khuzelma Cemetery, only a portion of which still exists. The avenue is bordered by modern shops, a cinema, offices and travel agencies, hotels (Hotel al-Makha). The buildings are concrete structures generally having two floors (five stories maximum), mediocre-looking, except for the ultra-modern headquarters of the Development Bank, which unfortunately disfigures the site of the Dar al-Choukr Palace.

The whole district of the modern center is still very incompletely built up. This business zone would tend to expand along the axis of Zubeiri Boulevard, which runs south along the city walls, chiefly in the eastern portion (travel agencies, Air France, modern shops).

The Old Intramural Quarters

The old Arab city is situated to the east. It has preserved a large part of its brick walls, which are reinforced by a great number of semi-circular towers. They are entirely preserved on the east and north sides [of the walls]; they still exist for some distance on the south side, but were almost entirely destroyed on the west side at the time of the Egyptian occupation (1962-1967), so the Avenue Abd-al-Moghni could be established.

Despite the presence of rather numerous gardens, generally located in over-deepened depressions corresponding to former areas where clay was extracted for building, the ancient Arab city is quite compact. It has the typical appearance of a "medine", with its maze of networked alleys, tortuous dead-end streets, dusty or transformed into puddles after the rains. The main market is north of Bab al-Yemen, in short, near the center of the old city, unless one includes the districts located west of the river (Seila). The market, like all Islamic bazaars, is arranged in specialized sections: blacksmiths' market, makers of "jambia" (Yemeni dagger), tinsmiths, jewelers, money-changers, grain market, etc. The markets are made up of small alleys scarcely two meters wide, bordered by tiny booths raised about 50 cm to 1 meter above the street, where sometimes the merchant has just enough room to sit tailor-fashion. They have just a single floor.

The density of the old city is high: 200 to 300 inhabitants per hectare in the quarters situated east of the Wadi (Seila), despite the presence of many--often huge--gardens that surely cover almost a tenth of the area. The developed quarters west of the river are less dense: 100 to 200 inhabitants per hectare. The gardens are more extensive. The lower density may bear witness to a slower integration into the old city.

This density does not mean there is crowding; in fact, the traditional buildings are often extremely high. Always having at least three stories, they sometimes reach eight stories; in short, the apartments are not overcrowded and the number of occupants per apartment is not at all excessive. These houses make Sana'a a city of fascinating beauty. The splendor of the outside is only equaled by the comfort of the interior, despite the age of the buildings (28.4 percent of the houses of Sana'a are over 50 years old; in the old city the proportion is naturally more significant).

The ground floor is generally constructed of beautiful chipped stone; the ornamentation is the result of various types of basalt and limestone. There are very few openings as wide as 3 or 4 meters; the door--massive, of sculpted wood with a metal knocker--and tiny windows often having the look of loopholes. The ground floor is often used for storage, granary and stable, as in rural houses.

The floors above are built of fired brick or blocks of earth (dibn) of large size (10x10x38 cm) or adobe (zabour). The walls are about 40 cm thick. The inside of the walls and ceiling are usually covered with gypsum plaster (goss). The floor is made of squares of brick (or recently of cement).

The windows become larger the higher one goes from one floor to the next. The top floor--of more restrained dimensions--is a living room, called the Mufredj, lighted by immense bays. The windows are divided into two parts: the lower part is a classic window, often provided with picturesque wooden shutters; it opens almost to the floor (which is logical, since the Yemeni live seated on cushions and rugs). Above this window is a kind of semi-circular tympanum, sometimes done as a Moorish or pointed arch. The tympanum is enclosed by alabaster tile or stained glass formed of multicolored pieces of glass arranged in an intertwined network of plaster of great delicacy, in infinitely varied and sometimes symbolic motifs. Often the window includes both stained glass and alabaster tile and may be finished on the outside by a grill ornamented with plaster tracery.

The first floor is often occupied by the kitchen and by lavatories (Beitel-Ma, literally water room). The upper floors are devoted to living and the top floor, rather private, is a reception room. These houses are perfectly adapted to the climate; they are remarkably isothermal. Although the day-to-day range in Sana'a is considerable, the temperature in the apartments remains remarkably constant night and day and throughout the year--between 18° and 22° C, whereas in winter the outdoor temperature often goes down to about 2° at night (absolute minimum, -4°), to rise during the day to 22°, and in summer temperature varies between 12° and 28°.

Obviously these several-storied houses in old Sana'a are fascinating. There is extreme contrast between the walls of earth or reddish brick girdled by bands of plaster which outline the floors, the wooden moucharabies [translation unknown] and especially the windows surrounded by plaster ornamentation of a dazzling whiteness, with their stained glass and their tracery in which arabesques play games of light and shadow. On the exterior walls, too, great plastered grooves; they are waste water evacuation outlets which are thus diverted outdoors to be lost below in a drain. Formerly, one of the city's small professions was that of emptying these ditches and collecting the waste and excrement for use in making fertilizer or fuel, and travelers described a clean city without any bad odors. In our time this function has ceased to be, and the alleys are unfortunately much less clean and give off more disagreeable smells.

The Ancient Turkish City: a Garden City Housing the Administrative Functions

In the Turkish period the Ottomans settled in the western part of the old Arab city, between it and the Jewish outskirts-village of Qa al-Yahoud. Great lovers of greenness and freshness, they established themselves in the midst of gardens irrigated from wells (Bir) which often gave their names to the various subquarters: Bir al-Baheimi, Bir ash-Shems and, in particular, Bir al-Azeb. Princes and notables followed their example, and Bir al-Azeb became an agreeable and elegant residential area, with tall houses isolated from each other among the gardens and orchards full of vines, apricot trees, almond trees, peach trees, pomegranate trees and plum trees.

But the ancient Turkish city has relatively moved on; a large cross street has pierced it, Gamal Abd al-Nasser Avenue, connecting Liberation Square (Meidan al-Tahrir) to the northeast with Solbi Square, situated to the southwest on the fringe of the former ghetto. This street has a tendency to be transformed into a dynamic axis bordered by modern shops, administrative offices, diplomatic centers (the embassies of Italy, Egypt, etc.). It divides this district--which still remains fundamentally residential--into two parts:

The north is dominated by one-or-two-story houses, built mostly of stone. These buildings are either comfortable residences or administrative headquarters, ministries or embassies. This area is not yet densely built up, and its density is a mere 100 to 200 inhabitants per hectare.

In the south, the Bir al-Baheimi area is even less densely occupied; gardens still occupy vast spaces and the sound of motor-driven pumps replaces, alas!, more and more "the silence punctuated by the creaking of the wells, of their pulleys and ropes" described by Claudie Fayein. The buildings there are pleased to wear a country aspect: houses of two or three levels, build of earthen blocks and adobe. The density is between 50 and 150 inhabitants per hectare.

The old Jewish ghetto, the Qa al-Yahoud, is located at the western extremity of the Turkish city. For a long time it was a truly isolated village, separated by almost 2 km from the old intramural city before being reconnected with it by the development of the Turkish quarter and being surrounded, with the Turkish quarter, by walls in the last century. Even in 1932 the ghetto was still completely isolated by a wall containing only a single gate. This wall has now been dismantled.

The Jewish presence there is now only a memory, for they were nearly all evacuated to Israel in 1949. Thus a very ancient community disappeared, because since the first millenium BC a Jewish village had been in evidence 10 km east of what is now Sana'a on the Jebel Barash, a village whose inhabitants could undoubtedly have been the ancestors of Sana'a's Jews. Until 1679 the Jewish quarter was situated within the present old Arab city, west of Wadi Seila, centered around the Bab Khuzeima road. Is it possible that the Arab city was smaller than the present city and that it stopped at the Wadi Seila and that consequently the Jewish quarter was already at that time a district lying outside the walls?

In 1679 the Jews were forced to emigrate to Mauza (Moka). The date of their return to Sana'a is not well known, but they were still not authorized to resettle in their former neighborhood, integrated into the Arab city. They had to settle nearly 2 km west in what became the new "Jewish quarter", Qa al-Yahoud.

What is interesting in this quarter is the special appearance of the houses. As a general rule they are less high than the Arab houses; they scarcely ever exceed two floors, for several decrees during the course of history have limited their height. In 1761 a decree limited the height to 14 coudees (9 meters); other decrees forbade Jews to have houses as high as those of the Muslims. Those restrictions may explain the different arrangement of the houses:

First, almost all of them have cellars, probably related to the desire to gain in depth of space what it was forbidden to have in height. It is likely that the cellars were built to store the wines and spirits which only Jews were allowed to make.

The multiplicity of interior levels perhaps is related to an artful arrangement to make up for the lack of space. Houses with two exterior stories may easily have three to four interior levels.

The existence of the "Hijrah". This courtyard surrounded on three sides by apartments and enclosed on the fourth side by a wall, is never located on the ground floor, but is nearly always at top-floor level. The significance of this perched atrium space is not yet completely understood; is it a heritage from the Mesopotamian houses of which the old Yemeni houses were the last manifestation? Was it made necessary by the congestion in a quarter where space was limited? Or was it a provision meant to satisfy the specific needs of the Jewish community (especially at the time of the "Festival of the Tabernacles")?

The quarter remained deserted for a long time after the departure of the Jews for Israel in 1949. It was gradually repopulated with poor emigres from the country, so that in our time it again appears to be the most densely occupied quarter in Sana'a, with between 300 and 400 inhabitants per hectare. The average occupation rate per room is 6.9 persons in some sectors, whereas the average for all of Sana'a is less than 2 persons. This proletarianization has brought with it the district's general deterioration. The Qa al-Yahoud has a small traditional market behind the single gate which formerly gave access to the ghetto.

General Appurtenances

The very satisfactory quality of Sana'a's living conditions should be pointed out. It has been seen that the traditional houses offer excellent weather conditioning; these dwellings are rarely overcrowded, except in the former Jewish quarter. Moreover, 73.3 percent of the houses are electrified. However, the water supply is less satisfactory, since it is still basically provided by wells which are more or less polluted. The absence of sewers poses

a serious sanitary problem. For the moment, 44.8 percent of the houses have no water. Nearly all houses have traditional toilets, but only 5.2 percent have the benefit of modern flushing toilets. The city, which used to be clean, is now quite filthy because of the discharging of excrement and waste water into the street. But the situation will improve with the anticipated construction of a sewer system and a modern water supply system.

The various appurtenances are still rather few in number: a few hospitals, generally built by foreign countries, a quite new stadium west of Abd al-Moghni Avenue, built on the site of the ancient Bab Khuzeima cemetery; some modern schools, three movie houses, an archeological and ethnographic museum; numerous mosques, mainly concentrated in the old Arab city.

Thus, Yemen's urbanization is still embryonic. Near a capital which is beginning to assert itself, the Hodeida port is being developed. A former capital, Taiz, brought back to the rank of regional center, is being strengthened. A series of small local centers still exists; they are sometimes vegetating, rarely developing. A single noteworthy exception is Bajil, a small industrial village that blooms in Hodeida's orbit.

Appendix

The Center for Study and Research on the Contemporary Middle East (CERMOC)
BP [professional certificate] 2691, Beirut, Lebanon

CERMOC, officially established on 9 December 1977 in the presence of the Lebanese minister of National Education and Fine Arts and the French ambassador in Lebanon, is an institution for research and documentation established in Beirut and endowed with a Franco-Lebanese operating council. This council, half French and half Lebanese, composed of important scientists and university people, controls the center's activities and the recruiting of scientific personnel.

CERMOC's Franco-Lebanese orientation also appears in the recruitment of research workers. The latter, called "guest scientists", are French and Lebanese, but eventually will also be natives of other countries of the Arab Middle East. The "guest scientists", normally recruited for two years, are third-stage doctors or the equivalent. They come from various disciplines (geography, economics, demography, sociology, contemporary history, etc.).

As its name indicates, the CERMOC is first and foremost a center for research on the contemporary Middle East. Its research must be both classic university research and "applied" research, responsive to Lebanon's current concerns.

The research conducted by the "guest scientists" is multidiscipline collective research written into a research program approved by the Operating Council. The first research theme bears the following title: "Socio-economic Changes and the Improvement of Space in the Middle East: Industrialization in Lebanon."

But the CERMOC is also a center for documentation on the contemporary Middle East. It has at its disposal a documentary fund, intended, as a priority, for the center's research workers, for the students and teachers from Lebanon's various universities, and more generally for any person desirous of consulting documentation on the contemporary Middle East.

The CERMOC is not a center for higher education, but it may serve as a link between Lebanese research workers and the French universities, and must contribute to training national research workers in the field of social sciences. Thus, seminars which every week bring together the center's research workers are open to any research worker interested in the research program. Moreover, within the framework of the CERMOC's activities, the organizing of colloquies and conferences is provided for.

Composition of the CERMOC's Operating Council

Since its first meeting on 9 and 10 December 1977 the Council has been comprised of eight de facto members and eight members coopted for a three-year term. So that the Council can meet, Lebanese university people who will be coopted later have been selected by the Lebanese minister of National Education. The French university people, who are specialists in the contemporary Middle East, have been chosen by the Cultural, Scientific and Technical Relations Board. The director of the CERMOC attends the Council's deliberations and is entitled to speak and vote.

On the Lebanese side, four de facto members: the minister of National Education, Dr Assaad Rizk, or his representative; the rector of the Lebanese University, Boutros Dib, or his representative; the rector of St. Joseph University, R.P. Ducruet or his representative; the secretary general of the CNRS [expansion unknown], Joseph Naffah, or his representative.

Four coopted members: Omar Addada, sociology professor at St. Joseph University; Robert Kasperian, professor of Statistics and Economic Sciences at St. Joseph University; Mohamad Ali Makki, professor of history at the Lebanese University; Toufic Touma, professor of Sociology at the Lebanese University.

On the French side, four de facto members: the minister of Universities or his representative; the chairman of the Cultural, Scientific and Technical Relations Board of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, or his representative; the scientific director of the CNRS for the Sciences of Man, E. Lisle, or his representative; the president of the Lyon 2 University, Maurice Bernadet, or his representative.

Four coopted members: Michel Chatelus, professor of Economic Sciences at the Grenoble University of the Social Sciences (Grenoble 2); Dominique Chevallier, professor of History at the Paris-Sorbonne University (Paris 4); Andre Raymong, professor of History at the University of Provence (Aix-Marseille 1); Paul Sanlaville, geographer, head of research at CNRS.

Scientific Personnel Assigned to the CERMOC

CERMOC Director: Andre Bourgey, geographer.

"Scientific Secretaries": Selim Nasr, sociologist; Francois Rivier, economist.

"Guest Scientists": Jean-Pierre Bertrand, geographer; Aida Boudjikianian, geographer; Youssef Courbage, demographer; Philippe Fargues, sociologist and demographer; Youssef Gemayel, demographer; Jean Hannoyer, sociologist; Boutros Labaki, historian and economist; Nadine Picaudou, historian; Michel Seurat, sociologist and historian.

Young research workers fulfilling their military service through the cooperation: Gerard Claisse, economist; Andre Shammass, economist.

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